145. Meaning and Supposition: The Distinction in Theological Language

Summary

This lecture explores the crucial distinction between the meaning of a word and what it stands for (supposition), using concrete examples like ‘I am the son of a man’ to illuminate how this applies to divine names. Berquist demonstrates how concrete names like ‘God’ can stand for different divine persons while maintaining a stable meaning, whereas abstract names like ’essence’ cannot stand for persons without contradiction. The lecture shows how understanding this linguistic principle resolves apparent contradictions in Scripture and Trinitarian theology, particularly through analysis of how substantial versus adjective names function differently in predication.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Core Distinction: Meaning vs. Supposition #

The Problem: Words seem to mean the same thing they stand for, but this creates logical puzzles
The Resolution: A word has one stable meaning (what it signifies about the nature of things) but can stand for (supposit) different particular instances depending on context
Example: The word “man” means “one having human nature” but stands for different individuals (my father, your father, etc.)
Significance: This is described as a “seed”—small in appearance but great in power, generating many theological insights

The Son Paradox as Illustration #

Principle: No son is the one of whom he is a son (logical necessity)
Statement: I am the son of a man (true)
False Conclusion: Therefore I am not a man (contradicts reality)
Solution: In “I am the son of a man,” the word “man” stands for (the father), not means something different
The meaning of “man” (having human nature) is stable; what it stands for varies with context

Concrete vs. Abstract Names in Divine Theology #

Concrete Names (e.g., “God”) #

Signify the divine essence as had by or in the one possessing it
Can stand for different divine persons while maintaining one meaning
Examples: “God generates” (stands for Father), “God is generated” (stands for Son), “God spirates” (stands for Father and Son together)
This works because “God” means “that which has the divine nature,” and each person has this nature

Abstract Names (e.g., “essence,” “divinity,” “divine nature”) #

Signify the divine nature in abstraction from the persons
Cannot properly stand for persons without implying distinction in the nature itself
Why not: To say “essence generates essence” would suggest the divine nature itself is divided, contradicting divine simplicity
This is a false solution that was actually attempted by Joachim of Flora

The Way of Signifying (Modus Significandi) #

Thomas’s key principle: For truth of speech, one must consider not only what is signified (the thing itself) but also the way of signifying (how the word signifies it)
Two names can refer to the same reality (God and divine essence are identical secundum rem) but signify in different ways
Concrete names signify by way of substance; abstract names signify by way of form or nature apart from subject
This difference in how they signify determines what they can stand for

The Problem of Generation in Divine Persons #

Objection: In creatures, when a father generates a son, a new human nature comes into being. Why not in God?
Answer: In creatures, the generated receives a numerically different individual nature (my humanity ≠ my father’s humanity), though the same in species
In God: The Son receives the same divine nature in number that the Father has—not a new nature or a copy
Result: The divine nature is not generated; only the Son is generated (in his personal existence as distinct by relation)
This distinction is critical: generation affects the person, not the essence

Key Arguments #

Argument from Linguistic Analysis #

Words have stable meanings based on what they signify about nature
What words stand for can vary based on context and what is predicated
Therefore, we can maintain stable theological language while allowing different references
This resolves apparent contradictions in Scripture

Argument against Abstract Names Standing for Persons #

To say “essence generates” would require the essence itself to be distinguished into generator and generated
The divine essence is absolutely simple
Any distinction within the essence would contradict simplicity
Therefore, abstract names cannot stand for persons in personal actions
Yet concrete names can, because they signify essence as in persons (plural subjects, one nature)

Argument on Substantial vs. Adjective Names #

Substantial names bring their own subject and derive unity/multiplicity from the form they signify
Adjective names depend on a subject and derive unity/multiplicity from their subjects
Personal properties are adjective-like in that they belong to persons as relations inhere in subjects
Therefore, personal properties cannot be predicated of the essence except as added to a substantive name (“God generating,” not “essence generating”)

Important Definitions #

Supposition (Suppositio) #

The reference of a term to the particular thing(s) it stands for in a given context; distinct from the term’s meaning (significatio)

Meaning (Significatio) #

What a word signifies about the nature or form of things; remains constant across different contexts

Concrete Name (Nomen Concretum) #

A name that signifies a form as existing in a subject (e.g., “God,” “man”, “white”)

Abstract Name (Nomen Abstractum) #

A name that signifies a form or nature apart from any subject (e.g., “divinity,” “humanity,” “whiteness”)

Substantial Name (Nomen Substantivum) #

A name that signifies something in the manner of substance and brings its own subject; receives unity/multiplicity from the form signified

Adjective Name (Nomen Adjectivum) #

A name that signifies something by way of accident; does not bring its own subject but inheres in or is placed around the subject implied by a substantive name

Modus Significandi (Way of Signifying) #

The manner in which a word signifies its object—whether as substance, accident, concrete form, abstract form, etc.

