96. Divine Providence and Its Extension to All Things
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
Etymology and Concept of Providence: Providence (providentia) derives from foresight (προνοια), which Shakespeare characterizes as reason’s ability to “look before and after.” This echoes Homer’s similar characterization in the Iliad, demonstrating how poets illuminate philosophical concepts. The word prudence (prudentia) itself derives from providentia through contraction.
The Central Question: Whether divine providence extends only to universals and incorruptible things, or to all things including particulars, corruptible things, and contingent events.
Five Objections Against Universal Providence:
- Fortune and chance seem to escape divine foresight
- Evil in the world contradicts an all-knowing, all-powerful provider
- Necessary things do not require foresight (which concerns contingents)
- God leaves man “in the hand of his own counsel,” suggesting exclusion from providence
- God has no care about oxen (and other irrational creatures)
God’s Universal Causality: The foundational argument: every agent acts for an end; therefore, the ordering of effects to their end extends as far as the agent’s causality extends. God, as first agent and universal cause of being, has causality extending to all beings—not merely species principles but individual principles.
Knowledge and Execution: God’s knowledge extends to all particulars (not merely universals), and His knowledge is compared to the artist’s knowledge of artificial things. All things must therefore be ordered under divine providence as artifacts are ordered under art.
Key Arguments #
The Universal Causality Argument #
- Since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects to their end proceeds from the agent’s causality
- God’s causality extends to all being (as cause of being as such)
- Therefore, all things—whether incorruptible or corruptible, necessary or contingent, universal or particular—are ordered by God to an end
- Corollary: Divine providence is nothing other than “the reason of the order of things to their end”
Response to Fortune and Chance (Objection 1) #
- Distinction: something can escape the order of a particular cause through interference by another particular cause
- Nothing can escape the order of the universal cause
- What is fortuitous with respect to a particular cause is nonetheless foreseen with respect to the universal cause
- Example: Two servants meeting by chance is fortuitous from their perspective but foreseen by God who sends them to the same place
Response to Evil in the World (Objection 2) #
- A universal provider permits defects in particulars to preserve the good of the whole
- The corruption of one thing is the generation of another; species is conserved through this process
- Without death of animals, there would be no life for lions; without persecution, no patience of martyrs
- Augustine: God would not permit evil unless He could make good even out of evil
- Note: Thomas does not attempt to prove in detail that goods resulting from evil outweigh goods that would have obtained without evil—this exceeds human comprehension
Response to Necessary Things (Objection 3) #
- Man is not the institutor of nature but uses natural things for his purposes
- Human foresight does not extend to necessary things coming from nature
- God, as author of nature, has foresight over necessary things
- Distinction: human prudence (as Aristotle defines it) concerns contingent things; divine providence concerns all things
Response to Human Free Will (Objection 4) #
- God leaving man “in the hand of his own counsel” does not exclude him from divine providence
- Rather, it shows that man has a power not determined to one thing (unlike natural things)
- The natural power is determined to one effect; the rational power is open to opposites
- Examples: Fire necessarily heats; a doctor’s art can heal or make sick; a cook can make good or bad tea
- Acts of free choice are reduced to God as universal cause while remaining free
Response to Irrational Creatures (Objection 5) #
- The rational creature has special dominion over his acts through free will
- Therefore special divine providence regarding guilt, merit, and salvation
- This does not exclude irrational creatures from divine providence, only from moral accountability
Important Definitions #
Providence (Providentia): The divine reason constituted in the beginning of all things, which disposes and orders all things. The “reason of the order of things to their end.”
Foresight (Προνοια): Etymologically from “pro” (before) and “noein” (to see/know). The chief integral part of prudence; the ability to see/foresee ahead. Related to reason’s characteristic of “looking before and after.”
Prudence (Prudentia): Derived from providentia through contraction; right reason about contingent things (things that can be or not be). The virtue concerning counsel and choice.
Contingent Things: Things that can be or not be; things about which counsel and choice are possible.
Universal vs. Particular Cause: A particular cause’s effects can be impeded by another particular cause. A universal cause’s effects cannot escape its order. What is fortuitous with respect to particular causes is foreseen by the universal cause.
