74. The Order of True and Good in Definition

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Transcendentals and Their Order #

• Being and something are the most fundamental transcendentals
• One, true, and good follow in a definable order
• Although good and true are convertible with being in subject (everything that is, is good and true), they differ in definition (ratio)
• The order among them matters for understanding creation, causality, and the divine nature

Article 4: Is Good Prior to Truth in Definition? #

Objections:

1. Good is more universal than true (true is merely the good of the intellect); therefore good should be prior
2. Good exists in things while truth exists in the understanding; things are prior to understanding, so good is prior
3. Truth is a species of virtue (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV); virtue falls under good; therefore good is prior

Thomas’s Response:

• True is actually prior to good in definition because true is closer to being, the most fundamental transcendental
• Truth regards being simply and immediately; good regards being as perfect or desirable, which adds a qualification
• Knowledge naturally precedes desire: true pertains to reason, good to the will
• Therefore, true is prior secundum rationem (in definition), though good may be prior in the order of desirables

Critical Distinction: Per Se vs. Secundum Quid

• Good is prior in the order of desirables (what we desire)
• True is prior in the order of understandables (what we understand)
• Objections fail by confusing what is true simply (per se) with what is true in some respect (secundum quid)
• Example: True is in a certain way a particular good (good of intellect), but this does not make good simply universal over true
• Just as an understanding of “man” applies to all men simply, but understanding a particular man (like Mark) is only in some way understanding man, one must distinguish between what is so simpliciter and what is so secundum quid

To the First Objection: Will and understanding mutually include each other. In the order of desirables, good is universal and true is particular. In the order of understandables, true is universal and good is particular. The objection conflates these two orders.

To the Second Objection: Although good is in things and truth is in understanding, the understanding grasps being itself first, then that it understands being, then that it desires being. So in the order of concepts (rationes cogitationis), being comes first, then true, then good—even though good exists in things.

To the Third Objection: The virtue of truth mentioned by Aristotle (a habit of showing oneself as one is in words and deeds) is not the transcendental truth discussed here. The transcendental truth is common to all things.

Article 5: Is God Truth? #

Objections:

1. Truth requires composition (putting together and dividing); God is utterly simple; therefore God is not true
2. Truth is likeness to a beginning (Augustine); God has no beginning; therefore God is not truth
3. If God is the cause of all truth and true statements exist about sin, then God causes sin (which is false)

Thomas’s Response:

• God is not merely true but is truth itself (veritas ipsa)—the highest and first truth
• God’s being is identical with his understanding: God is his understanding, and his understanding is the measure and cause of all other being and understanding
• Although God lacks composition, his simple understanding knows all composite things without composition—he knows composite things in a simple way, material things in an immaterial way
• Therefore, truth is found in God eminently and preeminently

On Divine Simplicity and Predication:

• In God, there is no real distinction between abstract and concrete (no distinction between God and his goodness, his knowledge, his truth)
• When we say “God has knowledge,” we mean “God is knowledge itself”
• This is unlike creatures: I may have some geometry but I am not geometry; I may have some logic but I am not logic

To the First Objection: Although God’s understanding lacks composition and division, by his simple understanding he judges all things and knows all composite things. Thus truth is found in God’s understanding without requiring composition.

To the Second Objection: When Augustine says truth is likeness to a beginning, this applies to created truth (which conforms to the divine understanding as its source). For the divine truth said essentially (not as appropriation to the Son), Augustine’s statement must be resolved into the negative: the divine truth is a likeness to its beginning insofar as its being is not dissimilar to its understanding. (This illustrates the principle that certain affirmative statements about God must be understood negatively.)

To the Third Objection: Non-being and privation have no truth from themselves but only through the understanding’s apprehension. All truth of the statement “he is fornicating” comes from God. But to conclude “therefore, God causes fornication” commits the fallacy of the accident (fallacia accidentis)—confusing what is true of something accidentally with what is true of it essentially. God is the cause of the truth of our knowledge of evil acts, not the cause of the evil acts themselves.

