123. The Plurality of Persons in God and Divine Simplicity

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• The Plurality of Persons in God: Whether God can have multiple persons without contradicting divine simplicity
• Relations as Constitutive of Persons: Divine persons are distinguished by relative properties (fatherhood, sonship, spiration), not by absolute properties
• The Problem of Substance in the Definition: The equivocation of the word substantia in the definition of person
• Absolute vs. Relative Properties: Why absolute properties in God do not distinguish persons while relative properties do
• Number in God: The distinction between abstract number (numbering number) and numbered number, and why numerical language doesn’t imply composition

Key Arguments #

The Main Argument for Plurality #

• A divine person signifies a relation as subsisting in the divine nature
• There are many real relations in God
• Therefore, there are many subsisting things in the divine nature
• Therefore, there are many persons in God

First Objection: The Problem of Substance #

• Objection: The definition of person includes “individual substance of a reasonable nature.” If there are three persons in God, there would be three substances—a heretical position.
• Solution: The word substantia (substance) has two meanings: (1) essence or nature, and (2) individual subsisting thing. The definition uses substance in the second sense, which the Greeks call hypostasis. Since hypostasis means “standing under” (ὑπό = under, στάσις = stands), it denotes what subsists individually, not the essence.

Second Objection: Absolute Properties #

• Objection: A plurality of absolute properties (goodness, wisdom, knowledge) doesn’t give distinction of persons in God or in us, so why would relations?
• Solution: The key difference is that absolute properties in God subsist but are not really distinct from each other, whereas relations in God both subsist AND are really distinct. In creatures, absolute properties are really distinct but don’t subsist. For multiple persons, one needs both subsistence and real distinction—conditions met only by divine relations.
• Why relations are really distinct: Relations are opposed to each other (father vs. son; both vs. Holy Spirit), and distinction requires opposition. Absolute properties like goodness and wisdom are not opposed to each other.

Third Objection: Boethius on Unity #

• Objection: Boethius says “that is truly one in which there is no number.” Plurality implies number, so there cannot be many persons in God.
• Solution: Boethius’s statement about unity and simplicity excludes every plurality of things said absolutely (real plurality of absolute properties), but not plurality of relations. Relations are said of something “towards another” (ad aliquid) and thus do not signify any composition in the thing to which they belong.

Fourth Objection: Whole and Part #

• Objection: Wherever there is number, there is whole and part. If God has three persons (a number), there will be whole and part in God, contradicting divine simplicity.
• Solution: Number is twofold: (1) numbering number (abstract number like “three”), which exists only in the mind, and (2) numbered number (number of things, like “three persons”). If we take number absolutely (numbering number), it doesn’t imply composition in God because it exists only in the mind. If we take numbered number, we must recognize that in God the Father is not a part of God—the Father IS God. Therefore, the Father and the Son together do not constitute “more” of God than the Father alone.

Important Definitions #

Divine Person: A relation (relatio) as subsisting in the divine nature—signifies relation per modum substantiae (by way of substance), meaning the relation exists by itself and not as an accident in a subject.

Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις): An individual subsisting thing; that which stands under. From ὑπό (under) + στάσις (stands). Corresponds to substantia in the sense of individual substance, as opposed to substantia meaning essence or nature.

Absolute Properties: Properties not involving relation to another thing—such as goodness, wisdom, knowledge, and love. In God, these subsist but are not really distinct from the divine essence or from each other.

Relative Properties: Properties involving relation to another—such as fatherhood and sonship. In God, these both subsist and are really distinct from each other.

Real Distinction (distinctio realis): A distinction between two things that are actually two things, not merely distinguished by the mind. In God, only relations are really distinct from each other; absolute properties are only rationally distinct.

Numbering Number (abstract number): Number considered in itself, such as “three” or “seven.” Exists only in the mind and does not imply composition in the thing numbered.

Numbered Number: Number as applied to things, such as “three persons” or “three men.” Requires careful analysis regarding composition and parts.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Equivocation of Substance #

Berquist illustrates the problem with an analogy to happiness: “Happiness is the end of human life, and human life is death—therefore happiness is death.” The word “end” is equivocal, and students initially misunderstand it as the temporal limit of existence rather than as purpose or goal. Similarly, “substance” in the definition of person must be understood as individual subsisting thing, not as essence or nature.

Real Distinction Requires Opposition #

Absolute properties like goodness and wisdom are not opposed to each other (they are not contradictories, privations, or relatives), so they are not really distinct. Father and son, by contrast, are opposed as relatives (one is father-of-the-other, the other is son-of-the-first), so they are really distinct. This is why relations can distinguish persons while absolute properties cannot.

Numbered Continuous Quantity #

When a wife asks for “three yards of cloth,” the number three does not imply three separate discrete pieces. Rather, three is the numbering of something continuous. Similarly, when we speak of “three persons” in God, we are numbering something of a single continuous divine essence. The Father is not a part of the whole Trinity; the Father is the whole Trinity (since Father = God).

Father and Trinity Are Identical #

The Father is just as much as the whole Trinity. There is no real distinction between the Father and God, so the Father is not less than the Trinity. This contrasts with creatures: two men have more humanity than one man alone (they have more flesh and bones), but the Father and Son together do not have more divinity than the Father alone.

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Are there many persons in God? Yes. This follows from the fact that (1) a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting in the divine nature, and (2) there are many real relations in God. Therefore, there are many subsisting things in the divine nature, which means many persons.

Q2: Does plurality of persons contradict divine simplicity? No, when properly understood. The plurality concerns relations, not the divine essence. Absolute number (numbering number) exists only in the mind and does not introduce composition. Numbered number, rightly understood, does not imply that one person is a part of God.

Q3: Why don’t absolute properties distinguish persons? Because absolute properties, though they subsist in God, are not really distinct from each other or from the divine essence. Real distinction requires opposition, which relations have but absolute properties do not.

Q4: How should we interpret Boethius’s statement that “God is one in which there is no number”? Boethius excludes absolute plurality (real multiplicity of absolute things) from God but permits plurality of relations. Relations signify things “towards another” and thus do not introduce composition or plurality of things said absolutely.

Notable Quotes #

“A divine person signifies a relation as a thing subsisting in the divine nature.”

“The Father is just as much as the whole Trinity. The Father, in other words, is not a part of God.”

“If you take the numbering number…that’s only in our mind. So that doesn’t put whole and part in God.”

“You’ve got to have both of these things, right? To have many persons in God, you have to have many really distinct, subsistent things.”

“The only kind of distinction there can be is one of opposites.”