85. God's Will as Cause of Things and Whether It Has a Cause
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Main Topics #
Article 4: Whether God Acts Through Will or by Necessity of Nature #
The Central Problem: Does God act through will and understanding, or does His goodness necessarily radiate from His essence like the sun naturally radiates light?
Dionysius’s Objection: Following Pseudo-Dionysius, the objection argues that God’s goodness, like the sun, sends forth rays of its own nature without reasoning or choosing. Since everything that acts through will must reason and choose, God does not act through will.
Thomas’s Solution: God must act through understanding and will, not by necessity of nature. Three proofs establish this:
Order of Agent Causes: Natural agents (which act by necessity of their form) require a superior understanding to predetermine their ends. Since God is the first agent, He must act through understanding and will.
Nature of Natural Agents: A natural agent always acts in the same way (unless impeded) because its action follows necessarily from its determined form. But God’s being is infinite and undetermined; it contains the whole perfection of being. Therefore, God cannot act by necessity of nature, or He would produce only one effect. Yet God produces many determined effects from His infinite perfection, which is possible only through the determination of will and understanding.
Relation of Effects to Cause: Effects preexist in a cause according to the mode of the cause. Since God is divine understanding, effects preexist in Him in an intelligible way. Therefore, they proceed from Him intelligibly and thus by way of will (since the inclination to act what is conceived by understanding pertains to will).
Key Distinction: Nature vs. Will
- Nature: Determined to one effect; acts necessarily in the same way unless impeded; acts according as it is (hence producing only effects like itself)
- Will/Reason: Open to opposites; capable of willing different effects; acts through knowledge, which encompasses opposites
Aristotle’s Crucial Insight: There is the same knowledge of opposites. A doctor’s knowledge of medicine enables him to heal or to harm—his knowledge is open to both. Knowledge alone cannot determine which opposite will be actualized; the will must determine this. Therefore, something must be added to knowledge to produce action: the will’s determination.
Reply to First Objection: Dionysius does not intend to exclude choice from God simply, but secundum quid (in a certain respect). He means that God communicates His goodness not to some things alone but to all things. Choice implies discretion, and God’s goodness appears indiscrete in that He sends rain on the just and unjust. Nevertheless, there is a metaphorical likeness in the comparison of God to the sun; metaphor is always based on likeness, though considerable difference remains.
Reply to Second Objection: God’s essence is His understanding and will. Therefore, that He acts through His essence means He acts by way of understanding and will. This is reflected in the Trinity: the Son proceeds from the Father by way of nature (by God’s natural understanding), while the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of what God freely (not merely naturally) wills.
Article 5: Whether the Divine Will Has a Cause #
The Problem: Augustine asks who would dare to say God constituted all things unreasonably. Does not reason for action imply a cause of willing? If the divine will has no cause, would it not follow that all things depend on God’s simple will alone, making other sciences superfluous?
Thomas’s Answer: The divine will has no cause whatsoever.
The Fundamental Reasoning:
Just as the will follows upon understanding, there can be a cause of willing in the same way there is a cause of understanding. In human understanding, premises cause knowledge of conclusions through discursive reasoning—one act of knowledge causes another. However, in God there is no discourse, neither in understanding nor in willing. God has only one act of understanding and one act of will. He understands and wills Himself, and in understanding and willing Himself, He understands and wills other things.
The Critical Axiom: Nothing is the beginning of itself (nihil est sui principium). Therefore, God’s willing cannot be caused—not even by itself—because the same thing cannot be a cause of itself.
The Analogy with Human Willing:
- For us, the will regarding the end is like premises to conclusions in understanding
- For us, one can will an end without yet willing the means to that end
- When we discover means to an end, our willing the end becomes a cause of our willing the means
- In God: By one act, He wills both the end and the means to the end. If His willing the end and His willing the means were two acts, one could cause the other. But they are one act. Therefore, His willing one cannot be the cause of His willing the other—for the same reason that nothing is a cause of itself.
Yet God’s Will Is Reasonable: God’s will is reasonable not because something external causes His willing, but because He wills this on account of that. For example, God wills man to have a hand that it might serve his understanding; He wills man to have understanding that he might be man; He wills man to be that he might enjoy God. This ordering of things is reasonable, but the ordering does not mean one willing causes another willing.
Important Distinction: God wills to order means to their end. He wills “this to be on account of that,” but not “on account of this willing of that.” One must distinguish between:
- Willing one thing for the sake of another (a matter of the content of will)
- One act of willing being caused by another act of willing (impossible in God)
Key Arguments #
Why God Cannot Act by Nature Alone #
Objection: “What is so essentially is before what is so by participation. God acts through His essence (which is His nature), therefore through nature and not will.”
