Lecture 141

141. Essence and Person in God: The Fundamental Question

Summary
This lecture addresses the foundational question of whether the divine essence is identical to or distinct from the divine persons in God. Berquist examines three powerful objections to the identity thesis, particularly the apparent contradiction that immaterial substances cannot have multiple individuals of the same nature (following Plato and Aristotle), yet God has one essence and three persons. He explains Thomas Aquinas’s solution: essence and person are identical in reality but distinguished only in our understanding, with real distinction between persons grounded in relations of opposition rather than distinction from the essence.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Structure and Context #

  • The Trinity treatise divides persons’ comparative consideration into relations to: essence, properties, notional acts, and to each other
  • The first article on essence versus person is foundational; all subsequent questions depend on it
  • The problem is unique to theology: philosophy cannot anticipate ways of speaking required by the Trinity

The Core Problem: Immaterial Substances and Numerical Multiplication #

Plato’s Insight:

  • In immaterial substances, there is only one individual of each nature
  • Each form is unique; no two forms share the same essence
  • Difference between immaterial beings is like circle vs. square (specific difference), not like two circles (numerical difference)

Aristotle’s Extension:

  • Matter subject to continuous quantity is the source of numerical multiplication within a single nature
  • Without matter, there cannot be multiple individuals of the same kind
  • Angels differ specifically from one another; no two angels share the same nature

The Contradiction in God:

  • God is immaterial, so by the above principle, there can be only one divine person
  • Yet Catholic faith affirms one essence and three persons
  • This appears to violate the principle that if essence and person are identical, multiplying one requires multiplying the other

Thomas’s Solution: Real Distinction Through Relation, Not Through Essence #

The Key Insight:

  • Essence and person are identical in reality (no real distinction between them)
  • Persons are distinguished from each other by relations of opposition, not by distinction from the essence
  • Relations are subsisting in the divine nature and are the divine nature itself

Why This Works:

  • The Father is not related to the divine nature; he is related to the Son
  • The Son is not the son of the divine nature but the son of the Father
  • Therefore, the divine nature remains numerically one while persons are really three by virtue of their mutual relations

The Distinction of Reason vs. Real Distinction #

Essence and Person Distinguished Only in Thought:

  • In reality: one divine essence and three divine persons are completely identical
  • In our understanding: we must use two distinct thoughts to express what is one in God
  • This is not merely verbal confusion but reflects the composition of human understanding applied to divine simplicity

Persons Distinguished in Reality by Opposition:

  • Relations of opposition create real distinction between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit
  • Aristotle identified relation as one of four kinds of opposition
  • Relatives are truly distinct from each other by virtue of their relative opposition

Language and Predication #

The Problem of Human Speech:

  • Our language derives from creatures where essence and individual are really distinct
  • We speak of creatures as “having” properties or properties being “in” creatures
  • In God, we must negate these compositions while using the same language
  • Principle: Whatever God has, he is; whatever is in God, is God

The Necessity of Precise Theological Language:

  • Words put forth disorderly generate heresy (Jerome/Hillary)
  • One must know the thing to speak correctly about it
  • Imprecise language eventually influences thinking

Key Arguments #

First Objection: The Immaterial Substance Problem #

Structure:

  • In whatever things essence and person are the same, there can be only one individual of that nature
  • This is evident in all separated substances (immaterial beings)
  • Therefore, in God, there should be only one person

Thomas’s Response:

  • The principle applies to creatures because their distinction requires matter
  • In God, relations subsist and can multiply persons without multiplying the divine essence
  • Relations in God are not accidents but are the divine nature itself

Second Objection: The Law of Non-Contradiction #

Structure:

  • Affirmation and negation together at once cannot be verified in the same thing
  • We affirm that persons are distinct but deny that the essence is distinct
  • Example: “The divine nature is not generated” but “The Son is generated”
  • This seems to violate the law of non-contradiction

Thomas’s Response:

  • The law applies to things as they are in reality, not to our imperfect understanding of reality
  • In reality, there is no composition; there is one simple divine reality
  • Our two thoughts (on essence and on persons) both refer to the same reality but under different aspects
  • Aristotle himself recognized this in the case of acting and being acted upon: the same reality, two different descriptions

Third Objection: The Language of Subjection #

Structure:

  • Nothing is subject to itself
  • The person (hypostasis = “standing under”) is subject to the essence
  • Therefore, the person is not the same as the essence

Thomas’s Response:

  • We impose names on divine things according to how we know creatures
  • In creatures, individuals are subject to their nature; we use this language for God
  • But we must negate the real distinction this language implies in creatures

