Lecture 70

70. Divine Ideas: Nature and Multiplicity

Summary
This lecture explores the metaphysical question of whether God possesses ideas (divine forms) and, if so, whether these ideas are multiple or singular. Berquist examines the historical debate between Platonic and Aristotelian approaches, Augustine’s theological reconciliation of Platonism with Christianity, and Thomas Aquinas’s definitive position that God necessarily possesses multiple ideas while remaining absolutely simple. The central philosophical problem concerns whether truth requires that the way we know something must be the way it exists in reality.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem of Ideas and Truth #

  • Core Question: Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are?
  • Two Positions: Plato answers yes (implicitly); Aristotle answers no
  • Significance: This fundamental disagreement shapes their respective philosophies and metaphysics
  • Historical Pattern: More philosophers have agreed with Plato than Aristotle on this question

Terminology: Idea as Mistranslation #

  • The Greek word ἰδέα (aidas) means form (species), not “idea” in the modern English sense
  • English “idea” can mean either a thought or an image, creating confusion
  • Better translation: “forms” (with capital F) or forma in Latin
  • Etymological note: idea derives from idein (to see); species from speculari (to look at)—both referring to “what is seen”
  • Colloquial English often uses “form” naturally: “democracy is one form of government” rather than “one species of government”

Why Divine Ideas Are Necessary #

  • Foundational Principle: No effect is produced by chance without a form as its end
  • Agency and Understanding: The agent does not act except insofar as a likeness of the form is in the agent itself
  • Two Modes of Pre-existence of Form:
    1. According to natural being: Father generates son; dog generates dog (form exists naturally in the agent)
    2. According to intelligible being: Architect makes house; form pre-exists in the architect’s mind
  • Applied to God: The world is not made by chance but by God acting through understanding; therefore, God must have ideas (forms) according to which He makes things
  • The Builder Analogy: A builder cannot conceive the form of a house without having proper thoughts of its parts; God must have proper ideas of all things He creates

The Platonic Problem and Historical Context #

  • Plato’s Journey: Left Athens after Socrates’ death; traveled to southern Italy; encountered Pythagorean teachings
  • Mathematical Influence: Studied mathematical theorems (e.g., mean proportionals between square and cube numbers)
  • The Conviction: If mathematicians truly know geometrical forms, and truth requires the way we know be the way things are, then geometrical forms must exist separately in reality
  • Plato’s Conclusion: Creates a theory of separate Forms existing apart from sensible matter
  • Socratic Influence: Socrates sought knowledge through definition; universals in definitions are separated from individual cases in thought

Aristotle’s Counter-Position #

  • Central Principle: Truth does not require that the way we know be the way things are
  • Example of Sphere: One can truly know sphere in separation from sensible matter (rubber, steel, wood, snow, earth) without falsity
    • The sphere is knowable without these materials
    • Falsity only arises if one claims sphere exists without matter in reality
  • Distinction: Things can be separated in thought but not in reality
  • The Mind’s Role: The mind is not false in knowing composed things separately, even though they cannot exist separately

Thomas’s Treatment: Reconciling Plato with Christian Theology #

  • Augustine’s Influence: Augustine attempted to harmonize Platonism with Christianity
  • The Problem: Augustine rejects Plato’s separately existing Forms but affirms that these forms must exist in God’s mind
  • Thomas’s Systematic Resolution:
    • Divine ideas are not additions to God’s essence
    • Ideas are God’s essence understood as imitable in various ways
    • In knowing Himself perfectly, God knows every way His essence can be imitated by creatures
    • This is consistent with divine simplicity

Divine Simplicity and Multiple Ideas #

  • The Apparent Contradiction: God is absolutely simple, yet we speak of multiple ideas
  • Critical Distinction:
    • The many ideas are not many forms by which God understands
    • Rather, they are many things that God understands
    • God understands through one form only: His own essence
  • The Resolution: God’s essence, being infinite, is imitable in infinite ways
    • Knowing His essence perfectly includes understanding every possible mode of imitation
    • These modes of imitation are the “many ideas”
  • Analogy: A perfect musician might understand how novices can imperfectly imitate his skill in various degrees and ways—all from knowing himself perfectly

