143. Predication and Trinitarian Theology: Substantial vs. Adjective Names
Summary
This lecture examines how essential names like “God” are predicated of the three divine persons, using the distinction between substantial (noun) and adjective predication to resolve the apparent contradiction between saying “one God” and “three persons.” Berquist works through Thomas Aquinas’s third article on the Trinity, which defends orthodox predication against objections drawn from human language, Hebrew idiom, Augustine’s statements, and the logic of person-language.
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Lecture Notes
Main Topics #
The Problem of Predication in Trinitarian Language #
- How can we affirm that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, yet deny that there are three gods?
- This requires understanding how the name “God” functions when predicated of the three persons
- The fundamental principle: essential names (substantial) are said singularly; adjective names are said plurally
Substantial vs. Adjective Predication #
- Substantial names (nouns) like “God,” “man” signify something in the manner of a substance
- They express what a thing is
- In creatures, multiplied according to the form signified (three men = three human natures)
- Said singularly when predicated of the three divine persons (one God)
- Adjective names like “divine,” “wise,” “eternal” signify something in the manner of an accident
- They express a quality inhering in a subject
- In creatures, multiplied according to the subjects in which they inhere (e.g., shape in multiple chairs)
- Said plurally when predicated of the three divine persons (three wise ones, three eternals)
Why God Differs from Creatures #
- In creatures: one form cannot be in many individual subjects except through a unity of order (e.g., an army)
- In God: the divine essence is one in reality and found in three persons without any external ordering
- Therefore: the essential name “God” is said singularly; persons are three according to relations, not natures
Key Arguments and Objections #
First Objection: The Analogy with “Man” #
- Objection: Just as “man” signifies one having human nature, so “God” signifies one having divine nature. Since three persons have divine nature, there are three gods (following the logic that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are three men).
- Response: “God” is a substantial name (noun), while having divine nature would be expressed adjectively. The grammatical form determines the mode of predication. The difference lies not in the meaning of “God” but in whether it is treated as a noun or adjective.
Second Objection: Hebrew Language (Elohim) #
- Objection: The Hebrew word Elohim (God) is plural in form and appears in Genesis 1:1, suggesting a plurality of gods
- Response: Different languages express the same reality differently. The Hebrews use the plural form Elohim; the Greeks speak of three ὑποστάσεις (hypostases). The grammatical plurality in one language does not imply a multiplicity of divine natures.
Third Objection: Augustine’s “Three Things” #
- Objection: Augustine says that the three things to be enjoyed are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (from Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana). If they are three things, why not three gods?
- Response: “Thing” is a transcendental name said of both substance and relation, but in different senses. According to substance (what God is), there is one thing; according to relation (the persons), there are three things. The same word can be used truly in both ways because it applies to different aspects of the reality.
Fourth Objection: Person vs. God #
- Objection: If we can say “three persons,” why cannot we say “three gods”? Both terms are predicated of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
- Response: The name “person” signifies personal properties (the relations of origin), not the divine nature. The name “God” signifies the divine nature itself. Since there are three personal properties but one divine nature, we rightly say three persons but one God.
Important Definitions #
Transcendentals (Transcendentalia) #
- Names that are said of all things and all categories
- Examples: ens (being), res (thing/something), unum (one), verum (true), bonum (good)
- These are the most universal names and are equivocal by reason (aequivoca secundum rationem), not by chance
- “Thing” is particularly important here: it is said of substance, quantity, quality, relation, etc., but not in exactly the same sense
Supposition (Suppositio) #
- The reference or standing-for function of a term in a proposition
- Distinct from signification (meaning)
- A single term can have one fixed meaning (signification) but different suppositions depending on context
- Example mentioned implicitly: “God” always signifies the divine nature, but in “God generates God,” the first instance stands for the Father and the second for the Son
Essential vs. Notional #
- Essential: Pertaining to the divine essence/nature, common to all three persons
- Notional: Pertaining to the relations or personal properties proper to each person (generation, breathing, etc.)
Examples & Illustrations #
The Shape of Chairs #
- Two chairs can have the same shape, but the shape is multiplied because it exists in two different pieces of wood
- The accident (shape) receives its multiplicity from the subjects in which it inheres
- Contrast with God: the divine nature is not multiplied even though it is in three persons
Knowledge of the Pythagorean Theorem #
- Multiple people can know the Pythagorean theorem
- The knowledge is multiplied because it exists in different minds (different subjects)
- This illustrates how accidents are multiplied according to their subjects, not according to the form itself
The Nature of Distinctions #
- People are naturally poor at seeing distinctions, especially between things close together
- Through the study of dialectic (Aristotle’s treatment), the mind is exercised in seeing differences
- The closer the things are, the more the mind must be exercised to distinguish them
- Example: distinguishing between different types of dogs exercises the mind more than distinguishing a dog from a chair
- But with likeness, it is reversed: seeing likeness between distant things (analogies) exercises the mind more
Wine Tasting #
- Berquist recounts an anecdote about Ron McCarthy (former president of Thomas Aquinas) serving wine from different bottles with switched labels
- Most guests were deceived by the labels, thinking they were drinking expensive wine when they were not
- Except for Brother Mark, who made an accurate judgment
- Illustrates how difficult it is to make fine distinctions without expertise
Questions Addressed #
Can we truly say “God generates God” without contradiction? #
- Yes, when we understand the different suppositions of the term “God”
- The Father (who is God) generates the Son (who is God)
- This does not mean God generates Himself or another God implying a second divine nature
- The supposition of “God” in the subject is different from its supposition in the predicate
How does Augustine say both “one highest thing” and “three things”? #
- Both statements are true because “thing” is a transcendental predicated of both substance and relation
- Taken substantially (referring to the divine nature): “the highest, greatest thing” (singular)
- Taken according to relation (the three persons): “three things”
- This appears in the same sentence in Augustine’s text
Why is understanding grammar important for theology? #
- Theology requires not just philosophical precision but grammatical precision
- The distinction between noun and adjective, substantial and accidental signification, is essential for speaking correctly about God
- Many heresies and confusions arise from neglecting grammatical distinctions
Notable Quotes #
“Speech is subject to the thing” — Attributed to Hilary of Poitiers (cited by Berquist as a principle governing how language relates to reality)
“Never affirm, seldom deny, always distinguish” — Cited as a Dominican maxim (Berquist notes this is an exaggeration, but the principle of distinction is sound)
“Belief seeking understanding” (Fides Quaerens Intellectum) — Attributed to St. Anselm, but “substantially” present in Augustine; describes the natural activity of reason reflecting on what it believes
“Theology is a science by which belief is engendered, nourished, strengthened, and defended” — St. Augustine (cited as Thomas Aquinas’s definition of theology in its practical purpose)