Reply: God’s essence is His understanding and His will. Therefore, to say He acts through His essence means He acts through understanding and will. Moreover, the Trinity exemplifies this: the Son proceeds naturally (per modum naturae) from the Father, while the Holy Spirit proceeds in a way that involves God’s will.
Why Knowledge Alone Cannot Determine Divine Action #
Principle: There is the same knowledge of opposites. Knowledge encompasses both what is and what is not the case; it contains knowledge of all possibilities.
Consequence: Knowledge alone cannot actualize one possibility rather than another. For example, medical knowledge encompasses both healing and harming; the doctor’s knowledge does not determine which he will do. Something must be added: the will’s determination.
Application to God: God necessarily knows all things (knowing them in Himself), but this knowledge does not necessitate His willing them. God’s knowledge is infinite and comprehensive; His will is free to determine which of these knowable things shall come to be.
Why Secondary Causes Remain Necessary #
Objection: “If God’s will is the cause of all things, why seek other causes? Would this not make all sciences superfluous?”
Reply: God wills effects to come about through secondary causes in order that there might be order in things. Seeking other causes is not superfluous if they are understood as dependent upon divine will, not as something first and independent.
Augustine’s Warning: Philosophers erred in attributing contingent effects to secondary causes as though these were first causes, while being unable to see the superior cause—God’s will—which encompasses them all.
Principle: The universal cause does not exclude particular causes; rather, particular causes are included under the universal cause.
Why Effects Depend on Divine Will in Different Ways #
Hierarchy of Dependence:
- First effects (e.g., that man has understanding): Depend on divine will alone
- Subsequent effects (e.g., that man has a hand): Depend on both divine will and secondary causes
Example: God wills man to have understanding (this depends on divine will alone). God wills man to have a hand that it might serve his understanding (this depends on both divine will and the secondary cause—the nature of man as a rational animal). God wills man to be that he might enjoy God (the ultimate end depends on divine will alone; intermediate ends and means depend on secondary causes ordered to this end).
Important Definitions #
Natural Agent (agens naturale): An agent that acts through its form, determined to one effect, acting necessarily in the same way unless impeded. Examples: fire heating, the sun producing light.
Rational/Voluntary Agent (agens rationale): An agent that acts through knowledge (per scientiam), open to opposites, capable of willing different effects. The same knowledge encompasses opposites (e.g., medical knowledge encompasses both healing and harming), so the will must determine which opposite is actualized.
The Axiom of Non-Self-Causation (nihil est sui principium): Nothing is the beginning of itself. Therefore, a thing cannot be a cause of itself, and an act cannot cause itself.
One Act of Divine Willing: God wills all things in one simple act, just as He understands all things in one act of understanding Himself. This does not mean multiplied acts in God, which would compromise His absolute simplicity.
Discourse (discursus): The movement from one act of knowledge to another act of knowledge. In human reasoning, knowledge of premises causes knowledge of conclusions. God has no discourse; He grasps all truths in one act.
Examples & Illustrations #
The Sun and God’s Goodness #
Dionysius compares God to the sun: just as the sun naturally radiates light without reasoning or choosing (the light flows from the sun’s essence), so God’s goodness naturally radiates to all things. Thomas’s Response: This is a metaphor. God does not act by natural necessity but by will and understanding. Metaphors are based on likenesses but involve considerable differences. We should not overextend the metaphor as if God’s goodness necessarily breaks out into creatures the way the sun necessarily radiates light.
The Doctor and Opposites #
A doctor’s knowledge of medicine enables him to heal or to harm. His knowledge is open to both opposites. The doctor cannot be determined by knowledge alone to heal or to harm; his will must determine which he does. A skillful doctor knows how to end someone’s life quickly and painlessly—this knowledge enables the opposite effect. Something other than knowledge determines the doctor to heal rather than harm: his will.
The Teacher and Deception #
A teacher of logic possesses knowledge of arguments. This knowledge enables both teaching correctly and deceiving students. When the teacher gives an argument where the premises are true and the conclusion is true but the conclusion does not follow, he knows students will be deceived. His knowledge enables this deception; his will determines whether he teaches truthfully or deceives.
The Example of the Argument #
Berquist provides: “Every mother is a woman, no man is a woman, therefore no man is a mother.” This argument is valid (the conclusion follows). But then he gives: “Every mother is a woman, no man is a mother, therefore no man is a woman.” Most students think this follows because both premises and conclusion are true, yet the conclusion does not follow from the premises. If he gives this same form with “Every dog is an animal, no cat is a dog, therefore no cat is an animal,” students recognize it does not follow. His knowledge enables him to know which formulation will deceive which students.