The Nature of Divine Ideas #

  • Definition: A form existing apart from a thing, functioning either as:
    1. An exemplar (model to be imitated)
    2. A principle of knowledge (source by which the thing is known)
  • Both Functions Required: For divine ideas to make sense, they must serve both functions simultaneously
  • Exemplar Status: God’s essence serves as exemplar for creation
  • Knowledge Function: Through ideas, God knows all creatures and all possible states of affairs

Key Arguments #

For the Necessity of Divine Ideas #

  1. From Causality and Order:

    • The world exhibits order and intentionality, not chance
    • Every ordered effect requires an end intended by the chief agent
    • God acts through understanding, not by chance (unlike agents that produce effects accidentally)
    • Therefore, God must have ideas (forms) as exemplars
  2. From the Unity of Purpose:

    • God intends the order of the whole universe, not just individual things
    • One cannot have a unified conception of a whole without conceptions of its parts
    • Therefore, God must have the proper ideas of each constituent thing
  3. From Perfection:

    • For God to be infinitely perfect in understanding, He must understand not merely His own nature but every possible way that nature could be participated in
    • Perfect self-knowledge includes understanding the infinite imitable aspects of one’s being

Against Separate Platonic Forms #

  • Objection: If forms are separate from sensible things, then they exist eternally; but creatures exist temporally; the temporal should not be the cause of the eternal
  • Resolution (via Thomas): The relations by which ideas are multiplied are not caused by creatures but by God’s understanding itself—by God comparing His essence to the various ways it can be imitated

Against Multiplicity in God #

  • Objection: If there are many ideas and God is one, there would be real multiplicity in God like the multiplicity of the three divine persons (which would be heretical)
  • Resolution: The relations by which ideas are multiplied are not real relations like those distinguishing the persons of the Trinity; they are relations understood by God—relations that exist in the divine mind but not as real compositions

Important Definitions #

Idea / Aidas (Greek) / Forma (Latin) #

“The form of some thing existing apart from it, either (1) as an exemplar of that of which it is said to be the form, or (2) as a beginning, a source of the knowledge of the thing.”

Exemplar #

A model or pattern that something imitates; the form in the agent’s mind that guides the production of an effect. In God, the divine essence serves as exemplar for all creation.

Distinction: “The Way We Know” vs. “The Way Things Are” #

  • In our knowledge: We often know things in separation from their actual conditions (sphere without matter, a person as philosopher without knowing all their other properties)
  • In reality: These things may not exist in such separation
  • The Point: Conformity with reality does not require identity of mode between knowledge and being; it requires only that what we affirm about the thing is true of it

Per Se vs. Per Accidens Order to Understanding #

  • Per se order: A thing depends on understanding for its very existence or definition (e.g., a house depends on the builder’s understanding)
  • Per accidens order: A thing is knowable by understanding but does not depend on understanding for existence (e.g., a natural stone)
  • Significance: Ideas properly refer to per se order (exemplars); things in per accidens order are known through ideas but don’t have ideas in the same sense

Examples & Illustrations #

The Sphere in Geometry #

  • One can truly know sphere without sensible matter (without knowing it as rubber, steel, wood, snow, or earth)
  • The mind is not false in this knowledge
  • Falsity would arise only if one asserted: “Because I know sphere without sensible matter, therefore sphere exists without sensible matter in reality”
  • Lesson: The way we know need not be the way things are

The Philosopher-Grandfather #

  • Berquist uses himself as example: he is both a philosopher and a grandfather
  • Hospital nurses know him as grandfather, leaving out that he’s a philosopher
  • Students in class know him as philosopher, leaving out that he’s a grandfather
  • Question: Is either knowledge false?
  • Answer: No. Each knowledge is imperfect but not false, because “being a philosopher” is knowable without “being a grandfather” and vice versa
  • Application: Things can be known separately in thought even when united in reality, if they are knowable apart from each other

