120. The Name and Meaning of Person in Divine Things

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Problem of Applying ‘Person’ to God #

Thomas addresses four major objections to using ‘person’ in divine theology:

1. Scripture does not use this term - Dionysius maintains we should speak only of what is “divinely expressed” in sacred writings
2. Problematic etymology - ‘Person’ derives from theatrical masks (personae) used in comedies and tragedies, which cannot apply to God
3. Hypostasis problems - The term hypostasis signifies “that which stands under accidents,” but God stands under nothing
4. Definition excludes God - The definition “individual substance of rational nature” implies:
   • Rationality suggests discursive knowledge (which God lacks)
   • Individuation requires matter (which God lacks)
   • Substance implies standing under accidents (irrelevant to God)

Etymology vs. Meaning: The Critical Distinction #

Berquist emphasizes that Thomas distinguishes sharply between etymologia (the source from which a name is drawn) and significatio (what the name signifies or means).

Key principle: A name can be drawn from something without that source limiting its meaning.

Examples:

• “Perfect” comes from factum (made), yet God is perfect though not made—because “perfect” means actualitas (having achieved its nature), not necessarily having been made
• “Person” comes from theatrical masks, yet properly signifies dignity and subsistence in a rational nature

This distinction resolves the apparent contradiction: the etymology of person does not apply to God, but the meaning does.

Thomas’s Resolution: Person Signifies What Is Most Perfect #

Thomas argues that person should be attributed to God because:

Person signifies that which is most perfect in the whole of nature: something subsisting in a rational (intellectual) nature.

Argument structure:

1. Among all natures, rational nature is highest (superior to plants and animals)
2. Among all kinds of being, that which exists by itself (subsists) is superior to that which exists in another
3. Therefore, person (subsisting in rational nature) signifies what is most perfect
4. Whatever pertains to perfection should be attributed to God in an eminent (more excellent) way
5. Therefore, person should be attributed to God, though not in the same mode as creatures

Key principle: When borrowing creature-names for God, one must always apply them in a more excellent manner. As the Fourth Lateran Council states: “A likeness of the creature to God cannot be recognized without a greater unlikeness.”

Key Arguments #

Why the Meaning of “Person” Applies to God #

1. Subsistence

• “Substance” (substantia) etymologically means “that which stands under”
• But properly means “exists by itself” (per se), not merely “stands under accidents”
• God supremely exists by Himself and subsists most perfectly
• This aspect of personhood belongs supremely to God

2. Rational/Intellectual Nature

• “Rational” need not mean discursive reasoning
• It can be understood more broadly as intellectual nature (natura intellectualis)
• God’s understanding is superior to human reason, not deficient
• The essential meaning is the capacity for understanding, transcending the mode of understanding

3. Incommunicability (Individual)

• “Individual” does not require material individuation
• Properly understood, it signifies incommunicability—that which cannot be shared or communicated to another
• God’s nature is unique and supremely incommunicable
• This belongs most perfectly to God

The Problem of Translation and Equivocation #

Berquist illustrates how the Latin word substantia creates theological confusion:

• Greek hypostasis: Means individual substance; does not signify essence/nature
• Latin substantia: Has two meanings—(1) individual substance and (2) essence/nature of a thing
• Problem: Translating hypostasis as substantia creates ambiguity. “Three hypostases” becomes “three substantiae,” which could mean “three natures,” leading to tritheism
• Solution: Use “subsistence” (subsistentia) instead, which better captures the meaning without the equivocation

This demonstrates Berquist’s earlier point: confusion over words causes theological problems. Christoph (cited) notes that mixing up the senses of a word is the most common mistake in theology and philosophy.

