56. Analogy, Relations, and the Predication of Names about God

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Univocal vs. Equivocal Predication and Analogy #

• The fundamental distinction between univocal (same meaning), equivocal (entirely different meanings), and analogical (diverse meanings with reference to something one) predication
• In predications about words, univocal uses are more fundamental than equivocal ones (e.g., ‘bat’ as baseball bat and flying rodent both presuppose univocal uses)
• In causation, the order reverses: equivocal causes (not operating univocally) precede univocal causes
• The humanity of Christ as univocal cause of our resurrection (Christ rises as we rise), while the divinity is an equivocal cause (God’s divine nature does not rise)
• Univocal agents cause particular instances of a species, while equivocal (non-univocal) agents are universal causes of the whole species
• An equivocal agent is not entirely equivocal but analogous—there is always some likeness between effect and maker
• All univocal predications ultimately reduce to something first that is not univocal but analogical (being, thing, something)
• Terms like ‘being’ are said equivocally by reason or analogy across all categories

The Problem of Likeness and Unlikeness #

• Objection: equivocity excludes likeness, so God and creatures cannot share names without univocity
• Response: The likeness of creature to God is imperfect; the Fourth Lateran Council teaches that one cannot know the likeness between creature and God without knowing a greater unlikeness
• Scripture says ‘who is like the Lord’ precisely because creatures are more unlike God than like Him, yet still possess some likeness
• The analogy preserves this double truth: real likeness but primarily characterized by unlikeness

The Measure Objection #

• Objection: God is the measure of things, and the measure must be homogeneous with what is measured
• Response: God is not a measure proportioned to creatures; it is not necessary that God and creatures be contained under one genus
• Nothing is said univocally of God and creatures; rather, all such names are said analogically

Order of Imposition vs. Order of Things #

• Critical distinction between two different orders:
  • Order of imposition (ordo impositionis): the order in which we come to know things and place names upon them—creatures first, because we know creatures before God
  • Order of things (ordo rerum): the metaphysical order in reality—God first, because all perfections flow from God into creatures
• Names are placed on creatures before God according to imposition because we learn ‘father,’ ‘good,’ ‘wise’ from creatures
• But according to the thing signified through the name, these names are said of God before creatures, for from God these perfections flow into creatures
• Example: ‘father’ is imposed first on human fathers (we encounter them first), but in the order of things, God is Father before any human father is father (as the source of all fatherhood)
• Scripture’s testimony: Ephesians 3:14-15 (‘from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named’) refers to the order of things, not the order of imposition
• The distinction explains how names can be ‘carried over’ (translata) from creatures to God while still maintaining that in reality God is the source
• Objection from Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Book 5): ’nature’ is first imposed on birth (external generation) but really more fundamental is the source within

Relations: The Three Types #

• Relations are real things in nature, not mere constructs of reason (though some are relations of reason only)

• First type—Relation of reason only on both sides: when the relation cannot exist between things except through the grasping of reason

  • Example: ‘Socrates is Socrates’ (the relation of identity to itself)—in reality Socrates is one, but the mind takes him twice (as subject and predicate)
  • All relations following on being and non-being, since non-being is nothing in reality
  • Genus and species relations, which depend on universality existing only in the mind
  • These are the subject matter of logic, which is exact and certain despite being about relations of reason

• Second type—Real relation on both sides: when there is a real having between two extremes according to something really belonging to both

  • Relations following quantity: if four is really double two, then two is really half of four (the quantity is in both extremes)
  • Examples: taller/shorter, large/small, double/half
  • Relations following action and passion: mover and moved, father and son (generation is a real act in both)
  • Based on something real in both extremes

• Third type—Real relation on one side, relation of reason on the other: when two extremes are not of one order

  • The difficult and subtle case that Aristotle discovered
  • Example: sense and knowledge (scientia) related to sensible and knowable things
    • My knowledge of a tree is really related to that tree (it is knowledge of that tree)
    • But the tree’s being known by me is not something real added to the tree
    • The relation is real on my side (my act of knowing) but only of reason on the tree’s side
    • Reason cannot think of one thing toward another without thinking of the reverse, but in this case the reverse relation is not real
  • Example: the column and the animal
    • The column is ’to the right’ of the animal
    • When the animal moves, the column becomes ’to the left’
    • No change occurs in the column itself; the relation exists only in the animal’s position
    • The relation is real on the animal’s side (really positioned relative to the column) but only of reason on the column’s side
  • Example: the measure and measured
    • The measure is really related to what it measures
    • But the thing measured is not really changed by being measured

Application to God and Creatures #

• God is outside the whole order of creatures, and creatures are ordered to God non-reciprocally (not mutually)
• It is manifest that creatures are really referred to God (they really depend on Him, really know Him, really love Him, really are His creatures)
• But in God there is no real relation to creatures, only a relation of reason
• When we say God is ‘Lord,’ this is true because creatures really belong to God; it does not require something real added to God
• The relation of ‘Lord’ comes into being in time (when creatures are created and begin to exist), but God remains unchanged
• Change occurs in the creature (coming into existence), not in God
• This parallels the column example: the creature comes into existence (like the animal moving into position), and thus becomes related to God, but God does not acquire any new reality
• God’s knowing and loving creatures from eternity does not contradict that His being Lord and Creator is said of Him in time, because knowing and loving are imminent operations (remaining in the agent), while creating has an external product

