29. The Goodness of God: Essence, Causation, and Perfection

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Article 1: Whether Goodness Belongs to God #

• Core Question: Can the property of being good be attributed to God?
• Key Insight: Goodness belongs to God especially and most of all, not incidentally
• The Argument from Perfection: Something is good insofar as it is desirable; each thing desires its own perfection; the form of an effect is a likeness of the agent; therefore, since God is the first efficient cause, He is desirable and possesses the aspect of the good
• Berquist’s Observation: Thomas chooses a “roundabout way” rather than the more direct argument that God is perfect (from Q.4), therefore good. This indirect approach is pedagogically intentional—it prepares for Article 2’s argument about God as sumum bonum

Article 2: Whether God is the Highest Good (sumum bonum) #

• The Composition Problem: The objection claims that “highest” adds something to “good,” which would create composition; but God is simple, so God cannot be the highest good
• Thomas’s Response: “Highest” adds only a relation of reason, not a real composition. Relations like “knowable” (relative to knowledge) can be predicated without adding real properties to the subject
• God as Equivocal Cause: Perfections flow from God not as a univocal cause (where agent and effect share genus/species) but as an equivocal cause, where perfection exists in the cause in a more excellent way than in the effect
• Example: Heat exists in the sun more excellently than in fire; both are hot, but not in the same manner
• Conclusion: God is the highest good simpliciter (without qualification), not merely in some genus or order

Article 3: Whether Being Good Through Essence is Unique to God #

• Threefold Perfection Framework:
  1. Essential perfection: the thing’s very existence/being (substantial form)
  2. Accidental perfection: added qualities necessary for perfect operation (e.g., wisdom, justice)
  3. Operational perfection: attainment of its end
• Created Things vs. God: Created things possess these three perfections, but only the first belongs to them essentially; the others are added. God alone possesses all three through His essence
• Why God Alone: Only in God is essence identical with existence. He has no accidents; what are accidents in creatures (being powerful, wise) are substances in God. He has nothing as an end outside Himself
• The Infinite Regress Problem: If a created thing were good through something added to its essence, that added goodness would itself need to be good. Either we proceed infinitely or reach something good through itself—which must be God
• Resolution: The added goodness in creatures is good not because it has goodness, but because by it something else becomes good

The Distinction: “One” vs. “Good” as Transcendentals #

• One denotes indivision only; belongs to each thing through its essence
• Good denotes perfection; does not necessarily belong to each thing through its essence alone
• Why the Difference: A simple thing (like a point) is undivided by its nature, hence one through essence. But a thing is not perfect through essence alone unless its essence is its existence

Article 4 Preview #

• The lecture breaks before Article 4, but sets it up: all things are good by the divine goodness—not by being formally identical with it, but by participated likeness

Key Arguments #

Argument 1: God’s Goodness from Causation (Article 1) #

Premises:

1. Each thing desires its own perfection
2. Every agent makes what is like itself (established by induction: dogs produce dogs, cats produce cats, numbers beget numbers when operated upon)
3. The form of the effect is a likeness of the agent
4. God is the first efficient cause of all things

Conclusion: God is desirable and possesses the aspect of good

Subtlety: This grounds goodness not in God’s perfection directly but in His role as cause. Why? Because it seamlessly connects to Article 2’s argument about why God must be the highest good

Argument 2: Why “Highest” Does Not Create Composition (Article 2) #

Objection Structure:

• “Highest” adds something to “good”
• Whatever adds something real is composed
• God is simple
• Therefore, God is not the highest good

Thomistic Response:

• “Highest” adds only a relation of reason (relatio rationis)
• Relations of reason are predicated of subjects without being really in them
• Analogy: “Knowable” is said relative to knowledge; knowledge is really related to knowable objects, but knowable objects are not really modified by being known
• Application to God: Other things really fall short of God; we express this by calling Him “highest.” This is a real relation on their part, a relation of reason on His

Argument 3: The Infinite Regress Argument (Article 3) #

Structure:

1. Suppose a created thing is good through an added goodness (not its essence)
2. That added goodness must itself be good
3. Either it is good through another goodness (infinite regress) or through itself
4. If through itself, it must be like God—self-good
5. Therefore, we must posit a first goodness that is good through itself: God

The Subtlety Thomas Addresses: The added goodness is not good because it possesses goodness, but because by it something else becomes good. The goodness is not itself subject to further goodness in the same way

Objection from the “Good as What All Desire” #

Problem: If good = what all desire, and not all know/desire God, then good ≠ God

Thomas’s Response:

• This definition should not be taken to mean each good is desired by all, but that whatever is desired has the aspect of good
• When Scripture says “no one is good except God alone,” this refers to what is good through its essence, a point clarified in Article 3
• In desiring their perfections, all things (knowingly or unknowingly) desire God, since all perfections are likenesses of divine being

