114. Real Relations in God and Divine Distinction

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Question 28: Divine Relations #

Thomas’s treatment of relations in God proceeds through four articles:

1. Whether real relations exist in God
2. Whether those relations are identical with the divine essence or substance
3. Whether multiple relations really distinct from each other can exist in God
4. The number of divine relations (concluded to be four)

The Problem of Naming and Categories #

Berquist begins by reflecting on the philosophical problem of naming things that fall between established categories. Just as Aristotle lacked a term for a disposition lacking in sensation (ἀναίσθησία), and Renaissance scholars coined “tragicomedy” for plays between tragedy and comedy, so too does theology struggle to name the procession of the Holy Spirit properly. The term “breathing” (spiratio) is proposed as a possible invented name, since the procession is not a “generation” (which implies likeness, as in father-to-son) but rather proceeds by way of love.

The Category of Relation (ad aliquid) #

Aristotle’s category of “toward something” (Greek: πρός τι; Latin: ad aliquid) is central to understanding divine relations. Relations are fundamentally about a respect or ordering toward another thing. The key insight is that:

• Relations can be real (when grounded in the nature of things)
• Relations can be of reason only (when existing only in the mind’s consideration)
• The distinction between these two types is crucial for understanding how God can have real relations while remaining absolutely one

Real vs. Rational Relations #

Real Relations exist when things are naturally ordered to each other:

• A son proceeding from his father in the same specific nature establishes real relations on both sides
• The procession of the Word (Son) and Love (Holy Spirit) in identity of nature with the Father establish real relations
• In creatures: a heavy body is really related to the center of the universe (its natural place)

Relations of Reason exist only in the mind’s consideration:

• A thing to itself (e.g., Socrates to Socrates)
• Universals: genus to species, subject to predicate
• Logical distinctions that do not reflect real ontological differences
• Relations between non-existent things (today to tomorrow, since tomorrow does not yet exist)
• Relations arising purely from understanding, as studied in logic

Key Arguments #

Article 1: Whether Real Relations Exist in God #

Objections claiming relations are NOT real:

1. Boethius’s principle: “When someone turns the predicaments into divine predication, all are changed into substance.” If relations were real accidents (as in creatures), they would be something other than the divine substance. But this contradicts the principle that whatever is in God is God.

2. Two distinct extremes required: Real relations require two really distinct things. But in God, there is only one substance. Therefore, relations cannot be real.

3. Self-relation analogy: Boethius states the relation of Father to Son is “like the relation of that which is the same to that which is the same” (similis est relatio)—i.e., like the relation of Socrates to Socrates. Such relations are merely rational, not real.

4. Relations from understanding are rational: Relations arising from understanding are relations of reason only (as in logic: genus, species, subject, predicate). Generation in divine things follows from the proceeding of the understandable word. Therefore, fatherhood and sonhood are relations of reason only.

Thomas’s Response: Real relations exist in God because the processions are in identity of nature. When something proceeds from a beginning of the same nature (not merely the same universal kind, but the same numerical substance shared), both the proceeding thing and that from which it proceeds must have real relations to each other.

The crucial principle: Whatever is in God is God. Since God’s understanding of Himself is identical with His being (God as understood is God), and God’s loving of Himself is identical with His being (God is love), the relations arising from these processions must be real. They are not accidents inhering in a subject, but are identified with the divine substance itself.

The Boethius Problem: Resolving the Apparent Contradiction #

Boethius seems to say that relations are not truly said “ad aliquid” (toward something) in God, suggesting they lack the defining character of relations. Thomas clarifies: Boethius is not denying that relations are in God, but rather denying that they are predicated “by way of existing within” according to the proper notion of a relation as an accident. Rather, relations have themselves “toward another” without being extrinsic accidents.

The analogy to self-relation (Socrates to Socrates) is apt only in one respect: through these relations, the substance is not diversified. Just as “Socrates is Socrates” does not introduce a new Socrates, so too “God from God, Light from Light” does not introduce a new God. The substance remains one and numerically identical.

The Identity of Substance and Relations #

Key principle: There is no real distinction between the divine essence and the relations, but there is a distinction of reason (distinctio rationis).

• Between the Father and God: no real distinction (the Father is God)
• Between Fatherhood and divine nature: no real distinction (they are one and the same)
• Between Father and Son: real distinction (they are really distinct persons)

This apparent paradox is resolved by understanding that:

• The relations are identical with the substance
• But the relations are really distinct from each other
• This is unique to God; in creatures, accidents are distinct from substance

Important Definitions #

ad aliquid (πρός τι) #

The category of “toward something”—a relation that signifies a respect toward another thing. In Aristotle, this is one of the ten categories. Relations can be either real (grounded in the nature of things) or rational (existing only in reason’s consideration).