Natural Power vs. Rational Power: Natural power is determined to one effect (fire always heats). Rational power is open to opposites (a doctor can heal or make sick; reason can produce good or bad results).
Examples & Illustrations #
The Two Servants: Two servants running together meet by chance from their perspective, but God foresaw and arranged their meeting. They did not intend to meet; the one did not know about the other.
The Car Accident: A man and woman meet in court over a car accident. Through repeated court appearances, they meet many times, grow to like each other, and eventually marry. Fortuitous from their perspective; foreseen by God.
The Lion and Its Prey: If all bad things were prevented, there would be no life for lions (which requires killing of animals). Similarly, without persecution by tyrants, there would be no patience of martyrs.
The Doctor’s Art: A doctor’s art enables him to heal or to make sick; his rational power is open to opposites, unlike the determined power of fire (which can only burn).
Tea and Steak: Good or bad tea depends on steeping time; chemicals released change after 7-10 minutes, making bad tea qualitatively different, not merely stronger. A cook can make good or bad steak. These illustrate rational power’s openness to opposites.
Notable Quotes #
“Reason is the ability for a large discourse looking before and after.” (Shakespeare, Hamlet, on the nature of reason and foresight)
“The omnipotent God in no way would allow there to be something bad in his works unless he was so omnipotent and good that he could make good even out of evil.” (Augustine, Enchiridion)
“He reaches from end to end strongly and disposes all things sweetly.” (Wisdom 8:1, on divine wisdom—the contra objections passage)
Questions Addressed #
Q: Does divine providence extend to all things, including particulars and corruptible things?
A: Yes. God’s causality as cause of being extends to all things not only in their universal aspects but in their individual, particular principles. Divine providence is the ordering of all effects to their end, and this ordering extends wherever God’s causality extends.
Q: How can things happen by chance if God foresees all things?
A: What is fortuitous with respect to particular causes is nonetheless foreseen by the universal cause. God’s causality is so powerful that what He foresees takes place in the way He foresaw it—some by necessity, some by chance, some by contingency. Nothing escapes the order of the universal cause, even if particular causes can be impeded.
Q: Why does God permit evil if He is all-powerful and all-knowing?
A: A universal provider permits defects in particulars to preserve the good of the whole. The corruption of one thing is the generation of another, conserving the species. Without such defects, many goods would be lacking—there would be no lion’s life, no martyrs’ patience. Our minds cannot grasp all the reasons why specific evils are permitted, but reason shows this must be the way things are.
Q: If something is necessary, why does it need divine foresight?
A: Man, not being the institutor of nature, cannot exercise foresight over necessary things from nature. God, being the author of nature, has foresight even over necessary things. Human prudence (as Aristotle defines it) concerns contingent things, but divine providence concerns all things without exception.
Q: Does God’s providence over human acts eliminate human free will?
A: No. God leaving man “in the hand of his own counsel” means man has a power not determined to one thing. This is not exclusion from providence but rather a manifestation of divine providence respecting the nature of rational creatures. Acts of free choice are reduced to God as universal cause while remaining truly free.
Scholastic Method and Rhetorical Notes #
Antonomasia: The figure of speech of substituting the general for the particular (or vice versa). Examples: calling Aristotle “the Philosopher,” calling St. Paul “the Apostle,” calling a lover “a Romeo.” Berquist notes this figure was invented by rhetoricians, not philosophers, and often the word etymology does not illuminate the figure itself.
Classification of Minds: Following Hesiod and Aristotle, Berquist playfully divides minds into three categories: (1) those capable of great discoveries themselves (“wits”), (2) those who can learn great discoveries from great minds (“dimwits”), and (3) those who can neither discover nor learn great things (“nitwits”). He classifies himself as an “upper dimwit”—one who knows who the great minds are (like Thomas Aquinas).
The Value of Heresy and Error: Augustine notes that heresies are necessary; they force the Church to understand articles of faith more deeply through refutation of misunderstandings. Similarly, in philosophy, refutation of error is a means by which the human mind advances.