68. God's Knowledge of Statements and Immutability

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

God’s Knowledge of Statements (Article 14) #

• The Problem: God is simple and without composition; statements (enunciabilia) are composed (subject, predicate, copula); therefore, how can God know statements?
• God’s knowledge does not work by composing or dividing as human understanding does
• There is no composition or division in divine understanding because God is altogether simple
• God knows statements through understanding His own essence, which is the ultimate likeness of all being
• Every affirmative statement signifies some being; God, being itself (I AM), knows all participations in being

The Distinction: Way of Knowing vs. Way of Being #

• A fundamental principle: the way God knows is not the way things are, yet He knows them truly
• We can know things in separation that do not exist in separation (e.g., knowing someone as a philosopher without knowing them as a grandfather)
• Things can be known in a different order than they come in reality without falsity
• Material things can be known immaterially; composed things can be known simply
• By analogy: just as God knows material things in an immaterial way, He knows composed things in a simple way

The Composition and Division Fallacy #

• When we say “everything known by God is necessary,” this must be carefully distinguished:
  • Composed sense (as a whole): True—if God foreknows something, it must happen under His knowledge
  • Divided sense (in itself): False—the thing in itself need not be necessary
• The fallacy of composition occurs when one treats composed statements as if they were divided
• Example: “Can I be standing when I’m sitting?” In composed sense, no. In divided sense (the time when I’m sitting, I could be standing), yes.
• Some object that this distinction only applies to separable forms (like white becoming black), not to inseparable properties (like being known by God)
• Berquist’s Resolution: To be known by God does not imply a disposition inhering in the subject; it implies the act of the knower toward the thing known. Even though something is always known by God when it is known, this is attributed to it only insofar as it stands under the act of being known, just as materiality is attributed to stone in itself, not according as it is understood.

God’s Knowledge is His Substance (Article 15) #

• God’s knowledge is not distinct from His substance; they are identical
• Therefore, God’s knowledge is altogether unchangeable, just as His substance is unchangeable
• No change, not even the shadow of a change, pertains to God (James 1:17)

Relations: Real vs. Rational (Creator/Lord vs. Knowledge) #

• Creation (Creator, Lord): These names imply relations to creatures according as they are in themselves
• Creation is a transitive act with an external product; God does not create except when there exist things created
• Knowledge (Knowing, Loving): These names imply relations to creatures according as they are in God
• Knowledge and love are immanent acts that remain in the knower; they do not require an external product
• Therefore: God can know something eternally even when it does not exist in itself; He cannot be called a creator before creatures exist
• The relations of “Creator” and “Lord” follow upon acts understood to end in exterior things (creatures themselves)
• The relations of “Knowledge” and “Love” follow upon acts understood to be only in God
• Conclusion: Relations following from transitive acts (like creation) vary according to creatures; relations following from immanent acts (like knowledge) are predicated without variation of God

Knowledge of Things That Could Be vs. Things That Will Be #

• Objection: God can make more things than He has made; therefore, He could know more things than He knows
• Response: God knows both things that are/were/will be (scientia visionis—knowledge of vision) and things He could make but never will (scientia simplicis intelligentiae—knowledge of simple understanding)
• From the fact that God could do more than He does, it does not follow that He could know more than He knows—unless this refers to knowledge of vision
• God does not begin to know when things come into being in time; whatever is able to be according to some time, God knows eternally all at once
• God knows the variability of things without His knowledge varying
• Conclusion: It would be false to say God can know more things than He knows, because such a statement implies He once did not know something and then came to know it—which would be a change in God’s knowledge itself

Key Arguments #

The Simplicity Problem #

• Objection 1: To know statements belongs to understanding insofar as it composes or divides; but God’s understanding involves no composition; therefore, God does not know statements
• Objection 2: All knowledge is through some likeness; but there is no likeness in God of statements, since God is simple and they are composed; therefore, God does not know statements
• Resolution: God knows composed things in a simple way, just as He knows material things immaterially. By understanding His own essence (which is being itself), He knows the being that is signified by every statement.

The Immutability Problem #

• Objection: God’s knowledge seems variable because: (1) relations to creatures vary; (2) God could know more than He does; (3) God knew “Christ will be born” but now does not know this
• Resolution: God’s knowledge is His substance, which is unchangeable. Relations like “Creator” are real from the creature’s side only. God knows all times as eternally present to Him; therefore, what was future is now eternally known as having occurred.

Important Definitions #

Enunciabilia (Statable Things) #

Propositions or statements that involve composition of subject and predicate with a copula, expressing affirmation or negation. Examples: “man is an animal,” “man is not a dog.”

Scientia Visionis #

Knowledge of vision—God’s knowledge of things that are, were, or will be in time.

Scientia Simplicis Intelligentiae #

Knowledge of simple understanding—God’s knowledge of things He could do or make but will not actually do or make.

