57. The Name 'God' and the Divine Nature

Summary

This lecture examines whether the name ‘God’ (Deus) signifies the divine nature or merely divine operations, and whether this name is communicable to creatures. Berquist explores the distinction between the etymology of a name (the source from which it derives) and its meaning (what it is imposed to signify), arguing that while ‘God’ is derived from divine operations, it is imposed to signify the divine nature itself. The lecture also addresses how the divine nature can be communicated to creatures through participation while remaining incommunicable in its primary meaning.

Listen to Lecture

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Etymology vs. Meaning of Names #

The distinction between id a quo nomen imponitur (that from which a name is taken) and id ad quod nomen imponitur (that to which the name is imposed)
A name may derive from one thing but be imposed to signify something else entirely
Example: The name “stone” (lapis) is possibly derived from “to hurt the foot” (laedere pedem), but is imposed to signify the substance of stone, not the action
We know the substance of things through their properties and operations, but the name signifies the substance itself, not the operations

The Name “God” as Signifying Divine Nature #

Etymology: Damascene offers three etymologies:

From thein (to run) - God’s universal providence over all things
From aiein (to burn) - God as a consuming fire burning away evil
From athiesthai (to consider) - God’s perfect consideration of all things

All three etymologies pertain to divine operations, not the divine nature itself.

Meaning: Despite deriving from operations, the name “God” is imposed to signify the divine nature itself. This follows the pattern of knowing things through their effects while naming the underlying substance.

How We Know and Name God #

Since we cannot know God’s nature directly in itself (secundum se), we know it:

By way of eminence (via eminentiae): God as the supreme good (summum bonum)
By way of causality (via causalitatis): God as the first cause
By way of negation (via negationis): God as bodiless, uncomposed, etc.

Though the name “God” is taken from operations (providence), it signifies:

That which exists above all other things (eminence)
The beginning of all things (causality)
That which is removed from all things (negation)

The Communicability of the Name “God” #

Primary distinction: Names can be communicable in two ways:

Properly (proprie): When the whole meaning of the name is communicable to many (e.g., “man” said of all humans)
By likeness (per similitudinem): When a name is applied metaphorically to things that share some quality (e.g., “lion” applied to a brave person)

The divine nature is incommunicable secundum rem (in reality) because:

The divine nature cannot be multiplied; it remains one even in the Trinity
God is not a universal nature that can be instantiated in multiple supposita

The divine nature is communicable secundum opinionem (according to opinion) when creatures are called “gods”:

Not properly, but by participation in divine likeness
This follows from texts like Psalm 81: “I have said you are gods”
Such participation requires a “very distant likeness” according to the Fourth Lateran Council

The Distinction Between Appellativum and Proprium #

“God” is a nomen appellativum (common name/appellation), not a proper name
It has a plural form: “gods” (Psalm 81)
It signifies the divine nature as possessing it, not the individual divine suppositum
Unlike the Tetragrammaton (the four-letter divine name of the Hebrews), which signifies God as this individual (suppositum) and is therefore completely incommunicable

Ambrose’s Doctrine #

Ambrose claims that “God” is a nomen naturae (name of nature). Thomas affirms this but clarifies that:

The name is taken from divine operations (etymologically)
But it is imposed to signify the divine nature (meaningfully)
This distinction reconciles the objection that if the name signified only operations, it would be as communicable as other names derived from operations (like “good” or “wise”)

Names from Operations vs. the Name “God” #

Names like “good,” “wise,” etc.:

Are imposed from perfections that proceed from God into creatures
Signify the perfections themselves absolutely
Are communicable to both God and creatures
Can be further restricted by addition (e.g., “highest good” applies only to God)

The name “God”:

Is imposed from the operation proper to God (universal providence)
Is imposed to signify the divine nature itself, not the operation
Is incommunicable secundum rem but communicable secundum opinionem (by participation)

Key Arguments #

Article 8: Whether “God” is a Name of Nature #

Objection: Damascene’s etymologies all pertain to operations (running, burning, considering), so “God” should signify operation, not nature.

Response:

We know things through their operations and effects
Yet we name the substance itself, not the operations
Just as “stone” derives from hurting the foot but signifies the substance of stone
Similarly, “God” derives from divine operations but is imposed to signify the divine nature

Second Objection: How can we name what we don’t know? God’s nature is unknown to us.

Response:

We know the substance of things through their properties and effects
This knowledge is sufficient to name and signify the substance itself
The name signifies the divine nature as known through the three ways: eminence, causality, and negation

Article 9: Whether “God” is Communicable #

Objection 1 (from 2 Peter 1:4): We are made partakers of the divine nature; therefore the name “God” should be communicable.

