59. The Divine Names: 'Who Is' as God's Proper Name

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Article 11: ‘Who Is’ as God’s Most Proper Name #

The Question: Whether the name ‘who is’ (qui est) is more properly the name of God than the name ‘God’

Three Objections Against the Article:

1. The name ‘God’ is incommunicable, but ‘who is’ is not; therefore ‘God’ should be more proper
2. According to Dionysius, the name ‘good’ is more proper because it manifests all divine processions and beginnings
3. All divine names imply relation to creatures (since God is known through creatures), but ‘who is’ implies no such relation; therefore it is not most proper

Scriptural Authority: Exodus 3—when Moses asks God’s name, the Lord responds ‘I am, who am’ (ego sum qui sum), establishing this name as divinely revealed.

Thomas’s Resolution: Three Reasons Why ‘Who Is’ Is Most Proper #

1. On Account of Its Meaning

• The name ‘who is’ does not signify a form but being itself (ipsum esse)
• Since God’s being (esse) is His very essence and substance—which belongs to nothing else—this name most properly names God
• Each thing is denominated from its form; the unique aspect of the divine form is that it IS existence itself

2. On Account of Its Universality

• All other divine names are either less common OR, if convertible with being, add something above it by reason
• Example: ‘one’ is convertible with being but adds “undivided being” by reason; ‘good’ means “desirable being”
• When names add something, they inform and determine being
• Our understanding cannot know God’s essence in this life as it is in itself
• Therefore, names that are less determined and more common are said of God more properly by us
• God is infinite; therefore the infinite and undetermined name (pelagos—ocean—of divine substance) is most fitting

3. On Account of Its Consignification

• The name signifies being in the present tense (present indicative)
• This most properly belongs to God, whose being knows no past or future
• Augustine teaches this in the fifth book of the Trinity
• Example: Christ says “Before Abraham was, I am” (not “I was”)

The Distinction Between That From Which a Name Is Taken vs. That to Which It Is Imposed #

Thomas makes a subtle distinction in reply to the first objection:

• As regards that from which the name is taken (id ex quo nomen sumitur): ‘Who is’ is more proper to God because it is taken from being itself (esse), and we name things from their form/substance. Only God’s substance is being.

• As regards that to which the name is imposed (id cui nomen imponitur—the thing to which the name refers): The name ‘God’ is more proper because it is imposed to signify the divine nature. Even more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the incommunicable divine substance as singular.

Philosophical Context: This distinction reflects the earlier distinction about whether ‘God’ signifies the divine substance or operation, showing how the same reality can be considered from different perspectives.

Article 12: Whether Affirmative Statements Can Be Formed About God #

The Question: Can affirmative propositions (such as “God is good” or “God is omnipotent”) be truly formed about God?

Objections:

1. Dionysius says negations about God are true but affirmations “don’t fit together” (incompacta sunt)
2. Boethius: A simple form cannot be a subject; God is a simple form; therefore no affirmative proposition can have God as subject
3. Every understanding that understands a thing to be other than it is is false; God is without composition; affirmative understanding understands something composed; therefore affirmative propositions about God are false

The Third Objection and the Central Question of Philosophy: This objection confuses the way we know with the way things are. The fundamental philosophical question is: “Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are?” Aristotle says no; Plato seems to say yes.

Boethius’s Example: In the Consolation of Philosophy, when discussing divine knowledge of temporal things, Boethius must abandon Plato and follow Aristotle, recognizing that God’s eternal knowledge of temporal things is not false even though the mode of knowing differs from the mode of being.

Thomas’s Resolution: The Principle of Predication #

In every true affirmative proposition, the predicate and subject must:

• Signify the same thing in reality (secundum rem)
• Differ in definition or reason (secundum rationem)

Examples in creatures:

• “Man is white”: same subject (man), different definitions (man vs. white)
• “Man is an animal”: same individual substance with different natures (sensible and rational)
• The predicate holds itself formally; the subject materially

Applied to God:

• God in Himself is altogether one and simple
• Our understanding, however, knows Him through diverse thoughts (diversae conceptiones)
• We cannot see Him as He is in Himself
• Yet we understand that all these diverse thoughts correspond to one and the same thing
• The plurality (by reason) of subject and predicate represents this multiplicity of our understanding
• The composition in the statement represents unity in reality

The Key Principle: The multiplicity is in the mode of our knowing, not in God Himself. Therefore, our affirmative propositions are not false. We know a simple thing in a composed way, just as God knows composed things in a simple and unified way—the reverse holds true, but neither way of knowing falsifies the truth.

