121. Etymology Versus Meaning: The Name 'Person' in Theology

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Etymology-Meaning Distinction #

• Core principle: The origin of a word (its etymology) does not determine whether it can be applied to its current subject
• Etymology (impositio nominis): that from which the name is taken; what the word originally signified
• Meaning (significatum): that to which the name is applied; what the word now denotes
• These can diverge significantly; understanding this distinction is essential for theological language

Objections to Using ‘Person’ of God #

Based on the word’s theatrical origins:

• The name comes from theatrical masks (personae) used in comedies and tragedies to amplify actors’ voices
• This suggests the term cannot properly apply to God, who has no physical voice or body
• Yet Thomas argues this objection confuses etymology with meaning

Thomas’s Response on Person #

• What matters: Person now signifies dignity, excellence, and incommunicability—qualities that belong supremely to God
• The principle: Because God is the source of all perfection and dignity, the name ‘person’ belongs to God in an eminent way
• In ancient usage, ‘person’ was imposed to signify someone of dignity; therefore, God—who possesses dignity beyond all measure—is preeminently a person
• The theatrical origin is irrelevant to whether God can be called a person now

The Problem of Hypostasis and Substance #

• Etymological identity: Greek ὑπόστασις (hypostasis) and Latin substantia both mean “to stand under” (ὑπό + στάσις; sub + stare)
• The confusion: Latin substantia came to mean both:
  • That which stands under accidents (etymological sense)
  • The essence or nature of a thing (meaning)
• The problem: Greek hypostasis never carries the meaning of “essence” or “nature”; it means an individual substance that subsists
• The heretical danger: If “three hypostases” is translated as “three substances,” and substance means essence, it appears there are three natures in God—which is heretical
• Solution: Use ‘subsistence’ when translating hypostasis to capture its meaning (existing by itself) without the confusion of standing under accidents

The Word ‘Understanding’ as Linguistic Evidence #

• The English word “understand” is etymologically related to substantia and hypostasis
• “To understand” literally means “to know what stands under” (the substance)
• This reveals that only intellect knows substance; senses know only accidents
• The word ‘understand’ is superior to Greek γνῶσις (knowing) or even Latin intelligere because it more clearly reveals this connection
• Shakespeare exploits this double meaning, making readers attentive to what it means to understand something
• When you “understand a word,” you know what stands under that word—its substance or meaning

The Principle of Equivocal Signification #

• A word can keep its common meaning across different applications by dropping something private to the first meaning and retaining what is common
• Example: ‘Rational’
  • Strictly: reason implies discursive thinking (moving from one thought to another)
  • God does not think discursively; He understands all things intuitively
  • Yet ‘rational’ can be extended more broadly to mean ‘intellectual nature’
  • What is dropped: discursiveness (private to human reason)
  • What is retained: understanding or intellection (common to all rational natures)
  • Therefore, God can be called ‘rational’ in this broader sense without equivocation

Negative Signification in Affirmative Language #

• Sometimes affirmative speech conceals negative meaning:
  • “Substance exists in itself” really means “substance does not exist in another”
  • “A statement is known to itself” means “a statement is not known from another statement”
• This grammatical distinction from logical meaning must be recognized
• When Augustine says “the person of the Father is the substance of the Father,” he is using affirmative language to express that a person is not said relative to the Son, but is absolute in itself

The Problem of Substance and God #

• Objection: Substance properly means that which stands under accidents; God has no accidents; therefore, substance does not apply to God
• Response: When ‘substance’ is applied to God, what is meant is not “that which stands under accidents” but “that which exists by itself” (per se)
  • A thing that exists by itself, not in another (like an accident)
  • Even a dog or cat exists per se; this meaning applies even more to God
  • What completes the meaning of substance is existing by itself, not standing under accidents
• The key: God is substance preeminently because He exists most perfectly by Himself