Response: The divine nature is communicable only through participation, not properly. The likeness is very distant.

Objection 2: The divine nature is communicable; therefore the name signifying it should be communicable.

Response: No single form can be instantiated in multiple supposita. The divine nature is unique and cannot be multiplied. The name is incommunicable secundum rem.

Objection 3: Names derived from operations (like “good” and “wise”) are communicable; so should “God” be.

Response:

“Good” and “wise” signify the perfections themselves absolutely, not the divine nature
The name “God” is imposed precisely to signify the divine nature, making it incommunicable secundum rem
However, creatures can be called “gods” by participation in the divine likeness

Important Definitions #

Etymology (id a quo nomen imponitur) #

That from which a name is taken or derived; the source of the name’s origin.

Meaning/Signification (id ad quod nomen imponitur) #

That which the name is imposed to signify; what the name means.

Nomen Appellativum #

A common name or appellation that can be said of many things (as opposed to a proper name which is unique to one thing).

Nomen Naturae #

A name that signifies the nature or essence of a thing.

Summum Bonum #

The highest good; that which is good in an eminent way, applicable only to God.

Suppositum #

An individual substance; in the context of God, the divine individual (suppositum) as distinct from the divine nature.

Secundum Rem #

According to reality; in actual existence.

Secundum Opinionem #

According to opinion; according to what is believed or held to be true.

Tetragrammaton #

The four-letter Hebrew divine name, considered completely incommunicable because it signifies God as this individual (suppositum), not as possessing the divine nature.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Name “Stone” #

Etymology: Possibly from laedere pedem (to hurt the foot)
Meaning: The substance of stone
Lesson: A name derived from an action signifies the substance capable of that action, not the action itself

Divine Names from Operations #

Name: “Creator” or “Lord”
Etymology: God’s causative action toward creatures
Meaning: The divine nature as exercising dominion and causality
Lesson: Similar to “stone,” these names derive from divine operations but signify the divine nature

Creatures Called “Gods” #

Scripture: Psalm 81: “I have said you are gods”
Mode: By participation in the divine likeness, not properly
Restriction: This communicability is secundum opinionem (by opinion/participation), not secundum rem (in reality)
Likeness: Fourth Lateran Council teaches that the likeness of creature to God is always accompanied by a greater unlikeness

The Tetragrammaton #

Nature: The four-letter Hebrew divine name (YHWH)
Signification: Designates God as this individual (suppositum), not as possessing the divine nature
Communicability: Completely incommunicable both in reality and in understanding
Contrast: Unlike “God” which is somewhat communicable by participation, the Tetragrammaton cannot be applied to anything else

Notable Quotes #

“For just as the substance of lapidus [stone], we denominate from some action of it… nevertheless, this name is not placed upon something to signify the action, but the substance of the stone.”

“From these [operations], we are able to name them… this name, God is a name of operation as regards that from which it is placed upon something, to signify something. Because it is placed upon something, this name… is imposed to signify the divine nature.”

“The divine nature is not communicable properly, but only according to a partaking of likeness.”

“If there were some name imposed to signifying God, not on the part of his nature, but on the part of the suppositum, right? According as he’s considered as a this something… That name would be in every, in all ways, incommunicable, as is perhaps this word, tetragrammaton.”

Questions Addressed #

How can the name “God” signify the divine nature when it is derived from divine operations? #

Resolution: We come to know the substance of things through their operations and effects. A name can be taken from (derived from) one thing while being imposed to signify something else. Just as “stone” is derived from hurting the foot but signifies the substance of stone, so “God” is derived from divine operations (providence, burning, considering) but is imposed to signify the divine nature itself. The operations reveal to us what God is, enabling us to name His essence.

Since we don’t directly know God’s nature, how can we name it? #

Resolution: We know the divine nature indirectly through three ways: by eminence (God as supremely perfect), by causality (God as first cause), and by negation (God without bodily composition). The name “God” is imposed to signify the divine nature as known in these three ways through His effects.

Can creatures truly be called “gods” if the divine nature is incommunicable? #

Resolution: Creatures can be called “gods” by participation in the divine likeness, not properly. The divine nature is incommunicable secundum rem (in reality)—no creature can possess it or instantiate it. However, it is communicable secundum opinionem (according to opinion/participation)—creatures can share in a very distant likeness of the divine perfections, and thus be called “gods” in a qualified sense, as taught in Psalm 81.

Why is “God” a common name (appellativum) while the Tetragrammaton is a proper name? #

Resolution: The name “God” signifies the divine nature as possessed by its subject, and is therefore an appellative or common name—creatures can be called “gods” by participation. The Tetragrammaton signifies God as this individual (suppositum), the unique divine subject, and is therefore a proper name completely incommunicable to any other being.