Key Arguments #

The Problem of Equivocal Causation #

• Objection (implicit): If equivocal causes must precede univocal ones, and God is the first cause, then God must be an equivocal cause, which seems to contradict proper predication
• Response: God is indeed not a univocal cause (He does not share the nature of what He creates), but He is not merely equivocal—He is an analogous cause. There is always some likeness between God and His effects, which grounds the propriety of analogical predication.

The Reduction of Equivocation #

• Argument: All equivocations reduce to univocations (the equivocal use of ‘bat’ presupposes univocal uses within each meaning)
• Extended: Yet the most universal terms (being, thing, something) are said analogically of all things, showing that even at the most fundamental level, predication is not univocal but analogical

The Counterintuitive Order of Names #

• Apparent contradiction: Ephesians 3:14-15 says all fatherhood is named from God the Father, yet we encounter human fathers first and learn the name ‘father’ from them
• Resolution: The distinction between order of imposition and order of things explains how both can be true without contradiction

The Logical Problem of Relations in God #

• Objection: If relation is ‘something in God,’ then God would be affected or changed by His relation to creatures (since relations involve a real having in the relata)
• Alternative objection: If relation to creatures is not in God at all, then God is not really Lord (since to be Lord is to have the relation of domination)
• Resolution: God has a real relation to creatures according to reason only (not a real thing in God), yet it is truly said that God is Lord because the relation is real on the creature’s side. The creature really has the relation to God; God’s reality is not altered by this.

Important Definitions #

Univocal vs. Analogical Predication #

• Univocal: said of multiple things by the same meaning (e.g., ‘animal’ said of dog and horse)
• Equivocal: said of multiple things by entirely different meanings (e.g., ‘bank’ as financial institution and riverbank)
• Analogical (analogy by proportion): said of multiple things through diverse meanings but with reference to something one that grounds the diversity. Each analogue bears a different relationship to what is common but all are ordered to it.

Secundum rem vs. secundum rationem #

• Secundum rem: according to reality, in the thing itself
• Secundum rationem: according to reason, in the mind only
• Applied to God’s relation to creatures: the relation exists really (secundum rem) on the creature’s side but only according to reason (secundum rationem) on God’s side

Ordo impositionis and ordo rerum #

• Ordo impositionis (order of imposition): the historical and epistemological order in which we come to know things and assign names to them
• Ordo rerum (order of things): the metaphysical order in reality, the order of causality and fundamental reality

Relatio secundum esse vs. secundum dici #

• Relatio secundum esse: relations whose very nature is to be toward something else (relatio is their substance), such as father-son, double-half
• Relatio secundum dici: things whose primary nature is in another category but which have a relation following upon them, such as knowledge (which is a quality) implying relation to the known

Translatio (carried over) #

• Names that are transferred from creatures to God—the name is imposed primarily on creatures (where we first encounter the meaning) but is carried over to God
• Example: lion said of God signifies nothing other than that God has Himself strongly in His works as a lion in his

Examples & Illustrations #

The Baseball Bat and Flying Rodent #

• The word ‘bat’ is equivocal (meaning a wooden stick or a flying animal)
• Yet each equivocal meaning presupposes univocal uses: all baseball bats are univocally ‘bat’ with each other, and all flying rodents are univocally ‘bat’ with each other
• This shows that equivocation, when analyzed, reduces to univocation at some level

The Healthy #

• ‘Healthy’ is said analogically of:
  • The animal itself (having health intrinsically)
  • Medicine (causing health)
  • Urine (signifying health)
• Each has a different ratio (meaning) relative to health, yet all are ordered to one thing: the health of the animal
• This is the model for how names apply to God and creatures analogically

Christ’s Resurrection as Univocal and Equivocal Causation #

• The humanity of Christ is a univocal cause of our resurrection: Christ rises in His human nature as we rise in ours; the mode of causation is the same
• The divinity of Christ is an equivocal cause: God’s divine nature does not rise (God does not die or undergo change), yet the divine nature is the first cause enabling the human nature to rise
• This shows how univocal and equivocal causation can both be true of the same event

The Father and Human Fathers #

• ‘Father’ is imposed first on human fathers (we encounter them first and learn the name from them)
• Yet according to the order of things, God is Father before any human father, for God is the source of all fatherhood
• A person who had a bad human father may have difficulty relating to God as Father; conversely, one who had a good father finds it sweet to think of God as Father
• The name is placed on creatures first (order of imposition) but belongs to God first in reality (order of things)