The Carpenter and the House #

  • Before building, the carpenter has a form (idea) of the house in his mind
  • This form serves as an exemplar—the model the builder intends to realize
  • The form also serves as a principle of knowledge—the architect knows what house to make through this form
  • The built house is true insofar as it conforms to the form in the builder’s mind
  • Application to God: God has ideas of all things He creates; creation manifests God’s ideas

Musical Imitation #

  • A perfect musician understands not only his own skill but also the various imperfect ways others can imitate his ability
  • Understanding himself perfectly includes understanding these multiple modes of imitation
  • Similarly, God in knowing Himself understands every way creatures can imperfectly participate in divine perfection

Charles De Koninck’s Influence #

  • Berquist recalls attending a lecture from De Koninck (possibly the first time)
  • After studying with De Koninck’s students, Berquist noted how even small physical gestures were imitated—students unconsciously picked up De Koninck’s mannerisms
  • Shows how a form can be imitated in multiple ways and degrees, even in seemingly minor aspects

Notable Quotes #

“Now, you’ve got to be careful with this word idea, huh? It’s a transliteration, not a translation, okay?… The Greek word is aidas, huh? Species, huh? And maybe it would be better translated… forms with a capital F.”

“And so, if truth requires that the way we know be the way things are, then there must really be geometrical spheres and cubes and so on and numbers… Aristotle says, no, no. They’re separated in thought, but not in things.”

“Truth means somehow the conformity of the mind with things, right? The agreement of the mind with things. That seems to be what truth is… But the way in which we know them doesn’t have to be the way in which they exist.”

“For the agent does not act on account of some form except insofar as a likeness of the form is in the agent itself, right?”

“It is necessary that in the divine mind there be a form to the likeness of which the world is made. And in this consists the ratio of idea.”

“God, in perfectly understanding himself, understands the infinity of ways in which he could be imitated. Infinity of ways in which other things could be made more or less like him.”

“The many ideas are in the mind, the divine mind, not as many forms which he understands, but as what understood by him, right?”

“The idea does not name the divine essence insofar as it is his essence, but insofar as it is the likeness and the reason of this or that thing.”

Questions Addressed #

Does God Have Ideas? #

  • Position: Yes, necessarily
  • Reasoning: God creates through understanding, not by chance; therefore, God must have ideas (forms) as exemplars according to which He makes things
  • Clarification: These ideas are not additions to God’s essence but are God’s essence understood as imitable in various ways

Are There Many Ideas or One? #

  • Position: Many ideas, though God’s essence is one
  • Resolution of Apparent Contradiction:
    • Multiplicity comes from understanding the many ways the divine essence can be imitated
    • This does not introduce multiplicity of forms by which God understands
    • God understands all through His single essence
    • The many ideas are many things understood, not many principles of understanding

How Does God Know Many Things Through One Essence? #

  • Answer: In perfectly understanding His own essence, God understands:
    1. His essence as it is in itself
    2. His essence as imitable in infinite ways by creatures
    3. Each particular way of imitation as a distinct idea or reason
  • Analogy: Just as one sees multiple colors through the one faculty of sight

Do Ideas Contradict Divine Simplicity? #

  • Objection: If God has multiple ideas, then God is not simple
  • Response:
    • Divine simplicity requires that God’s essence is not composed
    • But it does not require that God understands only one thing
    • God understands many things through one form (His essence)
    • The ideas are not forms by which God understands but things that God understands
    • These relations exist in God’s understanding, not as real compositions in His essence

Structure of the Disputed Question #

Thomas’s treatment follows the classical medieval format:

  • Sed contra (“But against”):

    • First objection: God does not know through an idea (Dionysius)
    • Second objection: God knows Himself without an idea, so why would He need ideas for other things?
    • Third objection: God’s essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and doing
    • Fourth objection (Augustine): Defends necessity of ideas
    • Fifth objections regarding multiplicity of ideas and divine simplicity
  • Thomas’s systematic responses: Addresses each objection, clarifying the nature of ideas and their compatibility with divine simplicity