Reply to the Third Objection: Two Senses of “Understanding a Thing Otherwise” #

The statement “understanding a thing otherwise than it is is false” can mean:

1. On the part of the thing understood: This is true—if our understanding says God is composed when He is simple, it is false. But our affirmative statements do NOT say this; we explicitly state “God is simple.”

2. On the part of the one understanding: The statement is false (i.e., the principle does not apply). The way of understanding differs from the way of being even in things more known to us.

Example: Our immaterial understanding knows material things in an immaterial way. This does not mean we understand them to be immaterial; rather, we have an immaterial mode of understanding material things. Similarly, modern physics knows matter mathematically, yet mathematics contains no matter.

Key Arguments #

The Infinite Ocean (Pelagos) Metaphor #

Damascene quotes suggest that the name ‘who is’ comprehends as a pelagos (ἡ πελάγος—ocean; from Greek) the infinite and undetermined ocean of divine substance. This metaphor captures:

• The vastness and endlessness of God’s being
• The inadequacy of determinate names
• God’s absolute infinitude, which was established as one of the five divine attributes (simple, perfect, infinite, unchangeable, one)

The Connection to Divine Infinity #

Berquist notes that to appreciate this name ‘who is,’ one must already know that God is infinite. We cannot properly use this name without understanding God’s infinitude. The illustration from Saint Thérèse of Lisieux seeing the ocean for the first time and being impressed by its endless dimensions parallels our intellectual apprehension of God’s infinite being.

The Choice Between General and Particular Knowledge #

Berquist reflects on the academic choice between knowing all things in general versus knowing the best things in particular, or knowing lesser things in detail. The science of being as being (metaphysics) both knows things in general AND comes to know the best thing—God. Meanwhile, the entomologist knows lesser things in detail. This hierarchy of knowledge illustrates why ‘who is’ is most proper: it is the most universal and most fundamental name.

Important Definitions #

Pelagos (from Greek πελάγος): Ocean; used by Damascene to describe how the name ‘who is’ comprehends the infinite and undetermined ocean (the infinite sea or expanse) of divine substance. It signifies boundlessness and infinitude.

Secundum rem: According to the thing itself; in reality itself. When predicate and subject signify the same thing secundum rem, they refer to the same reality.

Secundum rationem: According to reason or definition; in our mode of understanding. Predicate and subject can differ secundum rationem while remaining the same secundum rem.

Ipsum esse (being itself): God’s very existence, which is identical to His essence and substance. This is what ‘who is’ signifies—not a form or quality, but being itself.

Qui est: The Latin form of the divine name ‘who is’ (Hebrew: אהיה אשר אהיה, ‘I AM WHO I AM’). In Greek: ὁ ὤν (ho ōn, “the one who is”).

Tetragrammaton: The four-letter Hebrew name of God (יהוה, YHWH), considered even more proper than ‘God’ because it signifies the incommunicable divine substance as singular.

Incommunicable name: A name that belongs to God alone and cannot properly be applied to creatures.

Immanent operation: An operation that remains in the agent (as opposed to transitive operations that produce external effects).

Examples & Illustrations #

Saint Thérèse and the Ocean #

Berquist recounts how Saint Thérèse of Lisieux was profoundly impressed when she saw the ocean for the first time. The endless dimensions of the ocean parallel our intellectual apprehension of God as the infinite ocean of divine being. Just as the material ocean seems endless to us, the divine being (pelagos of substance) transcends all limitation and determination.

Academic Choice in Studies #

The choice between knowing all things in general versus knowing the best things in particular. Metaphysics (the science of being as being) uniquely allows us to know universals and simultaneously come to know the best thing—God. The entomologist, by contrast, knows lesser things in great detail. This illustrates why ‘who is’—the most universal and fundamental name—is most proper to God.

The Name ‘God’ and Self-Reference in Questions #

Berquist notes an interesting logical point: when stating the problem in Article 11 using the word “utrum” (whether), one cannot even raise the question without using the name ‘God’ to refer to that which one seeks the proper name of. This suggests that, in a certain respect, ‘God’ must itself be the most proper name simply because it is how we refer to the very subject under question.