The Column to the Right of the Animal #

• A column standing to the right of an animal has a real relation on the animal’s side (the animal is really positioned relative to it)
• On the column’s side, being ’to the right’ is not something real in the column but only of reason
• When the animal moves, the column becomes ’to the left’—no change in the column, only in the animal’s position
• Applied to God: when a creature comes into existence, it becomes related to God as His creature; this is a real change in the creature but no real change in God

The Tree Known by Me #

• My knowledge of a particular tree is really related to that tree (it is knowledge of that tree)
• But the tree’s being known by me is not something real added to the tree
• If I never existed, the tree would still be what it is (real relations follow on what is really in the thing)
• The relation is real on my side (my knowing is a real act) but only of reason on the tree’s side (being known by me adds nothing real to the tree)

The Family Cat (Tabitha) #

• Berquist illustrates real relations with his experience with his cat
• Because he was much larger than the cat, his relation to her was entirely different than if he had been toy-sized
• Being larger or smaller is a real relation based on actual quantity in both parties
• If the roles were reversed, he would have been treated entirely differently

Nature’s Double Meaning (Aristotle) #

• In Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Book 5), ’nature’ (physis) is first imposed on birth (external generation)
• But really, the source of birth within is more fundamental
• This shows that the order of imposition can be reversed from the order of things, as with God and creatures

Notable Quotes #

“In actions, the agent that is not univocal, that’s equivocal in other words, of necessity precedes the univocal agent. So just the reverse, right?” — Duane Berquist, showing how causation reverses the order found in predication

“Just as in predications, all univocal things are reduced to something first. Not univocal, but what? Analogical.” — Berquist, on how even the most universal terms are analogical

“You can never know the likeness between the creature and God without at the same time a greater, what? Unlikeness.” — Fourth Lateran Council, cited by Berquist, on the asymmetry of analogy

“The goodness, whatever there is in the creature, is derived from goodness of God, right? So the order in things is just to reverse, right? Goodness in things is found in God before it’s found in the creature.” — Berquist, explaining the order of things vs. order of imposition

“God is outside the whole order of the creature, and all creatures are ordered to him non-reciprocally. It is manifest that creatures are really referred to God himself, but in God there is not a real relation to creatures, but according to reason only.” — Thomas Aquinas, on the asymmetrical nature of God’s relation to creatures

Questions Addressed #

How are univocal and equivocal predication related? #

• Univocal predications are more fundamental in predication about words, but in causation, equivocal (non-univocal) causes precede univocal ones. The distinction between word and cause shows why the terminology applies analogously to both domains.

Can names be said of God and creatures if they are not univocal? #

• Yes, they can be said analogically. Analogy provides a middle way between pure equivocation (entirely different meanings) and univocation (identical meanings). Names are said of God and creatures with diverse meanings but ordered reference to God as source and measure.

Does the likeness between creatures and God justify using the same names? #

• Yes, but with the crucial caveat that the likeness is far outweighed by unlikeness. One cannot know the similarity without simultaneously knowing a greater dissimilarity. This asymmetry is captured in analogical predication.

Why can God be said to be ‘Lord’ in time if God is eternal and unchangeable? #

• God’s relation to creatures is real on the creature’s side (the creature really depends on and belongs to God) but only a relation of reason on God’s side (no new reality is added to God). The temporal change occurs in the creature (coming into existence), not in God. God remains eternally unchanged while creatures come to exist as really related to Him.

How can we place the name ‘father’ on human fathers if God is Father first? #

• By distinguishing the order of imposition from the order of things. We impose the name ‘father’ on human fathers first because we know them first. But in the order of reality, God is Father before any human father, for all fatherhood derives from God. Both statements are true when properly distinguished.

What is the relationship between relations of reason and relations of reality? #

• Some relations are purely of reason on both sides (like identity or relations involving non-being). Some are real on both sides (like father and son, or double and half). The most difficult case is when a relation is real on one side but only of reason on the other—this occurs when the extremes are not of one order, as with knowledge and the known, or God and creatures.

Conceptual Connections #

To Aristotle #

• The discussion of univocation, equivocation, and their reduction derives from Metaphysics Book 4
• The analysis of relations (especially the three types) comes from Aristotle’s Categories
• The example of ‘healthy’ as an analogical predicate is from Metaphysics Book 4
• The distinction between relations secundum esse and secundum dici follows Aristotle’s Categories
• The observation about ’nature’ having a double order (imposition vs. reality) appears in Metaphysics Book 5

To Thomas Aquinas #

• The entire framework of using analogy to solve the problem of predication about God comes from Aquinas
• The distinction between order of imposition and order of things is Aquinas’s solution to apparent contradictions between Scripture and philosophy
• The application of Aristotle’s three types of relations to God is Aquinas’s theological extension

To Scripture #

• Ephesians 3:14-15 (‘from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named’) is the key scriptural text that motivates the entire discussion
• The application resolves an apparent tension with the principle that we name God from creatures (Dionysius, Divine Names)

To Earlier Material #

• Builds on the analysis of how we know God from creatures and effects
• Prepares for understanding how metaphorical names differ from proper names in theology
• Foundational for understanding the later treatment of the Incarnation and Christ’s nature