142. Relations in God and Subsisting Forms

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Relations in Creatures vs. Relations in God #

In Creatures:

• Relations are accidents, not substances
• Cannot constitute the distinction between individual substances
• Essential principles belonging to the genus of substance must effect such distinction
• Examples: being a father, teacher, husband, or son—these are relational accidents that do not multiply substances

In God:

• Relations are subsisting (ὑφεστώς), not accidental
• Relations have the capacity to distinguish persons (supposita) because they are real and subsisting
• Just as the divine wisdom is subsisting (not an accident as human wisdom is), so too the divine relations are subsisting
• Relations operate as a form of opposition that enables personal distinction

Aristotle’s Doctrine of Relation as Opposition #

• Thomas uses Aristotle’s Categories and the fifth book of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Wisdom)
• Aristotle identifies relation (πρὸς, ad/towards) as one of four kinds of opposition
• Relation is distinguished by the property that one term is directed toward (πρὸς/ad) another
• This doctrine from pagan philosophy providentially supports Christian theology of the Trinity
• Example from John’s Gospel: “the word was toward God” (πρὸς τὸν θεόν)—showing that relation involves a directed distinction

Acting and Undergoing as Relations #

• From Aristotle’s Physics, Book III: acting upon and undergoing are really the same action
• Example: kicking and being kicked are numerically one action but differ in definition
• Kicking is called thus insofar as it proceeds from one subject
• Being kicked is called thus insofar as it inheres in another subject
• What is affirmed of one (kicking) can be denied of the other (being kicked) precisely because of this definitional difference
• Heraclitus: “the way up and the way down is the same”

Key Arguments #

First Reply: Why Relations Cannot Distinguish Substances in Creatures #

1. Premise: Relations are accidents in creatures
2. Conclusion: Relations cannot constitute the distinction of individual substances
3. Reason: Only essential principles (belonging to the genus of substance) can effect such distinction
4. Therefore: Relations in creatures are not subsisting and thus cannot serve as distinguishing principles

Application to God #

1. Premise: In God, relations are subsisting
2. Premise: Relations have opposition to each other
3. Conclusion: Relations in God can distinguish persons (supposita)
4. Note: This does not mean relations are distinguished from each other according to the essence—rather, they are really identified with the essence while remaining relatively distinct

The Second Figure Syllogism in Negative Theology #

• The second figure of syllogism (where the middle term is predicate in both premises) yields only negative conclusions
• Such syllogisms are used throughout negative theology: one statement affirms something of one thing, another denies it of another
• Example: “Something composed is before it; God is nothing before him; therefore, God is not composed”
• This structure preserves logical validity while maintaining theological truth about divine simplicity

Important Definitions #

Relation (σχέσις/relatio) #

• In creatures: an accident that one thing has toward another, not capable of subsisting
• In God: a subsisting reality that is identified with the divine essence, yet relatively distinct from other relations
• Distinguished by the property of being toward or ad something else (πρὸς/ad)

Subsisting (ὑφεστώς/subsistens) #

• That which exists in and of itself rather than as an accident in a subject
• Divine relations are subsisting, unlike creaturely relations
• Makes relations capable of distinguishing divine persons

Opposition (ἐναντίωσις/oppositio) #

• Four kinds according to Aristotle: contradiction, privation, contrariety, and relation
• Relation constitutes a form of opposition by virtue of one term being directed toward another
• Enables distinction without requiring real distinction in essence

Supposita/Persons (ὑποστάσεις/supposita) #

• Individual subsisting realities
• In God: distinguished by subsisting relations, not by matter or essence
• The divine persons are three supposita united in one essence

Examples & Illustrations #

Kicking and Being Kicked #

• Same action, different definitions
• “Kicking” describes the action as emanating from the agent
• “Being kicked” describes the same action as received in the patient
• Affirm one, deny the other—not because of numerical difference, but because of definitional difference

Human Relationships as Non-Subsisting Relations #

• Being a father, teacher, husband, or son are relations
• In humans, these do not constitute multiple substances
• One man can be father, teacher, and husband simultaneously without multiplying substances
• Contrast: in God, relations are subsisting and thus capable of distinguishing persons

Divine Wisdom vs. Human Wisdom #

• Human wisdom: an accidental quality of the human subject
• Divine wisdom: subsisting in itself, identical with God’s being
• This illustrates how “subsisting” changes the nature of what would otherwise be an accident

Notable Quotes #

“In creatures there cannot be a distinction of individual substances through relations, because relations in creatures are accidents. But it is necessary that it be through essential principles, principles that belong in the genus of substance. Because relations are not subsisting in creatures. But in God, the relations are subsisting. Just as the wisdom is subsisting, right? Why in me, if I have any wisdom, it’s an accident of me. And therefore, according as they have opposition to each other, right? They are able to distinguish the supposita.”

“I think it’s kind of marvelous, huh? That when Thomas sees relation as one kind of opposition, right? He’s going back to this pagan, who knew nothing of the Christian faith, Aristotle, right? Who in the categories, and in the fifth book of wisdom, distinguishes relations as one of the four kinds of opposites. And you can see the divine providence in that, huh?”

“And if you know Aristotle, you’ve got the Greek of St. John, you say, hey, there is a distinction between the word and what the word is toward, right? And that’s a distinction of relation.”

Questions Addressed #

How can relations distinguish persons in God if they are accidents in creatures? #

• Answer: Because in God, relations are subsisting (not accidental), they possess the ontological status necessary to distinguish supposita. Creaturely relations cannot do this because they remain dependent on subjects.

How does relation function as opposition? #

• Answer: Relation involves one term being directed toward (πρὸς) another, creating a definitive distinction. This is one of Aristotle’s four kinds of opposition and does not require real distinction in essence.

Can something be one in reality yet many in definition? #

• Answer: Yes. The example of kicking and being kicked shows this: one action, but distinguished by definition (as emanating vs. received). So too divine relations are one with the essence, yet relatively distinct by definition.