Lecture 117

117. Equivocation, Opposition, and the Four Real Relations in God

Summary
This lecture explores the nature of equivocal names (particularly those equivocal by reason) and their critical importance for understanding the Trinity. Berquist emphasizes how Aristotle’s theory of opposition and relation provides essential logical and metaphysical tools for grasping how God can have real relations without violating divine simplicity. The lecture culminates in establishing why there are exactly four real relations in God (fatherhood, sonship, spiration, and procession) based on two internal processions: understanding and willing.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Theory of Equivocal Names #

  • Univocal names: Said with one and the same exact meaning across all things (e.g., ‘animal’ applied to dog, cat, horse)
  • Equivocal names: Said with multiple meanings
    • Equivocal by chance: No connection between meanings (e.g., ‘bat’ as animal vs. sports equipment)
    • Equivocal by reason: Multiple meanings with an underlying connection or likeness (e.g., ‘whole’ and ‘part’ in different senses)
  • Names said of all things (being, one) and of many things (act, ability) are equivocal by reason

Why Understanding Equivocation by Reason is Necessary #

  1. Understanding universal names: Names said of all things or very many things are equivocal by reason
  2. Understanding axioms: The foundational statements on which all thinking rests use equivocal names
  3. Avoiding sophistical errors: The most common mistake in thinking is confusing different senses of a word; this danger applies especially to equivocal-by-reason names (unlike obvious equivocals-by-chance)
  4. Understanding philosophical domains: Political philosophy and wisdom cannot be understood without grasping how ‘political’ and ‘being’ are equivocal by reason
  5. Speaking of non-sensible things: To name and discuss things we cannot sense or imagine requires understanding equivocation by reason

Opposition as Equivocal by Reason #

  • Opposites is itself a name equivocal by reason
  • Examples: virtue and vice are opposed; blindness and sight are opposed; double and half are opposed—but not in the same way
  • The relation of opposition has multiple senses corresponding to Aristotle’s four kinds of opposition

Aristotle’s Four Kinds of Opposition #

From Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book V:

  1. Contradiction: Being and non-being (one must be true)
  2. Privation/Habit: Sight and blindness (one removes the other)
  3. Contrariety: Virtue and vice (same genus; one removes the other)
  4. Relativity (relative opposition): Double and half; Father and Son
    • Neither can be the other
    • They mutually imply each other
    • Both founded on an underlying quantity or action

Relations Founded on Quantity vs. Action #

According to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book V:

  • Relations are founded either on quantity (e.g., double and half; taller and shorter) or on action (e.g., father and son; maker and made; master and servant)
  • Since God has no quantity, real relations in God must be founded on action
  • However, not all actions ground real relations: only internal actions (those remaining within the agent), not external actions

Real Relations vs. Relations of Reason in God #

  • Relations of reason (not real): Relations of God to creatures, because the relation is real only in the creature, not in God
    • Aristotle’s principle: The known is related to the knower because the knower is related to the known, but not vice versa
  • Real relations: Must be grounded in internal processions (activities that remain within God)
    • Only two such processions exist: understanding and willing
    • Each procession grounds exactly two opposed relations

The Two Internal Processions in God #

Procession of Understanding (the Word):

  • From God’s understanding of himself proceeds the Word (λόγος, logos)
  • This is called generation in the proper sense
  • Grounds two opposed relations:
    • Fatherhood (paternitas): The relation of the one from whom the Word proceeds
    • Sonship (filialitas): The relation of the one proceeding from another

Procession of Willing (Love):

  • From God’s willing/loving proceeds Love
  • This procession lacks a proper name in human language
  • Grounds two opposed relations:
    • Spiration (spiratio): The relation of the one from whom Love proceeds (strictly speaking, this names the activity rather than the relation itself)
    • Procession (unnamed): The relation of Love proceeding from another

Why Exactly Four Relations? #

  • God’s actions that ground relations are limited to understanding and willing
  • Each action produces a procession that remains in God
  • Each procession necessarily grounds two opposed relations (source and what proceeds)
  • Therefore: 2 processions × 2 relations each = 4 real relations total

Relations vs. Persons #

  • Although there are four real relations, there are only three divine persons
  • Spiration (the relation of the one breathing/spirating) does not distinguish persons because it belongs to both Father and Son
  • Opposition is required for real distinction of persons, and there is no opposition between spiration and fatherhood/sonship
  • Only three relations involve opposition that distinguishes persons: fatherhood, sonship, and passive procession

Key Arguments #

Against the Multiplication of Real Relations #

Objection 1: God understands himself, so there is a real relation between understanding God and understood God—why isn’t this a fifth real relation?

  • Response: In creatures, understanding and understood are really distinct; in God, they are identical. Therefore, this “relation” is a relation of reason only, not a real relation.

Objection 2: Avicenna shows that relations of understanding multiply infinitely (I can know that I know that I know, etc.)

  • Response: The concern is valid for relations of reason, but not for real relations in God. Real relations must be grounded in processions, and there are only two such processions.

Objection 3: Augustine teaches that there are eternal ideas in God (one for dogs, another for cats), so there are infinitely many eternal relations

  • Response: Relations based on God’s ideas of creatures are relations of reason, not real relations (they are real only in the creatures, not in God).

Objection 4: Equality, likeness, and identity are relations eternally in God

  • Response: These are real perfections in God but not relations in the technical sense (not grounded in the specific processions that generate real relations).

Against the Reduction to Fewer Than Four Relations #

Objection (Sed Contra): Aristotle says there is the same road from Athens to Thebes and from Thebes to Athens. By the same logic, fatherhood and sonship should be one relation, not two.

  • Response: Although the procession is the same, fatherhood and sonship differ in definition (fatherhood is “from whom” another proceeds; sonship is “from another”). They are really distinct relations despite being founded on the same procession, just as the road has a different relation depending on direction.

