115. Real Relations in God and Divine Simplicity
Summary
Listen to Lecture
Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript
Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
Real Relations vs. Relations of Reason #
Thomas argues that some relations within God are real relations, not merely mental constructs. This is essential because:
- If relations were only of reason, the distinctions between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit would be merely conceptual
- The processions in God (of Word and Love) occur in identity of nature, requiring real relations to ground the real distinctions between persons
- This avoids Sabellianism (the heresy that the three persons are merely different modes or aspects of one person)
Objections claim relations are only of reason because:
- They cite four types of relations of reason: (1) based on universals (genus to species); (2) involving non-existent things (today before tomorrow); (3) one-directional relations like measure to measured; (4) relations based on operations of understanding
Thomas’s response: These objections conflate different kinds of relations of reason and miss the distinction between relations that exist only in the mind versus relations grounded in the very nature of things.
Distinction Between Real and Non-Real Relations #
A real relation requires:
- Both relata to exist
- A natural ordering or inclination between them grounded in their natures
- Mutual dependence in their very nature
Relations of reason occur when:
- One or both relata don’t exist in reality
- A relation is one-directional (only one thing is really related)
- The relation depends on the mind’s operation of comparison
Key example: The relation of God to creatures is a relation of reason (creatures depend on God; God does not depend on creatures), but the relation of Father to Son is a real relation (both depend on each other’s relational definition).
Relations and the Divine Essence #
The central problem: If relations are in God, and nothing can be in God that is not God (due to divine simplicity), then relations must be identical with the divine essence. But then how can three relations (paternity, filiation, procession) be really distinct from each other?
Resolution: Relations differ from the divine essence only in definition (ratio), not in reality (secundum rem):
- Compared to the essence: Fatherhood = the divine essence; Sonship = the divine essence (no real distinction)
- Compared to each other: Fatherhood ≠ Sonship (really distinct, because they are opposite relations)
This distinction holds because:
- Fatherhood is defined as “the relation from whom another proceeds”
- Sonship is defined as “the relation from another proceeding”
- Though identical in reality (both are God’s essence), they differ in relational character
Aristotle’s Analysis of Opposition #
Thomas relies on Aristotle’s four types of opposition (from Categories, Book 5):
- Contradiction (being/non-being) - one must be true, the other false
- Lack and Habit (sight/blindness) - privation of a natural capacity
- Contraries (virtue/vice, health/sickness) - same genus, real opposition
- Relatives (double/half, father/son) - defined by relation to opposite
Why relatives matter for the Trinity: Relatives require their opposite to exist, but neither eliminates the other’s reality. Father and Son are really distinct yet remain one in substance because they are opposed as relatives, not as contraries.
The Problem of Transitive Equality #
Objection: If fatherhood = divine essence and sonship = divine essence, then by transitivity, fatherhood = sonship, which is false.
Response: This syllogism holds only when both things are identical in both reality and definition. Fatherhood and sonship are:
- Identical in reality (both are the divine essence)
- Different in definition (one implies “from whom,” the other “from another”)
Analogy: Acting-upon and undergoing are the same motion but differ in definition—one proceeds from the agent, the other is received in the patient. Similarly, the relational definitions differ while the reality remains one.
Relations as Accidents vs. Substantial Beings #
In creatures, relations are accidents (existing in a subject, like “father” existing in a man). In God:
- Nothing can exist as an accident in God (this would imply something in God that is not God)
- Therefore, relations must have substantial being in God
- Relations are the divine essence itself, understood relatively (ad aliquid)
Berquist’s clarification: When we say something “is in” God or God “has” something, we must realize that whatever is in God is God. Words like “in” and “to have” are borrowed from creatures where haver and had are distinct; in God, they are identical in reality.
Key Arguments #
Argument 1: Relations Procede from Divine Operations #
- God’s being is pure act; from this actuality, Word and Love proceed
- These processions occur in identity of nature (not like creature producing external effects)
- Real processions in identity of nature require real relations between producer and product
- Therefore, real relations exist in God (fatherhood of producer, filiation of product)
Argument 2: Divine Perfection Requires Relations Be Identical with Essence #
- If relations were accidents, they would be added to God’s essence
- Accidents imply potentiality (something that was not the essence becomes present)
- God is pure act; no potentiality can be in God
- Therefore, relations must be the divine essence itself
Argument 3: The Distinction Between Relations Is Real #
- Relations are defined as relatives: each relation is defined by reference to its opposite
- Where there is real opposition (relatives requiring each other), there is real distinction
- Fatherhood and sonship are opposed as relatives
- Therefore, they are really distinct, even though identical with the divine essence in reality
Important Definitions #
Relation (habitudo): The being of relation is to have itself toward another. In creatures, relation is an accident; in God, relation is the divine essence understood as toward another.