Distinction of Reason (distinctio rationis) #

A distinction that exists only in the intellect’s consideration, not in the thing itself. The distinction between the divine essence and the relations is one of reason, not a real distinction—meaning God’s essence and God’s relations are ultimately the same thing, though we can think of them distinctly.

Real Relation #

A relation existing in the nature of things themselves, arising from the intrinsic ordering of one thing to another. In God, the relations of fatherhood, sonhood, and spiration are real because they arise from the processions of the Word and Love, which are in identity of nature.

Procession (processio) #

The going forth of one divine person from another: the procession of the Word (Son) from the Father through understanding, and the procession of Love (Holy Spirit) from the Father and Son through willing. These processions are in identity of nature with God.

Relation of Reason (relatio rationis) #

A relation existing only in the mind’s consideration. Examples include: genus to species, subject to predicate, a thing to itself, and logical distinctions. These are studied in logic but do not correspond to real ontological distinctions.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Son and Father Relation #

Like “Socrates is Socrates” in that the substance is not diversified (numerically the same God), but unlike it in that Father and Son are really distinct persons. The distinction is not in the substance but in the relations themselves: Fatherhood vs. Sonhood.

Relations in Creatures #

• Heavy body and natural place: A heavy body has a real relation to the center of the universe (its natural place) because of its intrinsic nature and ordering.
• Knower and known: The knower is really related to what is known, but the known is not really related to the knower (a one-directional real relation, as God is to creatures).

Relations of Reason in Logic #

• Man and Animal: When I classify man as a species of animal (genus), this relation exists only in reason’s consideration, not in the individual man himself.
• Subject and Predicate: “Socrates” is a subject and “man” is a predicate in the statement “Socrates is a man,” but this distinction exists only in the logical structure, not in the thing itself.
• Three and Odd: Saying “three is an odd number” and “three is a number” expresses relations of reason based on universal concepts, not real properties of the number three.

Shakespeare’s Plays as Naming Problem #

The last plays of Shakespeare (Pericles, Cymbeline, The Tempest) were originally classified as either tragedies or comedies in the First Folio (1623). Modern editors created a new category, “romances,” to name plays that fall between tragedy and comedy. Berquist further subdivides these into “mercy and forgiveness romances” (closer to tragedy) and “love and friendship romances” (closer to comedy), exemplified by characters who mistake their spouse’s infidelity: comic in The Merry Wives of Windsor, tragic in Othello, and intermediate in Cymbeline and The Winter’s Tale.

The Heresy of Sabellius #

Sabellius erred by treating the distinctions of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as merely nominal or rational distinctions—merely three names for the same person, distinguished only according to His different operations (Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier). By affirming real relations in God, Thomas refutes this heresy and establishes that the three persons are genuinely distinct.

Notable Quotes #

“Likeness is a slippery thing.” — Plato (Sophist, cited by Berquist)

Berquist uses this to warn against exaggerating the likeness between God’s relation to Himself and a creature’s self-relation. Plato notes that likeness is essential to knowledge but also a source of deception when differences are overlooked.

“God from God, light from light, true God from true God.” — Athanasian Creed

This formula expresses the real relations while maintaining the numerical identity of substance—not a different God proceeding from God, but the same God, just as light from light is not different light.

“Whatever is in God is God.” — Thomas Aquinas

This principle resolves how real relations can exist in God without introducing composition or multiplying the divine substance.

“A relation signifies by its proper definition only a respect toward some other thing.” — Thomas Aquinas (on ad aliquid)

Questions Addressed #

Q: Are there real relations in God? #

A: Yes. Because the processions in God are in identity of nature (God’s understanding of Himself is His being; God’s loving of Himself is His being), the relations arising from these processions must be real. The Father and Son are really related to each other because the Son truly proceeds from the Father in the same divine nature.

Q: Can one thing be related to itself in a real way? #

A: No. Relations to oneself are purely rational. However, the Father’s relation to the Son is not a relation of one thing to itself—it is a relation between two really distinct persons who share one substance numerically. The analogy to self-relation holds only in that the substance is not diversified (as in “Socrates is Socrates”), not in the full sense.

Q: How can God have real relations while remaining absolutely simple and one? #

A: The relations are identical with the divine essence. There is no real distinction between the essence and the relations, though there is a distinction of reason. The real distinctions are between the relations themselves (fatherhood vs. sonship), not between essence and relations. This is unique to God because God is pure act without composition.