Prayer Language #

Berquist mentions that at the monastery, they pray: “Let us thank the one who is for all that is.” This illustrates the practical use of the name ‘who is’ as capturing the truth that God alone truly is, while creatures participate in being.

Biblical Example: John’s Gospel #

The repeated use of “I am” in John’s Gospel and especially Christ’s statement “Before Abraham was, I am” illustrates the consignification of the present tense and eternal presence. When Peter denies Christ three times saying “I am not,” the negation of being corresponds to the denial of Christ.

Questions Addressed #

Question 13, Article 11: Is ‘Who Is’ the Most Proper Name of God? #

Answer: Yes. For three reasons:

1. Meaning: It signifies being itself, not form. Only God’s substance is being.
2. Universality: It is the most universal and undetermined name; other names add determinations and thus fall short of capturing God’s infinitude.
3. Consignification: It signifies being in the present tense, proper to God’s eternal existence.

Distinction: However, ‘God’ is more proper in terms of that to which the name refers (what it designates), while ‘who is’ is more proper in terms of that from which the name is taken (what it is derived from).

Question 13, Article 12: Can Affirmative Statements Be Made About God? #

Answer: Yes. Although God is simple, affirmative statements about God can be true. The multiplicity exists in our mode of knowing (through diverse conceptions and the composition of our propositions), not in God’s being. God’s simple being can be truly expressed through composed statements because:

• The predicate and subject signify the same reality (secundum rem) while differing in definition (secundum rationem)
• This principle applies even more universally: our immaterial understanding knows material things immaterially, yet this does not falsify our knowledge
• The way we know does not have to match the way things are for knowledge to be true (contra Plato; following Aristotle)

Notable Quotes #

“It’s interesting, in John’s Gospel, how many times the Lord says, I am, because I am he, and when St. Peter denies him, three times Peter says, I am not.”

“[The name ‘who is’] comprehends…the infinite and undetermined…infinity or ocean of this divine…substance.”

“We name things as we know them, right? So we have to know that God is infinite before we can appreciate this name.”

“[This name] determines no particular way of being, right? But it has itself indeterminately to all. And therefore, it names the…infinite ocean of substance.”

“Well, as far as that from which the name is taken, I am, who am, is the most proper name of God, right? But as far as that to which the name is applied, God is the most proper name of God.”

“The multiplicity is in the way we know God, right? So we know a simple thing in one, in a composed way, in a multiple way, where he knows composed things in a multiple things in a one and simple way, which is the reverse, right? But in either case…the way we know the same as the way things are, right? But the mind is not false, because those two don’t have to be the same, right?”

“Don’t fence me in, God is saying.”

Pedagogical Reflections #

The Central Question of Philosophy #

Berquist emphasizes that underlying much of this discussion is a fundamental philosophical question: “Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are?”

• Aristotle’s answer: No. Knowledge can be true even when the mode of knowing differs from the mode of being.
• Plato’s apparent position: Yes, suggesting a more stringent correspondence requirement.
• Boethius’s Resolution: In the Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius moves from the Academy (Platonic school) to follow Aristotle when addressing how God’s eternal knowledge can be true of temporal things. This subtle move illustrates the philosophical victory of Aristotle’s position: our composed, temporal, diverse mode of understanding can be true of God’s simple, eternal, unified reality.

Why This Matters #

This resolves apparent contradictions about God:

• God can be simple yet have multiple attributes named (diverse conceptions in our minds)
• God can know future contingents without determining them (His mode of knowing differs from temporal causation)
• God can be known and loved by creatures differently than He knows and loves Himself
• Negative theology (negations about God are true) and affirmative theology (affirmations about God are true) are both valid

Connection to Earlier and Later Questions #

Earlier: The Five Attributes of God #

Berquist references the earlier establishment that God has five attributes: simple, perfect, infinite, unchangeable, and one. The name ‘who is’ encapsulates infinitude especially; one cannot appreciate this name without understanding God’s infinitude.

Later: Article 12 Preview #

The discussion of how our composed mode of knowing God relates to God’s simple being will continue into Article 12 on affirmative propositions, deepening the treatment of how truth and composition relate.