118. Boethius's Definition of Person and the Problem of Singulars

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• The Definition of Person: Boethius’s formulation as “an individual substance of a rational nature” and its adequacy
• The Problem of Defining Singulars: Whether singular things can be defined and how the definition applies
• Substance and Its Meanings: The distinction between first substance, second substance, and substance as a category
• Individuation of Substances vs. Accidents: How substances are individuated through themselves, while accidents are individuated through their subjects
• The Excluded Cases: Why separated souls and assumed natures do not qualify as persons
• The Special Status of Rational Nature: Why rational substances receive the specific name “person”

Key Arguments #

Objection 1: The Problem of Defining Singulars #

• Objection: Nothing singular is defined; person signifies something singular; therefore person cannot be suitably defined
• Response: While particular singulars (“this singular” or “that singular”) cannot be defined, the common notion of singularity itself can be. We define what it means to be singular in general, not the singular in particular. Aristotle does this in the Categories when defining first substance.

Objection 2: Ambiguity of “Substance” in the Definition #

• Objection: If substance means first substance, “individual” is superfluous (since first substance is already individual). If it means second substance, it is false (since second substances are universal).
• Response: “Substance” is taken commonly as that which is divided into first and second substance. The addition of “individual” specifies that we are drawing toward first substance. The word “substance” can be understood in three ways: (1) what a thing is (essence); (2) the individual subject or supposit that subsists; (3) substance as a category common to both first and second substance.

Objection 3: Using an Intention in a Real Definition #

• Objection: “Individual” is an intention (a mental concept), not a thing. Since person is a thing, one should not use an intention in its definition.
• Response: When substantial differences are unknown or unnamed, accidental differences or intentional distinctions are appropriately used in their place. This is common practice in definition. The name “rational” itself names what follows upon substantial nature rather than the substantial difference.

Objection 4: Nature as Part of the Definition #

• Objection: Nature is defined as “a beginning of motion and rest,” but person exists even in unchanging things like God and angels. Therefore, “nature” should not appear in the definition; “essence” is more suitable.
• Response: [Berquist indicates this will be addressed but does not fully develop the response in this lecture]

Objection 5: The Separated Soul #

• Objection: A separated soul (like St. Peter in heaven) is an individual substance of a rational nature, yet it is not a person. Therefore, the definition is unsuitable.
• Response: The separated soul is only a part of human nature, not the complete individual substance. The use of “Peter is in heaven” is a synecdoche, using the name of the whole for the part. A person requires the complete individual substance.

The Response: Why Substances Receive Special Naming #

• Individual substances are individuated through themselves, not through an external subject
• Accidents (health, knowledge, size) are individuated through the subject in which they inhere
• Rational substances possess special dominion over their own acts—they act by themselves, not merely being acted upon
• Therefore, among all substances, singulars of rational nature receive a special name: person
• The definition properly lays down “individual substance” to signify a singular in the genus of substance, and “of a rational nature” to signify a singular in rational substances specifically

Important Definitions #

• Person (persōna): An individual substance of a rational nature; specifically applies to singular beings of rational nature that possess dominion over their own acts
• Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις): Etymologically means “standing under”; among Greeks, signifies any individual substance, but they customarily used it for individuals of rational nature
• Subsistence (subsistentia): The mode of existing by itself and not in another as in a subject
• Essence (essentia): What a thing is; that which the definition signifies; the nature or substance of a thing
• Supposit/Suppositum: The individual subject that subsists in the genus of substance; the bearer of accidents
• Intention (intentio): Something existing in the mind; a mental concept or category
• First Substance (πρώτη οὐσία/substantia prima): The individual subject; that which exists not in another and is not said of another
• Second Substance (δεύτερη οὐσία/substantia secunda): The genus or species; that which is said of many individuals but not in another

Examples & Illustrations #

Individuation of Substances vs. Accidents #

• My health is individually different from your health because my health exists in my body while your health exists in your body
• My knowledge of the Pythagorean Theorem is individually different from your knowledge because it exists in my soul, not yours
• Substances individuate themselves; accidents are individuated by their subject

The Separated Soul #

• St. Peter in heaven: his soul is there, not his complete person
• The statement “Peter is in heaven” is a synecdoche (part for whole)
• A person requires the complete individual substance, not merely a part

Why Singulars Cannot Be Defined (Yet Singularity Can Be) #

• I cannot define “Socrates” or “Plato”—these particular singulars resist definition
• However, I can define what it means to be singular or individual
• Similarly, I cannot define “my health,” “my hand,” or “my shape,” yet these have definitions as types
• Reason can grasp the universal notion of singularity even though it cannot grasp the particular singular itself

On the Hierarchy of Greater Minds and Brevity #

• The greater a mind, the more it accomplishes in fewer words
• Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas say much more in a few words than an entire book by others
• This reflects the unity and simplicity of superior intellects
• Lesser minds require more examples and longer explanations to understand what a greater mind grasps simply

Notable Quotes #

“Although this singular or that cannot be defined, that which pertains to the common notion singularity can be defined.”

“Substances are individuated through themselves. But accidents, like quantity, my size, right? My health and so on, are individuated through the subject in which they are.”

“Among other substances, singulars of a rational nature also have a certain special name. And this name is person.”

“Actions are found in singulars.” (Explanation for why rational substances receive special naming)

Questions Addressed #

Can Singulars Be Defined? #

• Question: How can we define “person” if it signifies a singular, and nothing singular is defined?
• Answer: The universal notion of singularity can be defined even though particular singulars cannot. We define what it means to be singular in general, not the particular singular instance.

What Does “Substance” Mean in the Definition? #

• Question: Does “substance” in Boethius’s definition mean first substance or second substance?
• Answer: Substance is taken commonly, dividing into first and second. The addition of “individual” specifies first substance. Substance has multiple meanings: essence, the individual subject/supposit, or the category common to both first and second substance.

Why Is “Individual” Appropriate Despite Being an Intention? #

• Question: Is using an intention (mental concept) in the definition of a real thing inappropriate?
• Answer: No, when substantial differences are unknown or unnamed, accidental differences and intentional designations are properly employed in definitions. “Rational” similarly names what follows upon substantial nature rather than the substantial difference itself.

Why Do Rational Substances Receive the Special Name “Person”? #

• Question: Why does the definition specifically require both “individual substance” and “of a rational nature”?
• Answer: Because rational substances possess dominion over their own acts—they act by themselves rather than merely being acted upon. Actions occur in singulars. Among all individual substances, only rational ones have this active character, so they receive a special designation.

Why Is a Separated Soul Not a Person? #

• Question: If a separated soul is an individual substance of a rational nature, why is it not a person?
• Answer: Because the soul is a part of human nature, not the complete individual substance. Person requires the complete individual substance. The use of “Peter is in heaven” is a synecdoche, using the whole person’s name for his soul alone.