Important Definitions #

Transcendentals (Transcendentalia) #

• Universal concepts that apply to all being
• Include: ens (being), aliquid (something), unum (one), verum (true), bonum (good)
• All are convertible with being in subject (every being is one, true, and good)
• They differ in definition (ratio)

Per Se vs. Secundum Quid #

• Per se (through itself/as such): what belongs to something by its very nature or definition
• Secundum quid (in some respect): what happens to be true of something but is not essential to it
• Critical for avoiding confusion between what is simply true and what is true only in some respect

Convertible (Convertibilia) #

• Two things are convertible if every instance of one is an instance of the other and vice versa
• Being, one, true, and good are mutually convertible: every being is one, true, and good; every true thing is a being; etc.

Privation (Privatio) vs. Non-being (Non-ens) #

• Privation: the lack of something a subject is naturally apt to have and should have (e.g., blindness in a sighted creature)
• Non-being: mere negation without reference to a natural subject (e.g., a cup is not blind because it is not naturally apt to see)
• Bad is always a privation, not pure non-being

Appropriation (Appropriatio) #

• A theological practice of assigning an attribute of the divine substance to a particular divine Person (Father, Son, or Holy Spirit) based on a certain likeness
• Example: Truth is appropriated to the Son because he proceeds as the Word of God
• Example: Life is appropriated to the divine nature as related to divine understanding
• Such appropriations are not exclusive but reflect a special fittingness

Examples & Illustrations #

The “Simply” vs. “In Some Respect” Distinction in Practice #

• A young woman is asked if she knows the philosopher’s brother Mark. She says no. Then asked if she knows what a man is, she says yes. The philosopher concludes: “But that is what my brother Mark is. So you do know him.” She actually knows Mark in some way (knowing what a man is) but does not know Mark simply (as a particular person). The objection to Thomas makes the same mistake.

At the Door Example #

• If you cannot see who is at the door and someone asks if you know who it is, you say no. When you open the door and find your mother, you realize you know your mother simply, but you did not know her as the person knocking at the door (secundum quid). This illustrates how knowledge can be true in one respect but not another.

Mathematics and the Absence of Good #

• In mathematics, we have many true statements (about circles, triangles, geometric relations) but no notion of end or purpose—which is essential to the concept of good
• A circle is not smooth so it can roll away; a triangle does not point to protect itself
• Thus the true extends to things (like mathematical truths) where the good does not, showing true is broader

Sugar and Coffee Analogy #

• Sugar is sweet through itself (per se)—sweetness belongs to sugar by its very nature
• Coffee is sweet through another (per aliud)—it is not sweet by itself but receives sweetness from sugar
• The per se is before the per aliud and is the cause of it: sugar can be sweet without coffee being sweet, but coffee cannot be sweet without sugar
• This principle applies to all causality and is foundational in logic

Teaching and Learning #

• It is accidental to teaching that the teacher learns; teaching essentially perfects the student, not the teacher
• Yet because profound teaching often involves learning, people confuse the accidental with the essential
• Christ, the perfect teacher, learned nothing from teaching—showing that learning is not essential to teaching

Virtue of Truth vs. Transcendental Truth #

• Aristotle identifies a virtue called truth (Nicomachean Ethics IV) where a person shows himself in words and deeds as he is (opposed to Iago’s deception)
• This is a particular moral virtue, not the transcendental truth common to all things
• The objection conflates these two different senses of “truth”

Notable Quotes #

“For what is more universal is before according to reason. Just like animals before dog, right? Because animals are in the definition of dog, but not vice versa.” — Berquist, illustrating the principle that more universal concepts are prior in definition

“But you’ve got health and you’ve got a lot of other goods, right?” — Berquist, showing that true is merely one particular good (good of intellect) among many goods

“Because the true that is a species of virtue wouldn’t seem to be the true that is transcendental. And it’s being said of all things in some way.” — Berquist, distinguishing between transcendental truth and the virtue of truthfulness

“The true regards being simply and immediately. But the notion of good falls upon being, according as it is in some way perfect, right? For thus it is good or desirable.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist), the key reason true is prior to good

“Knowledge naturally comes before, what? Desire.” — Berquist, summarizing the second reason true is prior to good

“A and B are convertible if every A is a B and every B is an A.” — Berquist, defining convertibility of transcendentals