Individual and Incommunicability #

• The definition of person includes “individual substance,” but individuation usually requires matter (what makes this dog different from that dog)
• God’s individuation: God is not individual because of matter (He has no matter) but because of incommunicability—being proper to one and not shareable with another
• In creatures: individuation comes from matter; in God: individuation comes from relations (e.g., what makes the Father distinct from the Son)
• What matters in calling God “individual” is the meaning of incommunicability, not the etymological connection to matter

Aristotle on Substance and Being #

• Aristotle (Metaphysics IV, book of “wisdom”): Being is said in many ways, but substance is the primary meaning
• All other meanings of being refer back to substance
• Therefore, wisdom (first philosophy) is chiefly about being in the sense of substance
• This explains why understanding (knowing substance) is fundamental to philosophy

Key Arguments #

For the Use of ‘Person’ in Divine Theology #

1. The meaning of ‘person’ now signifies dignity and excellence
2. God possesses dignity in the highest degree
3. Therefore, God is preeminently a person
4. The theatrical origin of the word is irrelevant to whether it applies to God

Against Confusing Etymology with Meaning #

1. A word’s origin does not determine its current application
2. Many words have undergone significant semantic shifts from their origins
3. Theology must follow what a word means now, not necessarily where it came from
4. This is especially important when defending doctrine against heretics

On the Distinction Between Meaning and Definition #

1. The definition of person: individual substance of a rational nature
2. This definition does not mention relation, yet person can signify relation in God
3. A diverse definition of the less common (divine person) does not make the term equivocal in the more common usage
4. Just as ‘animal’ is univocally said of different creatures despite their different definitions, ‘person’ can be said of God and creatures

Important Definitions #

ἐτυμολογία / Etymologia (Etymology) #

That from which a name is taken; the original sense or linguistic origin of a word. Often contrasted with current meaning.

Significatum (Meaning) #

That to which a name is applied; what a word now denotes or signifies. This, not etymology, determines a word’s theological applicability.

Impositio Nominis (The Placing of a Name) #

Literally, the placing of a name upon something. Thomas uses this concept to analyze how words are imposed and acquire meaning through usage.

Per Se / Per Se Existere #

“By itself” or “to exist by itself”; existence that is not dependent on another, particularly not as an accident inheres in a substance.

Substantia (Substance) #

• Etymologically: that which stands under (sub + stare)
• As meaning in theology: that which exists by itself, not in another
• In God: the divine nature insofar as it exists by itself in supreme independence

Ὑπόστασις / Hypostasis #

• Etymologically: that which stands under (ὑπό + στάσις)
• As meaning: an individual substance that subsists; a divine person
• Not to be confused with: essence or nature (which hypostasis does not signify in Greek)

Incommunicability #

The quality of being proper to one person and not shareable with or transferable to another; what makes divine persons distinct from one another.

Rationalis / Rational Nature #

• Strictly: a nature capable of discursive reasoning
• More broadly: an intellectual nature
• The broader meaning allows God to be called rational despite not reasoning discursively

Examples & Illustrations #

The Word ‘Perfect’ #

• Etymology: from Latin facere (to make); suggests something that has been made
• Meaning: complete, lacking nothing
• Application to God: God is most perfect, yet God was not made
• This shows that etymology must not be allowed to prevent theological application

The Word ‘Philosophy’ #

• Etymology: from Greek φιλο- (love) and σοφία (wisdom); literally “love of wisdom”
• Meaning for Aristotle: not the love of wisdom itself, but the knowledge that the love of wisdom pursues
• Lesson: Even in Aristotle and Plato, the word philosophy does not mean what its etymology suggests

The Word ‘Lapis’ (Stone) #

• Thomas gives (admittedly falsely) the etymology from laedit pedem (it hurts the foot)
• Yet ‘stone’ does not mean “that which hurts the foot”
• The etymology calls attention to the thing; the meaning defines what it is

Transubstantiation #

• Etymology: suggests a change from one substance to another (trans + substantia)
• Meaning in doctrine: the substance of bread and wine is replaced by the substance of the body and blood of Christ
• The problem: This word appears nowhere in Scripture, yet it is necessary to defend the faith against heretics
• The principle: New names can be imposed to signify the ancient faith when necessary against heretics, provided they are not profane (not discordant from Scripture’s sense)

