52. Naming God: Divine Names and Their Signification

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem of Naming God #

• God is absolutely simple (from Question 3) yet Scripture and tradition attribute multiple names to Him
• How can we name God if we don’t know Him as He is in Himself, but only through creatures?
• The fundamental principle: “according as something is known by us, so it is able to be named by us”
• God’s essence exceeds what we understand and signify by vocal sounds, hence He is said to be above being named

Three Ways God is Known from Creatures #

1. By relation of causality (secundum habitudinem causalitatis) - God as first cause and beginning
2. By way of excellence (per modum excellentiae) - God surpasses all creatures in perfection
3. By way of negation (remotionis) - God is not composed, not bodily, not in time

All three modes provide the foundation for naming God from creatures.

Concrete vs. Abstract Names #

The Problem:

• All names in our language are either concrete (signifying something subsisting with a form: “healthy,” “good”) or abstract (signifying the form itself: “health,” “goodness”)
• This division arises because our reason’s object is composed of matter and form; concrete names signify that which has the form, abstract names signify the form by which something is such
• Applied to God: If we say “God is good” (concrete), we seem to imply composition; if we say “God is goodness” (abstract), we seem to say God is not Himself good but only that by which things are good

The Solution:

• Both names must be used together
• Concrete names (“good”) bring out God’s subsistence and perfection
• Abstract names (“goodness”) bring out His simplicity
• Both names fall short because our understanding does not know God as He is in this life
• In heaven, there will be one name for God, not a concrete and abstract name

The Distinction Between Etymology and Meaning #

• Etymology (a quo): The source from which a name derives
• Meaning (ad quod): That to which a name is imposed to signify
• Example: “Lapis” (stone) may derive from “laedere pedem” (hurting the foot), but it is imposed to signify a certain kind of body, not the hurting
• This distinction is crucial for understanding how names can be said of God: they derive from creatures but are imposed to signify the divine substance itself

Substantial vs. Other Ways of Naming #

Three modes of naming God:

1. Substantially/Affirmatively - Names like “good,” “wise,” “living” signify the divine substance itself, though imperfectly
2. Negatively - Names like “incorporeal,” “simple” signify what God is not
3. Relationally - Names like “creator,” “Lord” signify God’s relation to creatures

The central question: Do absolute, affirmative names truly signify the divine substance, or only negations and relations?

Two inadequate positions:

• Maimonides’ view: All affirmative names are primarily negative in function; “God is living” means only that God is not inanimate like lifeless things
• The relational view: All names signify only God’s causal relation to creatures; “God is good” means only “God is the cause of goodness in creatures”

Thomas’s response: Both positions are unsuitable for three reasons:

1. They cannot explain why some names are attributed to God more than others (God is also the cause of bodies, yet we don’t call God a body)
2. They would make all names said posteriority of God (as “healthy” is said secondarily of medicine that causes health), but Scripture and reason suggest names are said primarily of God
3. They contradict the intention of those speaking about God; when we say “God is living,” we mean more than merely that He differs from inanimate things

How Absolute Names Signify God’s Substance #

Key principle: Names of this sort signify the divine substance, but imperfectly, just as creatures imperfectly represent God.

The logic:

• God has beforehand in Himself all the perfections of creatures because He is simply and universally perfect
• Every creature, insofar as it has perfection, represents God as a principle altogether excelling
• Effects, though they fall short of the form of the agent, achieve some likeness to it
• Forms of lower bodies represent the power of the sun in some way (analogy)
• Therefore, the names that signify these perfections truly signify the divine substance, though inadequately

The direction of causality: God is not good because He causes goodness in creatures; rather, because He is good, He pours out His goodness upon things. The teacher does not know because he teaches; he teaches because he knows.

Key Arguments #

Objection 1: Dionysius on Divine Names (from authority) #

• Dionysius claims that God has neither a name nor opinion about Him
• Proverbs asks: “What is his name? And what is the name of his son, if you know it?”

Response: God is said not to have a name because His essence, nature, and substance exceed that which we understand about God and signify by vocal sounds. Names are deficient insofar as they express the divine essence as it is.

Objection 2: The Concrete-Abstract Dilemma (from reason) #

• All names are either concrete (implying composition) or abstract (implying incompleteness)
• Concrete names seem to say God is composed (contrary to His simplicity)
• Abstract names seem to say God is not Himself the perfection but only that by which things are perfected
• No name can be suitable to God

Response: Both concrete and abstract names belong to God because He is both simple and subsistent/perfect. Names signifying the concrete do not belong to God since He is simple. Names signifying the abstract do not belong to God because they do not signify something perfect that subsists. Yet we must use both names, each compensating for the defect of the other.

Objection 3: Grammatical Difficulties (from grammar) #

• Names signify substance with quality (God has no accidents)
• Verbs signify with time (God is not in time)
• Pronouns require sensible demonstration (God cannot be sensed)
• Therefore God cannot be named

Response: These are defects in the mode of signifying, not in what is signified. Verbs are said of God because eternity includes all time. Demonstrative pronouns are said of God according to what is understood, not what is sensed. Christ exemplifies this: “Before Abraham was, I am” shows how temporal verbs can be rightly used of God’s eternal being.

