69. God's Speculative and Practical Knowledge

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Question of Speculative vs. Practical Knowledge in God #

• Objection: God’s knowledge causes things, but speculative knowledge does not cause what it knows; therefore God’s knowledge cannot be speculative
• God’s knowledge is presented as necessarily practical (ordered to doing) because it is causative
• The apparent contradiction: Can knowledge that causes things be speculative?

Three Modes of Speculative Knowledge #

Thomas distinguishes three ways something can be called speculative (theoretical/looking knowledge):

1. From the side of the thing known: When the thing known is not doable by the knower

   • Example: Human knowledge of natural things (whose cause is nature, not humans)
   • A fortiori: Human knowledge of divine things and angels

2. From the side of the manner of knowing: Even if a thing is doable, considering it speculatively rather than as doable

   • Example: A builder considering a house by defining, dividing, and examining universal predicates rather than considering how to build it
   • Similar to art appreciation: learning about music or painting without learning to make them
   • This involves abstract, demonstrative consideration rather than practical application

3. From the side of the end (purpose): Knowledge ordered to truth and understanding rather than to operation

   • Speculative knowledge pursues understanding for its own sake
   • Practical knowledge is ordered toward the end of operation/making
   • Example: A builder considering a house merely out of curiosity about design, not intending to construct it

God’s Knowledge of Himself: Purely Speculative #

• God’s knowledge of Himself is speculative knowledge only
• Reason: God is not doable; He is completely unchangeable and necessary
• This reflects a sign of nobility: God’s knowledge of Himself is the best knowledge He has

God’s Knowledge of Other Things: Both Speculative and Practical #

• God’s knowledge of all other things is both speculative and practical
• Speculative aspect: In the manner of knowing (defining, dividing, distinguishing perfectly)
• Practical aspect: Regarding things He makes or permits

Two Kinds of Divine Knowledge of Doable Things #

• Knowledge of vision (scientia visionis): God’s knowledge of things He actually makes, made, or will make
  • This is fully practical because ordered to divine action
• Knowledge of simple intelligence (scientia intelligentiae): God’s knowledge of things He can make but never intends to make
  • This is not practical according to the end, because God does not intend to do them
  • Yet God knows them as doable

God’s Knowledge of Evil #

• Bad/evil things, though not doable by God (He does not cause evil), come under His practical knowledge
• This is because He permits, impedes, or orders them
• Analogy: Sicknesses come under the physician’s practical knowledge not because he makes people sick, but because through his art he cures them

The Relation to Fundamental Philosophical Principles #

• The distinction between speculative and practical knowledge connects to two fundamental kinds of composition negated in God:
  • Composition of matter and form (from natural philosophy)
  • Composition of substance and accident (from logic/Categories)
• These appear in Thomas’s treatment of God’s simplicity and in Trinitarian theology

God’s Knowledge Transcends the Speculative-Practical Distinction #

• God’s knowledge is primarily speculative because primarily a knowledge of Himself
• God’s knowledge is not divided into two sciences (dogmatic theology as speculative, moral theology as practical) the way philosophical disciplines are divided
• Theology shares in divine wisdom and thus transcends the human dichotomy

The Perfection of Looking Knowledge #

• Looking/speculative knowledge is more noble than practical knowledge
• This is shown by Aristotle in the beginning of the Metaphysics and the famous preamble to wisdom
• The highest knowledge is pursued for its own sake, for understanding

Key Arguments #

Against the Objection that God’s Knowledge Cannot Be Speculative #

Structure of Response:

1. First distinction: God’s knowledge is causative, but not of Himself—only of other things
   • This preserves the purely speculative nature of God’s knowledge of Himself
2. Second distinction: Perfect knowledge of doable things requires knowing them as doable
   • But this does not diminish the nobility of looking knowledge
3. Key resolution: God knows all other things by knowing Himself speculatively
   • He sees all other things in Himself through His speculative knowledge of His own essence
   • Thus His knowledge extends to both speculative and practical understanding of all things through a single speculative act

Why Knowledge Derived from Things Does Not Belong to Speculative Knowledge As Such #

• Objection: Speculative knowledge is taken by abstraction from things; God’s knowledge is not derived from things; therefore God’s knowledge cannot be speculative
• Response: The derivation of knowledge from things is characteristic of human speculative knowledge, not speculative knowledge per se
  • This is a fallacy of composition and division (fallacia consequentis)
  • Human knowledge begins from sense and is derived from things, but this is not essential to speculative knowledge as such
  • God’s knowledge is independent of things yet remains speculative

Perfect Knowledge of Doable Things #

• Perfect knowledge of things that are doable requires knowing them as doable (i.e., how they can be done)
• God’s knowledge must be perfect, so He knows doable things insofar as they are doable
• Yet: This does not diminish the nobility of speculative knowledge
  • Reason: God knows all other things through His speculative knowledge of Himself
  • All things are known in God’s essence by God’s simple act of knowing Himself

Important Definitions #

Speculative Knowledge (Θεωρητική γνῶσις / Scientia Speculativa) #

• Knowledge pursued for understanding and truth rather than for action
• In Greek: theoretica (from theorein, to look/contemplate)
• Can be called speculative in three ways: from the side of the thing known, from the manner of knowing, or from its end
• Opposed to practical knowledge, which is ordered toward doing or making