Important Definitions #

Essence (Essentia): The nature or substance of God; that by which God is God; in God, identical with being and with each person

Person (Persona): A subsisting relation in the divine nature; signifies relation insofar as it exists as a substance in the divine nature

Suppositum: The individual substance; in God, identical with person

Hypostasis: From Greek meaning “standing under”; designates the individual substance or person; used to speak of the distinct subsistence of each person

Relation (Relatio): In God, the real distinction grounding the plurality of persons; one of Aristotle’s four kinds of opposition

Notional Act: An act proper to a single person (e.g., generation by the Father, being generated by the Son, breathing forth by Father and Son)

Examples & Illustrations #

Geometric Analogy: Circles and Points #

  • Two circles of identical size and shape differ only numerically (location); they differ as two circles
  • Two angels differ specifically (like a circle and a square), not numerically
  • In immaterial substances, numerical difference necessarily implies specific difference
  • Without matter and quantity, you cannot have multiple individuals of one nature

The Point at the Center of a Circle #

  • The divine essence resembles a point at the center
  • We can speak of this point as the end of one line (representing divine understanding) or the beginning of another (representing divine love)
  • In our thought: two distinct concepts of one point
  • In reality: one point, one essence
  • This illustrates how we understand simple things in a composed way

Acting and Being Acted Upon #

  • My kicking you and your being kicked are the same reality
  • Yet we affirm of one what we deny of the other (“I am kicking; you are being kicked”)
  • Shows that one reality can support two definitions and opposite predications
  • Similarly, the divine essence and persons are one reality expressible in two ways

The Example of a Mother of God #

  • When Mary is called “Mother of God,” the divine Word became flesh, not the Father
  • This is not appropriation but a specific truth about one person
  • Heretics twisted this language, denying Mary was mother of God and claiming she was only mother of Christ
  • This shows the danger of imprecise theological language

Notable Quotes #

“In whatever things the essence or nature is the same thing as a person or the individual substance, it is necessary that there be only one individual of that nature.” — Thomas Aquinas (restating the principle grounding the objection)

“The relation, right, multiplies the Trinity of persons in God.” — Boethius (explaining how relations ground the plurality of persons without multiplying the essence)

“Whatever God has, he is; whatever is in God, is God.” — Thomas Aquinas (on negating composition in God)

“Ex verbi sinori nati prolatis, some words put forth disorderly, heresy arises.” — Jerome (on the danger of imprecise theological language)

“If you’re reading too fast, you get mental indigestion.” — Thomas Aquinas (as cited by Berquist, on the necessity of slow, careful study)

“She shouldn’t be called the mother of God, but the mother of Christ.” — Heretical objection (cited as example of how imprecise language leads to heresy)

Questions Addressed #

Question 1: Is the essence the same as the person in God? #

Answer: Yes, they are identical in reality. Reasoning: The divine simplicity requires this identity. Persons are distinguished not by being different from the essence but by relations of opposition to each other.

Question 2: How can one essence be three persons if immaterial substances cannot have multiple individuals of the same nature? #

Answer: In God, relations subsist in the divine nature and ground real distinction between persons without creating distinction from the essence. In creatures, multiplicity of individuals requires matter; in God, relations replace matter as the ground of distinction.

Question 3: Does it violate the law of non-contradiction to affirm persons are distinct while denying the essence is distinct? #

Answer: No. The law applies to things as they are. In reality, there is no composition in God. Our two thoughts refer to one reality under different aspects. The same reality can support opposite descriptions when understood differently.

Question 4: If person means “standing under” the essence, how can they be identical? #

Answer: We derive theological language from creatures. In creatures, individuals are subject to their nature. We use this language for God but must negate the real distinction it implies in creatures. The language reflects our mode of understanding, not the thing itself.

Philosophical and Theological Context #

On Logic:

  • Logic properly considers how one thing is said of another
  • The Trinity presents ways of speaking that philosophy did not anticipate
  • Theology must make special considerations about what can be said of what

On Simplicity:

  • Divine simplicity requires that all distinctions in God are distinctions of reason only, except between persons
  • The person/essence distinction is unique: rational in God’s being, but grounded in our composed way of knowing

On Relations:

  • In God, relations are not accidents added to substance but are the divine substance itself
  • This is why relations can ground real distinction without requiring distinction from the essence

On Method:

  • Berquist emphasizes slow, careful reading and meditation
  • Understanding requires dwelling on each question until clarity emerges
  • The objections are not meant to paralyze but to sharpen understanding of the difficulty