The Hand and Understanding #
God wills man to have a hand that it might serve his understanding (hands are tools that enable diverse operations of reason). Animals have claws rather than hands because their intellect is limited. Anaxagoras said man is most intelligent because he has a hand; Aristotle reversed it: man has a hand because he is most intelligent. The hand is the tool of tools (organum organorum) serving reason’s infinite operations. Yet in God’s willing, this ordering does not mean His willing understanding causes His willing the hand in the sense of one act causing another.
Mozart’s Musical Joke #
Mozart composed a piece (K. 522) called “A Musical Joke” that contains obvious musical mistakes and more subtle ones Mozart is pointing out. Mozart knows how to write music correctly; his knowledge encompasses how to write incorrectly as well. He determines by his will to demonstrate bad composition while knowing how to do it well. This illustrates how knowledge of an art encompasses both correct and incorrect performances; the artist’s will determines which is actualized.
Shakespeare and Amateur Actors #
Shakespeare sometimes makes fun of amateur actors in his plays, showing he knows how to act badly as well as well. His knowledge and art enable him to represent both excellence and incompetence. His will determines what he chooses to portray.
Light Before Warmth #
In the Church Fathers, it is sometimes said that the Son enlightens the earth before it warms it. So also God enlightens the mind with the light of faith before He warms the heart with charity. Yet (per Augustine) by believing we come to hope, and by hoping to love. Although there is a metaphorical sequence in the order of illumination, God’s giving faith is a gift unlike the sun’s natural production of light and warmth in sequence.
Notable Quotes #
“God acts through will and not by necessity of nature, as some have estimated.” — Thomas Aquinas (quoted by Berquist)
“Nature is determined to one effect; but reason and will are open to opposites.” — Aristotle (cited by Thomas, quoted by Berquist)
“The will of God is reasonable. Not that something is to God the cause of willing, but insofar as he wills this to be on account of that.” — Thomas Aquinas, Reply to First Objection (quoted by Berquist)
“Nothing is the beginning of itself.” — Axiom used by Thomas (quoted by Berquist)
“Likeness is a slippery thing… and a dangerous thing, because likeness is the cause of deception.” — Berquist, reflecting on Plato
“Reason likes the differences of things, but imagination likes the likenesses of things.” — Shelley (cited by Berquist)
“Who dares to say that God unreasonably constituted all things?” — Augustine (quoted as first objection)
“For every efficient cause, every mover maker, is greater than that which it affects, but nothing is greater than the will of God.” — Augustine (quoted against the objections)
Questions Addressed #
Q: Why must God act through will rather than by necessity of nature?
A: Because God’s infinite perfection cannot be limited to producing one effect (as nature is). Nature acts always in the same way according to its determined form, producing effects like itself. But God’s being is infinite and contains the whole perfection of being. If God acted only by nature, He would produce only one effect. Yet God produces many determined effects from His infinite perfection. This is possible only through the determination of God’s will and understanding, which are open to opposites and can determine which effect to actualize.
Q: How can God’s essence be His nature yet He acts through will, not by nature?
A: God’s essence is His understanding and His will. Therefore, when we say He acts through His essence, this means He acts through understanding and will. The Trinity exemplifies this: the Son proceeds from the Father by way of nature (per modum naturae, through God’s natural understanding), while the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will (through what God freely wills).
Q: How can knowledge of opposites not determine action?
A: Because there is the same knowledge of opposites. Medical knowledge encompasses both healing and harming; the doctor’s knowledge does not determine which he will do. Knowledge presents possibilities; the will determines which shall be actualized. In God, infinite knowledge encompasses all possibilities, but only His will determines which shall come to be.
Q: Does the divine will have a cause?
A: No. The divine will has no cause whatsoever. The axiom “nothing is the beginning of itself” applies: God’s will cannot be caused, not even by itself. There is only one act of divine willing; one act cannot cause itself. Although God’s willing is reasonable (He wills this on account of that), this ordering of willing does not mean one act of willing causes another.
Q: If God’s will has no cause, are other sciences superfluous?
A: No. God wills effects to come about through secondary causes in order to preserve order in creation. Seeking secondary causes is not superfluous if they are understood as dependent upon divine will, not as first causes. The universal cause (God) does not exclude particular causes; rather, particular causes are included under the universal cause.
Q: How does God will both the end and the means to the end in one act?
A: For us, willing an end can occur without willing the means, and discovering means to an end can cause us to will the means. But God, by one simple act, wills all things. He wills man to have a hand that it might serve understanding; He wills understanding that man might be man; He wills man to be that he might enjoy God. In this one act, God wills this for the sake of that, but His willing one does not cause His willing the other (for nothing is a cause of itself). Yet He orders means to their end in this single willing.