84. The Divine Will: God's Willing of Himself and Creatures

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Existence of Will in God #

• Will must exist in God as understanding exists in God
• Will follows upon understanding, just as appetite follows upon sense power
• The will is not limited to desire (which implies lack) but includes love and joy
• God loves and rejoices in his own goodness without any imperfection
• The appetitus (appetitive power) is named from desire because desire is most apparent to us, but encompasses more than desire alone

Three Acts of the Will #

1. Love/Liking (basic act): One can love something whether possessing it or not
2. Wanting/Desiring: Occurs when one loves something but lacks it
3. Joy/Delight: Occurs when one loves something and possesses it

Only love and joy can belong to God; wanting cannot, since God lacks no good and contains all perfection.

God Wills Things Other Than Himself #

• God wills both himself and creatures, following the principle that every perfect agent communicates its goodness to others
• God wills himself as the end; creatures as ordered toward that end
• This is evidenced in nature: natural things diffuse their goodness to other things insofar as they are perfect and actual
• By willing his own goodness, God wills creatures as participating in that goodness in the way befitting the divine nature

The Necessity of Divine Willing #

• Absolutely necessary: God necessarily wills his own goodness (his own nature/essence)
• Not absolutely necessary: God does not necessarily will creatures
• Necessary from supposition: Once God has willed creatures, he cannot unwill them (his will is immutable and one act)
• The distinction parallels Socrates sitting: not absolutely necessary to sit, but necessary when sitting

Knowledge vs. Will: The Critical Distinction #

• God necessarily knows all things (including creatures) in knowing himself
• God does not necessarily will all things in willing himself
• Reason: Knowledge is had about things according as they are in the knower; will is compared to things as they are in themselves
• Since creatures have necessary being as they exist in God’s knowledge, God necessarily knows them
• Since creatures have contingent being in themselves and add nothing to God’s infinite goodness, God does not necessarily will them
• If God did not know creatures, there would be ignorance in God (a defect); but no defect if he does not will them

Key Arguments #

Against Will in God (Objections Presented) #

Objection 1: The End Objection

• The object of will is an end or good, but God has no end outside himself
• Response: God is his own end; his goodness has the character (ratio) of end with respect to all things that come from him

Objection 2: The Desire Objection

• Will is desire, which implies lack and imperfection
• Response: Though will is named from desire, it also includes love and joy; only desire strictly implies lack

Objection 3: The Unmoved Mover Objection

• The good moves the will; but God is the first unmoved mover
• Response: God’s will is moved only by himself, not by another; this is not motion in the strict sense

Against Willing Creatures (Objections Presented) #

Objection 1: The Identity Objection

• Divine willing is divine being; divine being is not other than itself; therefore no willing of other things
• Response: Though the act is the same, the words “being” and “willing” differ in their ratio (meaning): “being” implies no relation to something else, while “willing” does

Objection 2: The Multiplicity Objection

• If God wills himself and creatures, there would be multiple acts, thus composition
• Response: God wills all things by one simple act, just as he understands all things by one act

Objection 3: The Sufficiency Objection

• God’s goodness suffices for him; he needs nothing else
• Response: His goodness suffices, which is precisely why he wills things not out of need but freely; creatures add nothing to his goodness

Against Necessity of Willing Creatures (Objections Presented) #

Objection 1: The Eternity Objection

• Everything eternal is necessary; God wills from eternity
• Response: Some things are absolutely necessary (his own goodness); others are necessary from supposition

Objection 2: The Knowledge Parallel Objection

• God necessarily knows creatures; if will follows understanding, he necessarily wills them
• Response: Knowledge and will differ fundamentally: knowledge extends to things as they are in the knower (where they have necessary being in God); will extends to things as they are in themselves (where they have contingent being)

Objection 3: The Contingency Objection

• If God doesn’t necessarily will creatures, his will is contingent and thus imperfect
• Response: A necessary cause can have a non-necessary relation to an effect due to the defect of the effect, not the cause; God’s will is perfect; the contingency belongs to creatures

Important Definitions #

Natural Desire #

The inclination of a thing toward its natural form or perfection, not requiring consciousness. Example: a plant “desires” sunlight and water. Contrasts with intellectual desire (will).