Transitive Act #

An act that has an external product distinct from the act itself (e.g., creation, making, building).

Immanent Act #

An act that remains in the agent and has no external product (e.g., understanding, loving, knowing).

Examples & Illustrations #

The Mountain Analogy (Article 13, referenced here) #

• A traveler on a road cannot see those coming after him
• One on a mountain sees all travelers on the road at once and they are all present to him
• Similarly, God from His eternal vantage point sees all events in time simultaneously; they are all eternally present to Him

The Sitting/Standing Fallacy #

• “Can I be standing when I’m sitting?”
• Composed sense: No—I cannot simultaneously sit and stand
• Divided sense: Yes—at the time when I sit, I could be standing (at a different time)
• This illustrates composition and division fallacy in temporal contexts

The Divine Knowledge vs. Human Foreknowledge #

• When God foreknows “I will sin,” this must be distinguished:
• Composed: If God foreknows it as a whole, then it must happen (true)
• Divided: In itself, by free choice, I need not sin (also true)
• The fallacy would be to conclude that because God foreknows it, I cannot be responsible—that confuses the composed with the divided sense

The Philosopher vs. the Carpenter #

• The philosopher finishes his work (understanding) and has nothing external to show
• The carpenter finishes his work (making) and has a house, chair, or table to show
• Making has something noteworthy beyond the mere activity: an external product
• This illustrates why creation (making) and understanding (immanent act) are not equivalent in relation to God’s knowledge

The Cat’s Fear #

• When Berquist picked up a frightened cat (afraid of a dog), he could feel the cat shaking
• He could know this fear because he too has fear sometimes
• By knowing himself completely, one knows to some extent what a cat is (which has sensation and emotion) because the cat has something of what man has, but not all

The Numbers Analogy #

• Body + Life = Plant (like the number 2)
• Body + Life + Sensation = Animal (like the number 3)
• Body + Life + Sensation + Reason = Man (like the number 4)
• If four knew itself completely, it would know three and two in some way
• Similarly, if God (infinite being) knew Himself perfectly, He would know everything that could participate in being to any degree

Finger and Thumb #

• The opposable thumb is one of five digits but gets its own name because of its noteworthy function
• The other four retain the common name “fingers”
• This shows how something can be divided from a class not by being more perfect, but by having something noteworthy added (an external product in the case of making vs. doing)

White Becoming Black (Form Separable from Subject) #

• Some object that the composition/division distinction applies only to separable forms
• Example: “White is able to become black” (divisively true—the thing that is white can become black) vs. “White is black” (composedly false—cannot be both simultaneously)
• But they claim this distinction has no place for inseparable properties

Notable Quotes #

“Before God there is no change, nor even the shadow of a change.” — James 1:17, cited in the lecture

“God knows the thoughts of men, that are multiplied forever.” — Psalm 93, cited regarding God’s knowledge of statements

“What is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more.” — Shakespeare, cited in connection with numerical gradation of being

“Built for a large discourse, looking before and after.” — Shakespeare, cited regarding the successive nature of human understanding

“What is a beast if his chief good and market of his time be but to grow? A plant, no more.” — Berquist’s extension of Shakespeare’s logic to illustrate numerical participation in being

“By understanding his own essence he knows the essence of all things and whatever things can happen to them.” — Aquinas/Berquist, on God’s knowledge through self-knowledge

Questions Addressed #

Can God know statements if He is simple? #

Resolution: Yes. God knows statements not by composing and dividing (as human minds do) but by understanding His own essence, which is being itself. Every statement signifies some participation in being; God, being itself, knows all such participations in a simple act of understanding.

Does God’s knowledge vary with the variation of creatures? #

Resolution: No. God’s knowledge is His substance, which is unchangeable. Though God knows things that vary and change, His knowledge itself does not vary. Relations like “Creator” are real only from the creature’s side; God does not begin to create when creatures come to exist, nor does He begin to know them then. Knowledge, being an immanent act, does not require an external product and can be eternally directed to things that come to be in time.

If God foreknows I will sin, must I sin? #

Resolution: In a composed sense (taking the foreknowledge as a whole), yes—what God knows must come to pass. But in a divided sense (considering the thing in itself), no—by my free choice, I need not sin. The fallacy would be confusing these two senses and concluding that God’s foreknowledge destroys human freedom. Contingency is a property of things in themselves; under God’s eternal knowledge, they are necessarily known, but this does not make them absolutely necessary in their own causes.

Does God know more things than He actually makes? #

Resolution: Yes, God has two kinds of knowledge: (1) knowledge of vision (scientia visionis) of things that are, were, or will be, and (2) knowledge of simple understanding (scientia simplicis intelligentiae) of things He could make but never will. From the fact that God could make more than He does, it does not follow that He could know more than He knows—unless this refers to knowledge of vision. His knowledge does not increase or decrease.