Important Definitions #

Equivocal by Reason (aequivocum secundum rationem) #

A name that has multiple meanings with an internal connection or proportion between them, unlike equivocals-by-chance. The connection resides in the logos (definition/ratio) of the meanings, not mere accident.

Real Relation (relatio realis) #

A relation that exists genuinely in the thing, grounded in some real distinction or real action, not merely in the mind’s consideration. In God, real relations are grounded in processions that remain within the divine nature.

Procession (processio) #

An internal “going forth” from one divine person to another that remains within the divine substance (not external like creation). The procession of understanding produces the Word; the procession of willing produces Love.

Relative Opposition (oppositio relativorum) #

Opposition between relatives such as double and half, father and son. Neither term can be the other, yet each requires the other. The opposition is grounded in something absolute (a quantity or action).

Internal Action (actio immanens) #

An action that remains in the agent (understanding, willing) rather than extending outside the agent. Only internal actions ground real relations in God.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Whole is More Than a Part #

Berquist demonstrates sophistical equivocation: “Animal is a part of man” (composing part in the definition) vs. “Man is a part of animal” (universal whole). Students wrongly conclude the axiom is false by confusing the two meanings of ‘part’ and ‘whole’.

Double and Half #

  • Four is double of two; two is half of four
  • They are really distinct relations (double ≠ half)
  • Founded on the same quantity but with different orientations
  • Neither can be the other, yet each requires the other

The Road from Athens to Thebes #

The same road exists from Athens to Thebes and from Thebes to Athens, yet the relation differs in definition depending on direction. Similarly, fatherhood and sonship are based on the same procession but are really distinct relations.

Acting-Upon and Undergoing #

When I kick you: my kicking (action) and your being kicked (passion) are the same motion but really distinct relations. My action is in me toward you; your passion is in you. They differ in definition and in subject.

Warming Water #

The fire warms the water—warming (from fire) and being warmed (in water) are the same process but really distinct relations. The warming is in the fire as agent; being warmed is in the water as patient.

Imagination and Internal Proceeding #

When I imagine a gold mountain, the image proceeds from my imagination but remains within it. Similarly, the Word proceeds from the Father’s understanding but remains in God. This illustrates how internal procession differs from external creation.

Notable Quotes #

“Every name said univocally of many things is a genus or a difference or a species or a property or an accident.” — Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, cited to show how Porphyry’s Isagoge comprehensively covers univocal names

“The whole is more than a part.” — Used to illustrate the danger of equivocation and how mixing different senses of ‘whole’ and ‘part’ can lead to sophistical contradiction

“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was toward God, and the Word was God.” — St. John’s Gospel, illustrating how λόγος (logos) means both ‘word’ (external expression) and ’thought/reason’ (internal proceeding); the English translation forces ‘word’ to carry both senses, making it equivocal by reason

“The relation multiplies the Trinity.” — Boethius, cited by Thomas to show how the four real relations are essential to understanding the three divine persons

“The creature is really related to God as the measured is to the measure; but the measure is only said by reason to be the measure of the measured.” — Thomas, explaining why relations of God to creatures are not real in God

Questions Addressed #

Why are there exactly four real relations in God, not more? #

  • Real relations must be grounded in internal processions (actions remaining in God)
  • Only two such processions exist: understanding (producing the Word) and willing (producing Love)
  • Each procession grounds two opposed relations (source and what proceeds)
  • Therefore: 2 processions × 2 relations = 4 real relations

How can four relations ground only three divine persons? #

  • Opposition between relations is what distinguishes persons
  • The relation of spiration (breathing/spirating) does not oppose fatherhood or sonship; it belongs to both
  • Only three relations establish opposition: fatherhood vs. sonship vs. passive procession
  • The active relation (spiration) belongs to both Father and Son, so it does not create a fourth person

Why must real relations in God be grounded in internal actions, not external ones? #

  • God’s relations to creatures are founded on external action (creation)
  • But such relations are real only in creatures, not in God (the creature depends on God; God does not depend on the creature)
  • Real relations in God require mutual dependence or opposition among the divine persons
  • This is possible only through internal processions (understanding and willing), which remain within the divine nature

Can understanding and willing toward oneself ground real relations? #

  • In creatures, understanding and the understood are really distinct; hence a real relation exists
  • In God, understanding and the understood are identical; hence no real relation (only a relation of reason)
  • For a real relation to exist, the relation must be grounded in a procession producing something distinct (at least in definition)

How does equivocation help explain the Trinity? #

  • ‘Opposite’ is equivocal by reason with multiple senses (contradiction, privation, contrariety, relativity)
  • Father and Son are opposed as relatives (not contradictorily, privatively, or contrarily)
  • In relative opposition, both terms require each other and are really distinct without either negating the other
  • This resolves how Father and Son can be really distinct without one negating or diminishing the other

Connections to Other Topics #

Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book V #

  • The foundational text for understanding equivocity and the kinds of opposition
  • Essential background for grasping why real relations in God must be based on one specific kind of opposition (relativity)

Porphyry’s Isagoge #

  • The doctrine of the five predicables (genus, species, difference, property, accident) exhaustively covers all univocal names
  • Understanding this is essential for understanding what univocation is and, by contrast, what equivocation is

Divine Simplicity and Relations #

  • God’s absolute simplicity means relations cannot be accidents added to the divine substance
  • Relations must be identical to the divine substance in being, yet really distinct from each other in definition

Thomistic Logic and Method #

  • The careful distinction between equivocals-by-reason and equivocals-by-chance is essential for Thomistic philosophical discourse
  • Failure to make this distinction leads to sophistical refutation (as in the “whole is more than a part” example)