Appetitus (Appetitive Power) #

The general power of desiring or wanting, including both sensory appetite (emotions: ἐπιθυμία/epithumia and θυμός/thumos) and intellectual appetite (will). Named from what is most apparent to us (desire/wanting), though not limited to that.

Ratio (Notion/Definition/Meaning) #

The intelligible content or definition of a word or concept. Though “being” and “willing” signify the same thing in God, they differ in their ratio because “willing” implies a relation to something other than God.

Necessity: Absolute vs. From Supposition #

• Absolute necessity: Required by the very nature of the terms themselves (e.g., man must be animal)
• Necessity from supposition: Required given a condition as actual (e.g., if Socrates is sitting, he must be sitting)
• God’s willing creatures is necessary from supposition (once willed, cannot be unwilled) but not absolutely necessary

Examples & Illustrations #

The Philosopher and Wisdom #

• The philosopher is named from love of wisdom, not from wonder
• One can love wisdom whether possessing it or not
• Wonder (desire to know) diminishes once knowledge is gained; love can remain and even increase
• This illustrates why philosophers are named for love rather than desire: the name must not imply they necessarily lack wisdom
• Parallels God loving his own goodness eternally without any deficiency

The Bitter Medicine #

• A patient wills to take bitter medicine only for the sake of health
• The bitterness itself is not willed; only health is willed
• The patient does not necessarily will medicine if health can be achieved another way
• Illustrates how willing an end does not necessarily require willing all possible means to that end
• Similarly, God wills creatures only as ordered to his own goodness; if creatures were unnecessary, no necessity to will them

Natural Things Diffusing Goodness #

• Every agent insofar as it is actual and perfect makes something like itself
• A natural thing not only rests in its own good but also diffuses that good to other things
• This pertains to the notion of will: the good one has, one communicates to others according as possible
• Elevates to divine level: the divine will communicates its goodness to creatures by way of likeness

The Plant Wanting Sun and Water #

• When purchasing a plant, we speak of it “wanting” sun or water, or being “a big feeder”
• This is natural desire, not conscious desire, illustrating appetite in non-intellectual creatures
• Shows how the term appetite extends beyond conscious desiring

Notable Quotes #

“Love is more basic than wanting or joy. But when you love something and don’t have it, then you want it. When you love something and have it, then you rejoice.” — Berquist, on the three acts of will

“God wills himself as the end; other things as towards that end.” — Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologiae I, Q. 19, A. 2)

“Knowledge is had about things according as they are in the knower. But the will is compared to things as they are in themselves.” — Thomas Aquinas (citing Aristotle)

“You realize that choosing you to be was not because you were more deserving to be than all those other people that could have been.” — Berquist, on the gratuity of creation

“God in creatures is no more than God alone.” — Thomas Aquinas

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Does God have a will? #

Answer: Yes, necessarily. Will follows upon understanding as appetite follows upon sense power. Since God understands, he must have will. Just as his understanding is his very being, so his will is his very being—no accidents in God.

Q2: What are the three acts of will, and which apply to God? #

Answer: Love (basic act), wanting (desire for what is lacked), and joy (delight in what is possessed). Only love and joy pertain to God; wanting cannot, since he lacks no good.

Q3: Does God will only himself or also creatures? #

Answer: God wills both himself and creatures. Every perfect agent communicates its goodness to others. God wills himself as the end and creatures as ordered toward that end.

Q4: Does God necessarily will everything he wills? #

Answer: God necessarily wills his own goodness (himself). However, he does not necessarily will creatures, though once willed, the willing is immutable. The distinction is between absolute necessity and necessity from supposition.

Q5: Why doesn’t God necessarily will creatures if he necessarily knows them? #

Answer: Because knowledge extends to things as they are in the knower (where they have necessary being in God), while will extends to things as they are in themselves (where they have contingent being). Creatures add nothing to God’s infinite goodness, so there is no necessity to will them. If God did not know creatures, there would be ignorance in God (a defect), but no defect if he does not will them.

Q6: Is God’s will contingent and therefore imperfect if he does not necessarily will creatures? #

Answer: No. A necessary cause can have a non-necessary relation to an effect due to the defect of the effect, not the cause. God’s will is perfect and necessary in itself; the contingency belongs to creatures, not to God’s willing.