Objection from Comparison #

Problem: Things in different genera cannot be compared. God is not in any genus; therefore God cannot be compared to other goods as “highest”

Thomas’s Response:

• God is not merely in a different genus but outside all genera as their principle
• As the equivocal cause of all genera, He is compared to them by excess (excessus), the way an equivocal cause exceeds its effects
• This kind of comparison (by excess of the cause) is legitimate even when genera differ

Important Definitions #

Goodness (bonum) #

• Primary Definition: What all desire; the desirable
• Secondary Definition: That which is perfect
• Relation to Being: Convertible with being; every being is good insofar as it is
• In God: Identical with His essence; not dependent on added perfections

Perfection (perfectio) #

• In Creatures: Threefold—essential being (substantial form), accidental additions (accidents enabling operation), attainment of end
• In God: All perfections exist essentially and simply in His substance
• Scholastic Definition: That which lacks nothing it ought to have

Highest Good (sumum bonum) #

• What It Is Not: A composition of “good” + “highest” in a real sense
• What It Is: God, considered as desirable and as the source of all perfections; “highest” expresses the transcendence of the cause over all effects
• Why Only God: Only God has all perfections through His essence and is ordered to nothing external as an end

Univocal vs. Equivocal Cause #

• Univocal Cause (causa univoca): Agent and effect are of the same genus or species; the effect is like the cause in the same manner (e.g., dog produces dog)
• Equivocal Cause (causa aequivoca): Agent and effect differ in kind; the perfection of the cause is not confined to the generic/specific nature of the effect; perfection exists more excellently in the cause (e.g., sun’s heat vs. fire’s heat; God’s knowledge vs. human knowledge)

Relation of Reason vs. Real Relation #

• Relation of Reason (relatio rationis): A relation that exists only in the mind’s consideration; one term is really related, the other is not (e.g., “knowable” in relation to knowledge)
• Real Relation (relatio realis): Both terms are genuinely modified or ordered toward each other in reality
• Example from Lecture: “I am taller than Tabitha” is a real relation (survival-relevant); “Socrates is the same as Socrates” is a relation of reason

Substantial Form vs. Accidental Form #

• Substantial Form (forma substantialis): That which makes a thing what it essentially is; constitutes the thing’s being
• Accidental Form: Added qualities that perfect a thing’s operations but are not essential to what it is

Immanent Act (actus) #

• That which makes something to be or to operate; distinct from passive ability (potentia passiva)
• Principle: Something gives insofar as it is in act; what is given is like the act that gives it

Examples & Illustrations #

The Cookie Press #

• The press gives its shape to the dough (which is able to receive it)
• Illustration: Act gives what is like itself; the dough receives a likeness of the form intrinsic to the press
• Application: Every agent produces effects that are likenesses of itself

Dogs, Cats, and Numbers #

• When two dogs mate, they produce a dog (not a cat)
• When two cats mate, they produce a cat (not an elephant)
• When two numbers are operated on (added, multiplied, etc.), the result is a number
• When two statements are syllogized, the conclusion is a statement
• Point: Inductive evidence that agents produce like effects

The Carpenter and the Chair #

• A human carpenter (a man) makes a chair, not another man
• Subtlety: The carpenter produces an effect unlike himself in nature, but like himself by art—he has the idea of chair in his mind, making it in a subtle way “like himself”
• Lesson: Even when univocal causation seems absent, the principle holds: agents make what is like their act

The Sun’s Heat vs. Fire’s Heat #

• Heat in the sun is vastly superior to heat in fire
• The sun, 93 million miles away, maintains tremendous heat output over a sphere of enormous radius
• Point: Equivocal causes produce perfections in a more excellent mode than univocal causes

Julius Caesar and the Mixing of Elements #

• Shakespeare (quoted by Berquist): “the elements were so mixed in him that nature might stand up and say to all the world this was a man”
• Reference to Mode (modus): If there is too much fire, one becomes choleric; too much water, phlegmatic. Caesar’s elements were well-balanced, making him excellently human
• Application: Mode, species, and order pertain to created goodness, not divine goodness

God’s Plan and Human Reason #

• Shakespeare’s exhortation to reason: “He that made us with such large discourse gave us not the capability and godlike reason to fust in us and use”
• Three Reasons to Use Reason:
  1. Compared to beasts: Without reason, we fall to love the beast
  2. Compared to humanity itself: Using reason is essential to our chief good; it alone makes us true to ourselves
  3. Compared to God: Reason is godlike; using it, we become like God; this is God’s plan for us
• Connection: God’s plan for us is to become like Him—a perfect example of participation in divine goodness

Socrates on Love (Plato’s Symposium) #

• Socrates argues: If you love something, you want it; if you want it, you lack it; therefore, if you love something, you lack it
• Applied to God: If God is love (1 Jn), and love implies lack, then God would lack goodness and beauty—absurd
• Resolution: The English word “want” is ambiguous. One can “want” something in two senses:
  1. Lack it (lack of what you want)
  2. Lack it and desire it (strict sense implying privation)
• In God: Only love and joy exist (not wanting, hoping, or longing), because God lacks nothing