‘Transignification’ vs. ‘Transubstantiation’ #

• Modern heretics might propose ’transignification’ (change of meaning or significance) instead of transubstantiation
• This is a profane newness of voice because it contradicts Scripture’s meaning
• Transubstantiation, though the word appears nowhere in Scripture, signifies what Scripture teaches

Notable Quotes #

“You drop something that’s private to the first meaning, something that’s common there.” — Berquist, explaining how a term can be applied more broadly without equivocation

“When you study wisdom there, in the sense of first philosophy, right? Aristotle, in the fourth book of wisdom, shows that wisdom is about being as being. And then he shows that being is said in many ways, and that the first meaning is really substance, and the other meanings all go back to substance.” — Berquist, on Aristotle’s principle that substance is primary among meanings of being

“The meaning and the etymology don’t have to be the same thing. There may be a connection between them, but you have to know the meaning of the word to see what the connection is.” — Berquist

“So he’s emphasizing not the word thing, which you could say is the meaning of substance, right? But what completes the meaning of substance, right? Substance, right? You say, by substance, don’t you mean a thing that stands under accidents? Well, the standard of accidents is belong to God, see? But if by substance you mean a thing that exists by itself, right? Then to be a substance belongs most of all to God.” — Berquist, on how Thomas distinguishes between different aspects of substance’s meaning

Questions Addressed #

Can the name ‘person’ be applied to God given its theatrical origins? #

Answer: Yes. The etymology (theatrical masks) does not determine the meaning. ‘Person’ now signifies dignity and excellence, qualities that belong supremely to God. What matters is current meaning, not origin.

How do etymology and meaning relate in theological language? #

Answer: Etymology is that from which a name is taken; meaning is that to which it is applied. These can diverge. Theology follows meaning, not etymology, especially when defending the faith against heresy.

Why is ‘substance’ applicable to God even though etymologically it means “standing under accidents”? #

Answer: What completes the meaning of substance is not standing under accidents, but existing by itself (per se). God exists by itself supremely; therefore, substance belongs to God in an eminent way.

How can ‘rational’ be applied to God when God does not reason discursively? #

Answer: By taking ‘rational’ more broadly to mean ‘intellectual nature’ rather than strictly ‘discursively reasoning nature.’ What is common to all rational natures is intellection; what is private to human reason is discursiveness. By keeping the common element and dropping the private one, ‘rational’ can be extended to God without equivocation.

Why is the distinction between ὑπόστασις (hypostasis) and essence important? #

Answer: In Greek, hypostasis never means essence or nature. If three hypostases is translated as “three substances” and substance is understood as essence, it appears there are three natures in God, leading to heresy. Precision in translation and meaning is necessary.

Can new theological terms be legitimately imposed if they do not appear in Scripture? #

Answer: Yes, provided they are not profane (not discordant from Scripture’s meaning) and they are necessary to defend the faith against heretics. Examples: ’transubstantiation’ (Scripture teaches the substance changes, even if the word doesn’t appear); ‘person’ (Scripture teaches what person signifies, even if the term isn’t used).

Theological Principles Illustrated #

The Principle of Necessity Against Heresy #

• Heresy drives the development of theological language and understanding
• When defending the faith, the Church may impose new names to signify the ancient faith more precisely
• What makes a new name acceptable is whether it signifies what Scripture teaches, not whether the word itself appears in Scripture

The Principle of Affirmative and Negative Signification #

• Affirmative language sometimes conceals negative meaning
• “Exists in itself” means “does not exist in another”
• “Person is said absolutely” means “person is not said relative to another”
• Understanding this prevents misinterpretation of Augustine and other Fathers

The Principle of Analogy in Naming #

• A term is not made equivocal simply because it has a diverse definition in different contexts
• The more common meaning can remain stable while the less common meaning differs
• This is how ‘person’ can be said of both creatures and God without pure univocation or pure equivocation