Important Definitions #

Person (Persona) #

• Boethius’s definition: An individual substance of a rational nature
• Proper meaning: Something subsisting (existing by itself) in an intellectual nature
• In God: Applies to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—three persons distinguished by relations of origin, yet one divine nature
• Key component: Signifies what is most perfect in all nature

Substance (Substantia) #

• Etymology: From “sub” (under) and “stare” (to stand)
• In God context: Means “exists by itself” (per se), not “stands under accidents”
• Not to be confused with: Essence/nature (though Latin substantia can mean both)

Hypostasis (Ὑπόστασις) #

• Etymology: Greek “hypo” (under) + “stasis” (standing)—same root as Latin substantia
• Greek usage: Refers to individual substance, particularly of rational nature
• Problem in Latin: Cannot simply translate as substantia without causing equivocation regarding essence

Subsistence (Subsistentia) #

• Meaning: Exists by itself, not in another as in a subject
• Preferred term: For translating Greek hypostasis in theological contexts to avoid confusion with essence
• Application: Proper to substances; does not apply to accidents

Examples & Illustrations #

The Theatrical Origin and Its Irrelevance #

Berquist explains how “person” came from theater:

• In ancient comedies and tragedies, actors wore masks called personae
• The masks served practical purposes: they magnified the voice (personare = to sound through) through their concavity
• The Greeks called these masks prosopa (from “pros” = before, “ops” = eye)—placed before the eyes to hide the actor’s face
• Made facial expressions unnecessary; tone of voice conveyed the character
• Over time, “person” came to mean dignified individuals

But Berquist’s point: This etymology is irrelevant to the theological meaning. The name is drawn from something that does not limit its signification.

Language and Custom Agreement #

Berquist illustrates how words function:

• “No sound signifies by nature; it is by human custom and agreement”
• We call a cat a cat; that other being also calls it a cat—remarkable agreement given human irrationality
• Words like “someone” in English usage refer to persons (rational beings), not to individual things generally
• Example: We would not say a cat is “someone,” though etymologically “someone” means “some one thing”
• English opposes “something” and “nothing”; Greek opposition is “someone” (ute) and “no-one”
• Point: We must be aware of how languages use words, not just their etymologies

The Misunderstanding of Hypostasis in Translation #

Historically, translating the Greek conciliar statement “three hypostasis in one ousia” as “three substantiae in one substantia” created heretical confusion:

• The Latins interpreted this as “three essences,” suggesting three gods (tritheism)
• But the Greeks meant “three individual subsisting realities in one divine nature”
• Clarification required using “subsistence” instead of “substance” to preserve the original meaning

Notable Quotes #

“Person signifies that which is most perfect in the whole of nature. To wit, something subsisting in a rational nature.” — Thomas Aquinas (cited by Berquist)

“A rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” — Shakespeare (referenced by Berquist regarding the importance of meaning over etymology)

“One should not dare to say something or to think something about the super-substantial divinity apart from those things which are divinely expressed for us from the sacred writings.” — Dionysius, cited as first objection

“The name person is drawn from those persons which are presented in comedies and tragedies.” — Boethius, cited regarding etymology

“A likeness of the creature to God cannot be recognized without a greater unlikeness.” — Fourth Lateran Council, cited by Thomas on the method of applying creature-names to God

“The most common mistake is mixing up the senses of a word.” — Christoph, cited by Berquist on theological and philosophical errors

Questions Addressed #

Does the name “person” belong in divine things? #

Objections: Four appear conclusive against applying the term to God (from Scripture, etymology, the problem of hypostasis, and the definition itself)

Resolution:

• The name “person” does not come from something that applies to God (theatrical masks)
• But the meaning signified by “person” (subsistence in rational nature) applies to God most excellently
• All perfections of creatures, when properly understood in their essential meaning, belong to God in a more eminent way
• Scripture affirms what “person” signifies even if it does not use the word itself

How can God be an “individual substance” if individuation requires matter? #

Answer:

• “Individual” in the definition signifies incommunicability, not material individuation
• Matter causes individuation in material things by dividing the species (my flesh vs. your flesh)
• But incommunicability (uniqueness, inability to be shared) belongs to God supremely
• God is absolutely unique and cannot be communicated to another

How can God be of “rational nature” if rationality implies discursive knowledge? #

Answer:

• “Rational” can be understood more broadly as “intellectual nature”
• The definition intends the capacity for understanding, not a particular mode of understanding
• God’s knowledge is superior to human reason (simple, intuitive, at-a-glance), not deficient
• We retain the universal element (understanding) while acknowledging God transcends creature-modes

How can “substance” apply to God if it means “stands under accidents”? #

Answer:

• The etymological meaning is insufficient; we must consider the proper meaning
• “Substance” properly means “exists by itself” (per se), exists not in another
• God supremely exists by Himself and is subject to no accidents
• This aspect of being a substance belongs most perfectly to God