The Definition of Good and Its Ambiguity #

• “The good is what all want”
• Can be taken in two ways:
  1. Good in general: Any good that is desired
  2. Good itself (God): Even sinners, in perverse ways, seek to be like God
• Scriptural Echo: “I will be like Him” (Satan’s rebellion)—seeking godlikeness in a perverse mode

Know Thyself and Philosophy #

• Ernst Cassirer’s Essay on Man makes “Know Thyself” the end of philosophy
• Berquist’s Critique: This is perverse. “Know Thyself” is the beginning of philosophy, not the end
• Why We Know Ourselves: In seeking self-knowledge, we seek (in a way) to be like God, because God knows Himself primarily and through that knows all else
• Comparison with God-Knowledge: When we know ourselves, we achieve only a proportional likeness to God; when we know God Himself, we know what God knows—a higher assimilation

Karl Marx and Self-Projection #

• Marx: In transforming the world, man sees himself in his own man-made world; the end is to see himself as the beginning and end of all he knows—as a kind of god
• Perversity: Yet even here, there is a seeking after godlikeness, however distorted

Feuerbach’s Infinite Mind #

• Feuerbach (quoted by Berquist): “The human mind is infinite; the infinite is God; therefore, the human mind is God”
• Equivocation: Uses “infinite” in two different senses—the infinity of unlimited learning capacity vs. the infinity of divine transcendence
• Historical Regression: Aristotle criticized Melissus for mixing two senses of “infinite” (temporal vs. spatial). The 19th century repeated this crude thinking

Melissus and the Infinite #

• Melissus: Being had no beginning; therefore no end; therefore infinite
• Aristotle’s Critique: Confuses two senses of “beginning/end”—temporal vs. spatial; from having no temporal generation/corruption, one cannot infer spatial infinity
• Lesson: Modern thinkers repeated this ancient confusion

Notable Quotes #

“To be good, especially, most of all belongs to God.” — Thomas Aquinas, cited by Berquist

“Each thing is good as it is desirable, but each thing desires its own perfection.” — Thomas’s foundational definition

“Every agent makes what is like itself.” — Principle of causation underlying God’s goodness

“God is the highest good simply and not only in some genus or order of things.” — Thomas’s resolution

“The good is in God as in a cause; whence to him it pertains to impose upon others mode, species, and order.” — Thomas on created vs. divine goodness

“It’s more divine to give than to receive, because God is pure act and not able to receive anything, but only to give.” — Berquist’s commentary on divine causation

“We know that he appears, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.” — 1 John, cited by Thomas and Berquist on participation

“God is not the first cause because ‘first’ adds something to cause. So the first cause is composed of cause and first. But cause is altogether simple, therefore…” — Berquist’s reductio of the composition objection

“The goodness of the created thing is not its very nature itself, but something added above that.” — Thomas on why creatures are not good through essence

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Does goodness belong to God? #

• Answer: Yes, most of all. Goodness is the aspect of desirability, and since God is the first efficient cause from which all perfections flow, He is desirable and possesses goodness eminently
• Key Point: The indirect argument through causation prepares the way for Article 2’s treatment of God as highest good

Q2: Is God the highest good (sumum bonum)? #

• Answer: Yes, simply and without qualification. “Highest” adds only a relation of reason (not real composition), and God as equivocal cause exceeds all effects in every perfection
• Implications: God is highest not merely in some genus but transcends all genera as their source

Q3: Is being good through essence (alone) unique to God? #

• Answer: Yes. Only God’s essence is His existence. Created things require accidental additions and attainment of end to be fully good; their goodness is added to their essence, not identical with it
• Why This Matters: If a creature were good through something added to its essence, infinite regress follows unless we posit God as foundational goodness

Q4: Are all things good by the divine goodness? [Set up but not fully answered] #

• Direction: Not by identity, but by participated likeness; God is their exemplar (external form), efficient cause (maker), and final cause (end)—but not their formal cause (intrinsic form)
• To be developed: The distinction between intrinsic participated goodness and extrinsic denomination

Pedagogical Structure #

Berquist emphasizes that Thomas’s apparent “roundabout” approach in Article 1 (arguing through causation rather than perfection) is pedagogically intentional. The argument that “every agent makes what is like itself” provides:

1. A foundation for understanding God’s causality
2. A stepping stone to Article 2’s argument that God must be the highest good (because as equivocal cause, all perfections exist in Him most excellently)
3. Continuity for the learner, avoiding fragmented arguments

This mirrors a pattern Berquist observes in Thomas’s Summa: often the first argument of an article builds directly on the conclusion of the previous article, creating a chain of continuous reasoning rather than isolated proofs.