Real Relation: A relation grounded in the natures of things themselves, requiring both relata to exist and be naturally ordered to each other.
Relation of Reason: A relation that exists only in the mind’s consideration, either because one or both relata don’t exist in reality, or because the relation is one-directional.
Absolute (absolutum): That which is not defined by relation to another; substance, quantity, quality are absolute predicaments.
Relative (relativum): That which is defined by relation to another. The definition of a relative essentially includes reference to its opposite.
Opposite (oppositum): In relatives, a mutual dependence without mutual exclusion. Father and son require each other but both can exist simultaneously.
Distinction of Reason (distinctio rationis): A distinction that exists only in the mind’s consideration; the things distinguished are identical in reality but differ in definition.
Examples & Illustrations #
The Socrates Analogy #
The relation of Socrates to Socrates (identity) is unlike the relation of Father to Son in one way: in Socrates to Socrates, the subject and predicate are not really related. But Father and Son are really related, because they are opposed as relatives and really depend on each other’s relational being.
Acting Upon and Undergoing #
When A acts upon B, the acting and the undergoing are the same motion in reality, but they differ in definition:
- Acting: proceeds from the agent toward the patient
- Undergoing: is received in the patient from the agent
Similarly, fatherhood and sonship are the same divine essence in reality, but differ in relational definition.
Knowledge and Seeing #
Aristotle’s example: If I know you, my knowledge is related to you (depends on you existing). But is your being known by me a real relation to you? No—it’s a relation of reason. You exist whether or not I know you.
But Thomas says: God is to creatures as the known to the knower (relation of reason in God), while creatures are to God as the knower to the known (real relation in creatures). This shows how one-directional relations can be real on one side only.
Measure and Measured #
God is the measure of creatures (real relation in creatures), but creatures are not the measure of God. The measure is said by reason to be the measure of the measured, but the measured depends on the measure. Therefore, God is only said by reason to be related to creatures, while creatures are really related to God.
The Imagination and Deception #
Berquist notes that imagination is “the big cause of deception” because it deals with likenesses of things without accounting for their differences. This is why the metaphor and simile—based on likeness—can confuse us about the Trinity. We imagine three gods because imagination groups similar things together, not accounting for the real differences between relative opposition and absolute distinction.
Questions Addressed #
Q: Are there real relations in God, or only relations of reason? #
A: There are real relations in God. The processions of Word and Love occur in identity of nature and ground real relations between Father and Son. The objections confuse different types of relations of reason (based on universals, non-existent things, measure-measured, and operations of understanding) and wrongly apply them to the real relations that distinguish the divine persons.
Q: How can relations be identical with the divine essence while being really distinct from each other? #
A: Relations differ from essence only in definition, not in reality. Fatherhood and sonship are both the divine essence in reality, but they differ in relational definition because they are opposed as relatives. Real distinction can exist according to relative things even when there is no real distinction according to absolute things (the essence).
Q: Why doesn’t God have a real relation to creatures, even though creatures have a real relation to God? #
A: Because God produces creatures not from necessity of nature but from free will and understanding. God’s production of creatures does not belong to his nature; he could choose not to create. Creatures, however, are contained under divine order and depend on God by their very nature. Therefore, the relation is real in creatures but only of reason in God.
Q: How does Aristotle’s analysis of relatives help resolve the apparent contradiction in saying “one God” and “three persons”? #
A: Relatives (like father/son) are a type of opposition where each requires the other without mutual exclusion, unlike contraries (like virtue/vice) where one excludes the other. Father and Son are opposed as relatives while remaining one in substance. This shows that real distinction (among relatives) does not entail numerical plurality in substance.
Notable Quotes #
“Whatever is in God is God” (Implicit in Thomas’s argument from divine simplicity) This principle grounds the entire resolution: relations must be the divine essence itself because nothing else can exist in God.
“The relation multiplies the Trinity” (Augustine, De Trinitate) The relations themselves (not the essence) are what distinguish the three persons while substance provides their unity.
“If fatherhood were not real, God would not really be Father” Berquist’s emphasis that making relations merely of reason would undermine the reality of the Trinity itself.