One in Number (Unum Numero) #

Individually identical, the same single existing thing (as opposed to one in species or genus)

Secundum Rem #

“According to the thing itself”; in reality, as opposed to in our manner of understanding

Examples & Illustrations #

The Father-Son Relationship #

“I am the son of a man” is true
“Man” stands for the father (the one from whom I derive)
Yet “man” means “one having human nature,” which applies to me also
My father’s humanity and my humanity are distinct in number, though same in species

Scripture Examples #

John 3:16 #

“For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son”

“God” stands for God the Father in this context (the one who loves and gives)
The Son is not the one of whom he is a son, yet he is God
The meaning of “God” (divine essence) is constant; what it stands for shifts with the predicate

Matthew 16:16 #

“Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God”

“Living God” stands for God the Father
The Son is the Son of the living God, yet he himself is the living God
The meaning remains stable; the reference depends on the relational context

John 1:1 #

“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was towards God”

One is towards another (distinct persons); you are not towards yourself
Therefore “God” must stand for the Father here
If it stood for God in general (including the Word), it would be nonsensical

The Hail Mary Problem #

“Holy Mary, Mother of God”

Protestants sometimes object: Does this mean Mary is mother of the divine nature? This seems wrong.
Solution: “God” here stands for the divine person (the Son) who took human nature from Mary
Mary is the mother of this person according to his human nature (not according to his divinity)
The meaning of “God” is stable (divine essence); what it stands for is the Son as a person

Mathematical Analogy #

“Two is half of a number”

Two is not half of itself
In this statement, “number” stands for four
Yet “number” doesn’t acquire the meaning “four”; it still means “a quantity”
What “number” stands for depends on the mathematical relation

Generation in Creatures #

“A man generates a man”

First “man” stands for the father; second stands for the son
Both true individual men, yet numerically distinct in their humanity
The meaning of “man” doesn’t change; what it stands for varies with context

Notable Quotes #

“A beginning in philosophy or theology is always a seed, and a seed is something small in size, but great in its power. And because it’s small in size, it’s hard to see.”

“For the truth of locutions, of speeches, it is not only necessary to consider the things signified, but also the way of signifying.”

“Although God and the divine essence are the same in things, secundum rem, nevertheless, by reason of a different way of signifying, it’s necessary to speak diversely about both of them.”

“The name God signifies that which has the divine nature… and since the three persons all have that divine nature, the name God can stand for them. But the essence signifies a divine nature in a kind of abstraction from the persons, and therefore there can’t be understood any distinction in regard to the nature itself.”

Questions Addressed #

How can we say both “God generates” and “God is generated” without contradiction? #

Answer: In the first, “God” stands for the Father (the generator); in the second, it stands for the Son (the generated). The meaning of “God” is stable (divine essence), but supposition varies with the predicate.

Why can’t we say “essence generates essence” even though we can say “God generates God”? #

Answer: Because “essence” signifies the divine nature abstractly (apart from persons), and to assign the action of generating to the essence would imply that the essence itself is divided into generator and generated. This contradicts divine simplicity. “God,” by contrast, signifies the essence as in persons, so it can stand for different persons.

How is this distinction important for understanding Scripture? #

Answer: Many biblical passages use divine names in ways that would seem contradictory without this distinction. For example, “the Word was towards God” requires understanding that “God” stands for the Father, not for the Word itself or for God in general.

What is the error of Joachim of Flora? #

Answer: He thought that since God and divine essence are identical in reality (secundum rem), one can say of them the same things. Thus he claimed “essence generates essence” just as “God generates God.” He failed to account for the different way of signifying—concrete vs. abstract names signify differently despite referring to the same reality.

Why is divine simplicity relevant to whether abstract names can stand for persons? #

Answer: If abstract names like “essence” could stand for persons in their distinctive actions, it would require the essence to be distinguished within itself (as generator vs. generated). But divine simplicity means the essence is absolutely undivided. Therefore, abstract names cannot properly stand for persons in their relations or actions.

Why should we not say “the essence generates the essence” even though Augustine sometimes seemed to approach this language? #

Answer: Thomas acknowledges Augustine’s expressions but explains they should not be extended or taken literally. Instead, abstract names should be interpreted through concrete or personal names (“the divine essence” = “the Son, who is the divine essence, from the Father, who is also the divine essence”). This preserves Augustine’s intent to emphasize the unity of nature while respecting the rules of proper speech.

Connections to Previous Material #

On Divine Simplicity #

The lecture repeatedly appeals to God’s absolute simplicity—the fact that in God, essence and existence are identical, and there is no composition. This justifies why abstract names cannot introduce distinction into the divine essence itself.

On Concrete vs. Substantive Language #

The distinction between how “God” (concrete, substantive) and “essence” (abstract) function in speech reflects the general medieval logical principle that the modus significandi determines what linguistic operations are valid.

On Relations in God #

The three divine persons are distinguished not by essence but by relations (Father, Son, Holy Spirit). These relations are real relations—not external but constitutive of the persons. This is why relational predications like “generates” must be carefully handled: they apply to persons, not to the essence.

Pedagogical Methods Evident in This Lecture #

Dialectical approach: Presenting puzzles (the son paradox) and working through objections systematically
Linguistic analysis: Examining how words function to understand theological truths
Historical references: Using Augustine and the Church’s tradition to support and refine arguments
Concrete examples: Grounding abstract principles in familiar situations
Scriptural integration: Showing how the distinction illuminates biblical passages
Cautions against error: Identifying false solutions (like Joachim’s) and explaining why they fail