Practical Knowledge (Scientia Practica) #

• Knowledge ordered to action or making
• Pursued for the sake of doing or producing something
• Ordered toward an end beyond understanding itself

Knowledge of Vision (Scientia Visionis) #

• God’s knowledge of things that are, were, or will be in act
• Knowledge of things He actually creates or permits
• Fully practical because ordered to divine creative action

Knowledge of Simple Intelligence (Scientia Intelligentiae) #

• God’s knowledge of things He could make but never will make
• Knowledge in His power but not in His will to create
• Not fully practical because not ordered to divine action

Doable/Operable (Operabile) #

• That which can be made or done by the knower
• Contrasted with that which is merely knowable but not producible by the knower

Examples & Illustrations #

The Builder and the House #

• A builder considering the form of a house by defining and dividing its universal properties is engaging in speculative consideration of something doable
• The same knowledge becomes practical when the builder intends to build and applies it to construction
• A builder merely curious about house design (not intending to build) exercises speculative knowledge of something doable

Art Appreciation Course #

• Learning about music or painting without learning to compose music or paint
• Provides incomplete but non-false knowledge
• Illustrates speculative knowledge of doable things

The Physician and Disease #

• A doctor knows diseases not to cause them but through his art to cure them
• Diseases come under the physician’s practical knowledge through the intention to cure them
• Illustrates how evil/bad things can fall under practical knowledge through the intention to order them rightly

Correspondence by Email #

• Someone may know Berquist as a philosopher through his writings without knowing he is white, American, or a grandfather
• These different properties are all found in one person but are knowable separately without falsity
• Illustrates that incomplete knowledge is not false knowledge

The CIA Interview Scenario #

• Candidates for a secret agency are placed in situations (parties, temptations) designed to reveal their character
• The agency makes the circumstances but does not make the person weak; it reveals what is already there
• Illustrates the principle that setting up circumstances to reveal something is not making that thing false
• Parallels how God can know things as they truly are without being the cause of evil

The Spy Character (Paroles) in All’s Well That Ends Well #

• Shakespeare’s character claims bravery but reveals cowardice when tested
• Illustrates how circumstances can reveal true character
• The character’s name means “words” in French, emphasizing the gap between profession and reality

Notable Quotes #

“Looking knowledge is more noble than practical knowledge” (Aristotle, Metaphysics Book I)

“Perfect knowledge is not had of doable things, except if they are known insofar as they are doable”

“He does not recede from the nobility of looking knowledge, because all other things beside himself, he sees in himself”

“Our theology here is sharing in the divine wisdom, and therefore, our theology is primarily looking, because it’s primarily a knowledge of God”

“The fallacy that deceives even the wise” (Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations)

Questions Addressed #

Article 16, Question 1: Does God Have Speculative Knowledge? #

Objection: God’s knowledge causes things, but speculative knowledge does not cause things; therefore God does not have speculative knowledge

Resolution:

• God’s knowledge of Himself is purely speculative (He cannot make or change Himself)
• God’s knowledge of other things is speculative in manner (He knows things perfectly through defining, dividing, and understanding) even though it is causative
• The apparent contradiction is resolved by distinguishing speculative knowledge from causation—speculative knowledge need not be non-causative

Article 16, Question 2: Is Knowledge Derived from Things Essential to Speculative Knowledge? #

Objection: Our speculative knowledge is derived from things through abstraction; God’s knowledge is not derived from things; therefore God’s knowledge is not speculative

Resolution:

• The derivation from things is characteristic of human speculative knowledge, not of speculative knowledge as such
• This confuses the mode of human knowing with the essential nature of speculative knowledge
• God’s knowledge can be speculative while being independent of things

Article 16, Question 3: How Can God’s Knowledge Be Both Speculative and Practical? #

Problem: Speculative and practical seem to be opposed; how can God’s knowledge be both?

Resolution:

• God’s knowledge of Himself is purely speculative
• God’s knowledge of other things is speculative in manner of knowing but practical regarding things He makes
• Distinctions in the three modes of being speculative allow this: God’s knowledge is speculative in manner and not ordered to operation regarding non-existent things, yet practical regarding things He actually makes
• All this occurs through one eternal, simple act of knowing Himself

Article 16, Question 4: Does God Have Scientia Intelligentiae? #

Question: What of things God could make but never will make?

Resolution: God has scientia intelligentiae (knowledge of simple intelligence) of these things—knowledge in His power though not in His will to create—and this is not fully practical because not ordered to operation, yet not speculative in the full sense because they are doable

Philosophical Context #

Position Within Theology and Philosophy #

• This article completes Question 14 on God’s operations (intellect and will)
• Connects to the doctrine of divine simplicity and immutability (God’s knowledge cannot change)
• Relates to the problem of reconciling God’s causality with human freedom and the status of future contingents
• Establishes that theology itself (as divine wisdom) transcends the speculative-practical dichotomy found in natural philosophy and ethics

The Central Philosophical Principle #

• Berquist emphasizes throughout: “Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are?”
• This principle, derived from Aristotle, underlies the entire discussion
• God’s speculative knowledge demonstrates that truth does not require the way of knowing to match the way of being