Important Definitions #

Onoma (ὄνομα, Greek) / Nomen (Latin) - Both words mean both “name” and “noun,” though English distinguishes these concepts. This creates interpretive challenges when reading ancient commentaries.

Suppositum - That which subsists; the complete existing thing (as distinguished from its form)

Concretely / Abstractly - Ways of signifying: concretely signifies something subsisting with a form (determined form in which something subsists); abstractly signifies the form or principle itself

Habitudo - Relation; bearing toward something (ad aliquid)

Secundum - According to; in the manner of

Substantive naming - When a name signifies the divine substance itself, though imperfectly

Perfect/Perfection - In creatures, that which lacks nothing of its kind. In God, that which lacks nothing whatsoever. God is perfect absolutely, not merely in kind.

Examples & Illustrations #

Concrete and Abstract Names #

• “Healthy” (concrete—the healthy thing) vs. “health” (abstract—that by which something is healthy)
• “Wise” (concrete—the wise being) vs. “wisdom” (abstract—that by which something is wise)
• Applied to God: “God is good” vs. “God is goodness”

The Problem of Composition #

• A man has wisdom, geometry, logic—these are things he possesses but is not
• God is whatever He has; God is goodness, not someone who has goodness
• If we say “God is goodness,” He seems simple but not good; if we say “God is good,” He seems composed

Grammatical and Linguistic Puzzles #

• “Before Abraham was, I am” - Christ uses a temporal verb with an eternal being, yet this is not improper because eternity includes all time
• The name “omnipotent” is attributed to God in Exodus, showing that God does have a name
• Greek commentators understand Aristotle’s Categories as being about names signifying things through thoughts

Pointing Out God #

• We can point to a dog, a cat, a cup—sensible demonstrations work for creatures
• We cannot sensibly point out God
• Yet we can demonstrate God to the intellect according to something understood
• Christ’s human nature provides a bridge: “That little girl who asked Brother Bernard, ‘Are you Jesus?’ because she could sense and point to him”
• The Eucharist also bridges this gap, making God sensibly present in a way ordinary things are not

God’s Simplicity and Perfection Together #

• In creatures: stones are simple but imperfect; animals are composite but more perfect
• A plant is more perfect than a stone, an animal more perfect than a plant
• Yet only in God do simplicity and perfection coincide
• Aristotle hints at this in the Poetics: tragedy produces the same effect as epic but with fewer words—the simpler form is also more perfect
• A square contains more area with less perimeter than other shapes—occasionally hints of the divine appear in created things

The Direction of Causation #

• A teacher is wise, so he can teach others to be wise (not vice versa)
• God is good, so goodness flows from Him to creatures (not: God is good because He causes goodness)
• An agent makes an effect like itself—God’s goodness in creatures is an imperfect sharing of His own goodness

The Sphere and Center Analogy (implied) #

• God at the center (simple point) is the beginning of many lines (diverse perfections in creatures)
• Knowledge proceeds from the many endpoints back to the one center
• Yet all lines truly proceed from and represent the center

Notable Quotes #

“According as something is known by us, so it is able to be named by us.”

“God is said not to have a name, or to be above being named, because His essence, His nature, His substance, right, is above that which we understand about God, right, and signify by some vocal sound.”

“Names of this sort signify the divine substance, right? But imperfectly, just as creatures, what, imperfectly represent them.”

“What we call goodness in creatures pre-exists in God, huh? And this in a higher way. Whence, from this it does not follow that God, that it belongs to God to be good, insofar as he causes goodness, right? But rather it’s the reverse, because he is good, right? He pours out his goodness upon things.”

“Because God is both simple and subsisting, we attribute to him both abstract names to signify his simplicity, right? And concrete names to signify his subsistence and his, what, perfection.”

Questions Addressed #

First Article: Can God Be Named? #

• Question: Does God have a name, or is He above being named?
• Answer: God can be named from creatures according to how we know Him through creatures (via causality, excellence, and negation), but not as He is in Himself. Names signify Him imperfectly because our knowledge is imperfect.

Second Article (Primary Focus): Are Names Said of God Substantially? #

• Question: Do absolute, affirmative names like “good” and “wise” signify God’s substance, or only His negations and relations?
• Answer: These names truly signify the divine substance itself, though imperfectly. They are not merely negative or relational. The reason is that creatures represent God through the perfections they possess, and God possesses all such perfections in a simple, universal way.

Connections to Prior Teaching #

Question 12 (How God is Known) - The foundation: we can only name God according to how we know Him

Question 3 (Simplicity of God) - Why concrete and abstract names are both necessary; God is without composition

Question 4 (Perfection of God) - God is simply and universally perfect; all creature perfections pre-exist in Him in a higher way

The principle of naming: Since God has all perfections of creatures (though in a simple, universal way), and every creature represents God through its perfections, the names derived from these perfections truly signify God’s substance, though inadequately.