“God’s being not only is conformed to his understanding. But also it is his very active understanding.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist), on divine truth being identical with divine understanding

“That’s exactly where Forabach, you know, in his perverse little book there, The Essence of Christianity, the way he reasons. He says, the theologians tell us the infinite is God, but man’s mind is infinite. Therefore, man’s mind is God.” — Berquist, on Feuerbach’s fallacy of confusing what is true in some way with what is true simply

“So, you’re making this kind of mistake all the time, huh? All day long what you’re doing is doing something bad because it’s good in some way or not doing something good like studying because in some way it’s bad.” — Berquist, on how the per se / secundum quid distinction affects moral decision-making

Questions Addressed #

Is Good Prior to Truth in Definition? #

Resolution: No. Truth (verum) is prior to good (bonum) in definition (ratio) for two reasons:

1. Truth is closer to being, the most fundamental transcendental
2. Knowledge naturally precedes desire; truth pertains to reason, good to the will

However, good may be prior in the order of desirables (the good is what we desire), while true is prior in the order of understandables (the true is what we understand). This is not a contradiction but a difference of perspective.

Is God Truth? #

Resolution: Yes. God is not merely true but is truth itself—veritas ipsa, the highest and first truth. His being is identical with his understanding, and his understanding is the measure and cause of all other being and understanding. All created truths derive from and conform to divine truth.

How Can God Be Truth If He Is Completely Simple? #

Resolution: Although God’s understanding lacks composition and division (unlike human understanding which must put together and divide), God’s simple understanding knows all composite and divisible things. He knows them in a simple way, just as he knows material things in an immaterial way. Thus truth is found in God’s understanding eminently, without requiring composition.

How Can God Be the Cause of Truth but Not the Cause of False Statements and Sin? #

Resolution: Non-being and privation have no truth in themselves; they are knowable only through the understanding’s apprehension. The truth of the statement “he is fornicating” comes entirely from God, who is the cause of all truth. However, to conclude that God therefore causes fornication commits the fallacy of the accident: confusing the truth of knowledge about an act with the cause of the act itself. God causes our true knowledge of evil acts, not the evil acts themselves.

Connections to Broader Thomistic Thought #

Relation to the Trinity #

• The priority of truth over good explains why the Holy Spirit (proceeding by love/will) proceeds from the Son (the Word/truth), not vice versa
• The good must be known before it can be loved; thus knowledge (truth) is prior to love (good)
• Truth is appropriated to the Son; life to the divine nature as ordered to understanding

Relation to Christology #

• Christ’s saying “I am the way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:6) appropriates truth to the Son and life to the divine nature
• In the third part of the Summa, Thomas notes that via (way) pertains to Christ’s human nature while veritas (truth) and vita (life) pertain to his divine nature

Relation to Divine Simplicity #

• God’s identity with his own attributes (God = his being = his understanding = his truth = his goodness) illustrates the doctrine of divine simplicity
• In creatures, there is a real distinction between substance and accidents (I have knowledge but am not knowledge); in God, no such distinction exists

Relation to Logic and Metaphysics #

• The distinction between necessary and contingent truth is a fundamental division of truth but not of good (we speak of necessary vs. contingent truth but not necessary vs. contingent goodness)
• This shows truth is more fundamental than good
• The principle that per se is before per aliud is foundational to all causality and reasoning

Notable Logical/Metaphysical Principles Invoked #

Per Se vs. Per Aliud (Through Itself vs. Through Another) #

• What exists or is true through itself is before and is the cause of what exists or is true through another
• Applied to being, causality, definition, and knowledge
• Critical for understanding why certain things are foundational

The Four Kinds of Opposition (Aristotle, Categories) #

1. Relatives (father/son, double/half)
2. Contraries (virtue/vice)
3. Lack and possession (blindness/sight, ignorance/knowledge)
4. Contradictory opposition (being/non-being)

Fallacy of the Accident (Fallacia Accidentis) #

• Occurs when one treats an accidental property as though it were essential, or vice versa
• Example from lecture: Confusing the truth of the statement “he is fornicating” (which God causes) with God causing fornication itself
• One of the fallacies outside of language (fallaciae extra dictionem) in Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations