149. Relations and Persons in God: Identity and Distinction

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Identity of Relations and Persons #

• Central Question: Is the relation (e.g., fatherhood) the same thing as the person (the Father)?
• Thomas’s answer: In God, relations ARE identical with persons, though they differ in how they signify
• This identity follows necessarily from divine simplicity: whatever is in God IS God; whatever God has IS God
• Two distinct types of real identity in God emerge from two denials of composition:
  • Identity of abstract and concrete (deus/deitas - God/Deity are the same)
  • Identity of substance and accidents (no accidents exist in God)

Personal vs. Non-Personal Relations #

• Personal relations (fatherhood/πατρότης, sonship/υἱότης, spiration/spiratio): These constitute the persons themselves
  • Fatherhood IS the Father; Sonship IS the Son
  • These relations subsist per se as the very persons
• Non-personal relations (common breathing/spiratio communis): Belong to multiple persons but constitute no single person
  • Common breathing belongs to both Father and Son
  • Yet it is not either one person subsisting per se
  • It is in both by reason of essence-identity, not person-identity

The Two Compositions Denied in God #

1. Composition of matter and form (like body-soul composition in creatures)

   • Denial: In God, abstract and concrete are the same (deus = deitas)
   • Application: Father = Fatherhood (no distinction between concrete person and abstract property)

2. Composition of substance and accident (like a substance having accidental properties)

   • Denial: Whatever is in God is his essence
   • Application: Relations in God are not accidents but subsisting realities identical with essence
   • Result: Multiple relations can belong to one person without composition

Key Arguments #

First Objection: The Problem of Multiple Relations #

Problem: The Father has both fatherhood AND common breathing; how can both be identical with the person if they are not identical with each other?

Resolution:

• Personal relations constitute the person and are identical with it as abstract-concrete (denying first composition)
• Non-personal relations are identical with persons by essence-identity (denying second composition)
• This is not a contradiction because the modes of identity differ
• Just as God and divine wisdom are the same in reality (God is wisdom) while differing in how they signify, so fatherhood and common breathing can both be identical with the person through different identity-modes

Second Objection: “Nothing is in itself” #

Problem: If the relation is in the person, and they are identical, then the relation is in itself—which violates Aristotle’s axiom

Resolution:

• Properties are said to be in the divine essence by way of identity only
• Properties are said to be in the divine persons by way of identity AND as a form is in its underlying subject (suppositum)
• Different senses of in (ἐν) apply: essence-identity vs. form-subject relationship
• This distinction parallels Aristotle’s eight senses of in from Physics IV

Third Objection: Different Predications #

Problem: We say “the Father generates” but NOT “fatherhood generates.” If they were identical, whatever is said of one should be said of the other.

Resolution:

• The difference lies in modus significandi (way of signifying), not in reality (secundum rem)
• “Father” signifies as a person/suppositum (underlying subject)
• “Fatherhood” signifies as a form (that by which one is a father)
• Acts are attributed to suppositа (underlying substances), not to forms
• Example: “The strong man beat you,” not “strength beat you”—the underlying subject acts, but through the form
• Similarly: The Father (person/suppositum) generates through fatherhood (form)

Important Definitions #

Relation (relatio) #

• In God: A subsisting reality (not an accident) identical with the divine essence and constituting a divine person
• Defined by reference to another: esse relationis est habere se ad alterum (the being of relation is to have itself toward another)
• Personal relations: Fatherhood, Sonship, Spiration—these constitute the three persons
• Non-personal relations: Common breathing (spiratio communis)—belongs to Father and Son together

Suppositum #

• An individual substance or subsisting thing
• In creatures: Composed of matter-form and substance-accidents
• In God: The divine essence itself, subsisting as three distinct persons through relations
• Relations in God are subsisting supposita (the very persons themselves)

Modus Significandi #

• The way a word or concept represents reality to the intellect
• Same reality can be signified in different ways
• Example: “Father” and “fatherhood” signify the same reality but in different modes (person vs. form)
• This explains why the same reality can have different predicates

Actus Notionalis (notional act) #

• Acts that pertain to individual persons specifically
• Examples: Generation (proper to the Father and Son), Procession (the Holy Spirit’s notional act)
• These acts constitute the relations by which persons are distinguished

Examples & Illustrations #

The Multiple Relations Problem #

• Father has: Fatherhood (constitutes him) + Common breathing (shared with Son)
• Son has: Sonship (constitutes him) + Common breathing (shared with Father)
• Solution: One person can have multiple relations because of divine simplicity (no substance-accident composition)

Distinguishing Senses of “In” #

Berquist emphasizes Aristotle’s eight senses of in from Physics IV, ordered by Thomas according to Metaphysics V:

• Spatial containment: “I’m in this room”
• Part in whole: “My heart is in San Francisco”
• Power/ability: “You are in my power”
• Form in matter, Substance in accidents, etc.

Application: Relations are “in” persons in a unique way—not spatially, not as accidents, but as intrinsic constitutive principles.

The Form-Subject Distinction #

• When geometry is in your mind: You have the form of geometry, but YOU (the person/suppositum) do not change
• Predication: “You learned geometry” (person as subject) vs. “geometry learned you” (form cannot be subject of active verbs)
• Applied to Trinity: “The Father generates” (person as suppositum/subject) vs. “fatherhood generates” (form cannot be subject)

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Is the Relation the Same Thing as the Person? #

Answer: Yes, in reality (secundum rem), but they differ in their way of signifying (modus significandi)

• Personal relations (fatherhood, sonship) are identical with the persons they constitute
• This is analogous to how “God” and “divine nature” are identical in reality but differ in signification
• Non-personal relations (common breathing) are identical with the persons through essence-identity, not person-identity

Q2: How Does This Avoid Contradiction? #

Answer: By recognizing two distinct modes of real identity in God:

1. Identity of abstract and concrete (denies form-matter composition)
2. Identity of substance and accidents (denies substance-accident composition)

Both fatherhood and common breathing can be identical with the Father through different identity-modes without contradiction.

Q3: Why Say Relations Are “In” Persons Rather Than Only Identical? #

Answer:

• Relations are said to be in the divine essence by simple identity
• Relations are said to be in the divine persons both by identity AND by being a form in its underlying subject
• This reflects two different compositions that creatures have but God does not

Q4: What About the Axiom “Nothing Is In Itself”? #

Answer: The axiom does not apply here because:

• Relations are not merely “in” persons in a spatial or accidental sense
• Rather, they are intrinsic forms constitutive of the person as subject
• This is a legitimate use of in that differs from the problematic self-containment the axiom excludes

Notable Quotes #

“In God, what is and that by which it is are the same thing. The Father by fatherhood is father. Therefore, the Father is the same thing as his fatherhood.” — Thomas Aquinas, cited by Berquist (demonstrating identity through simplicity)

“Person and property are the same in the things themselves, but they differ in their thought.” — Thomas Aquinas, on the distinction between ontological reality and conceptual signification

“Because the divine simplicity excludes the composition of form and matter, it follows that in God the same is the abstract and the concrete, as God and Deity.” — Thomas Aquinas, explaining the first type of real identity

“Whatever is attributed to God is his essence” (by reason of denying substance-accident composition) — Thomas Aquinas, explaining why common breathing is identical with both Father and Son