150. Relations as Distinguishing Principles of Divine Persons

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Central Question #

• Issue: Are the divine persons (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) distinguished primarily by relations (fatherhood, sonship) or by origin (generation, procession)?
• Thomas’s Position: Relations are the primary distinguishing principle; origin plays only a secondary role
• Key Principle: Relations distinguish and constitute; origins presuppose the persons already constituted

Origin vs. Relations as Distinguishing Principles #

Origin (Generatio, Processio)

• Signifies as an action proceeding from a person (generation goes forth from the Father)
• Signifies as something coming to a person (nativity comes to the Son)
• Presupposes the person already constituted before they can act
• Cannot be the constitutive principle of distinction because it presupposes what it should constitute

Relations (Relatio)

• Signify as a form intrinsic to the person (fatherhood, sonship)
• Are subsisting—not accidents inhering in a subject, but the very persons themselves
• Constitute and distinguish the persons; do not presuppose them
• In God, the abstract and concrete are identical: fatherhood is the Father

Why Relations Must Be the Distinguishing Principle #

From the Nature of Distinction

• For two things to be understood as distinct, each must be distinguished by something intrinsic to itself
• In creatures: through matter or form
• In God: the divine nature is common to all three persons, so something else must account for their distinction
• Only relations remain as intrinsic distinguishing principles

From the Structure of Divine Simplicity

• The divine nature cannot distinguish (it is common)
• The divine intellect cannot distinguish (it is one)
• The divine will cannot distinguish (it is one)
• No absolute attribute distinguishes them
• Therefore, only relations (which are relative, not absolute) can serve this function

The Problem of Relation Presupposing Distinction #

The Objection: Relations presuppose distinction in their very definition (“the being of a relative is to have itself to another”)

Thomas’s Response:

• This is true when relations are accidents in creatures (equality presupposes two prior substances)
• But when relations are subsisting (as in God), they do not presuppose prior distinction
• Instead, they bring distinction with themselves
• The correlatives (Father and Son) are understood together, not one before the other
• As Aristotle says in the Categories, the relative and its correlative are natural pairs arising together

The Principle: Prior Distinctions Are Closer to Unity #

Key Axiom: Quanto distinctio prior, tanto est propinquior unitati

• The more a distinction is prior (first), the closer it is to unity
• The first distinctions are the smallest and therefore hardest to see
• If the first distinction were absolute, it would be further from unity than a relative distinction
• The distinction of divine persons—the very first distinction—should employ the minimal distinguishing principle: relation

Key Arguments #

Against Origin as Primary Distinguishing Principle #

1. Origin presupposes constitution, not constitution itself

   • The Father must exist before he can generate
   • Generation signifies as proceeding from him (extrinsic)
   • Therefore it cannot be the constitutive principle of his personhood

2. Origin and its correlative are not intrinsic to the person

   • Generation is a road from the person (the Father as originating)
   • Nativity is a road to the person (the Son as originated)
   • Neither inheres intrinsically in the person to constitute them

3. Relations better serve the distinguishing function

   • “This name Father not only signifies a property, but also a hypostasis [person]”
   • “This name generating or generated signifies only a property”
   • Fatherhood is constitutive and personal; generation is not

The Necessity of Relations for Distinction #

Objection 1: Simple things are distinguished by themselves, not by relations; divine persons are supremely simple

• Response: Persons are subsisting relations; they are not composed of relation + something else. Fatherhood IS the Father; distinguishing by relations is distinguishing by themselves.

Objection 2: Relations belong to the category of relation; hypostasis belongs to the category of substance; different categories cannot distinguish

• Response: Divine persons are not distinguished in their being (nature, intellect, will—all absolute attributes). They are distinguished only according to what is said towards another, i.e., in the relative dimension. Relations suffice because nothing absolute distinguishes them.

Objection 3: The absolute is prior to the relative; first distinctions should be absolute, not relative

• Response: The more prior a distinction is, the closer it is to unity, and thus the smaller. The first distinction of all (that of divine persons) must be the smallest distinction, requiring the minimal principle: relation, not absolute attributes.

Objection 4: Relations presuppose distinction in their definition

• Response: Accidental relations in creatures presuppose prior substances. But subsisting relations bring distinction with themselves, not presupposing it. The relative and its correlative arise together.

Important Definitions #

Relation (Relatio)

• Signifies not as something in itself but as towards another (ad alterum)
• In God: subsisting relation that constitutes a divine person
• Differs fundamentally from accidental relations in creatures

Personal Property (Proprietas Personalis)

• A relation proper to a single divine person
• Examples: Fatherhood (Father), Sonship (Son)
• Constitutes the hypostasis it belongs to

Origin (Generatio, Processio, Nativitas)

• Active: Generation (from the Father’s perspective); breathing (from Father and Son together)
• Passive: Nativity (the Son’s coming-to-be); procession (the Holy Spirit’s coming-to-be)
• Signifies as action or as a way to a person, not as intrinsic form

Mode of Signification (Modus Significandi)

• The way a term represents reality, distinct from the reality itself
• Example: “Father” signifies as a person (concrete); “fatherhood” signifies as a form (abstract)
• Relations and origins differ in mode of signification even when based on the same reality

Hypostasis

• An individual substance
• In God: a subsisting relation
• Cannot be understood apart from its constituting relation (for personal relations)

Examples & Illustrations #

Kicking (from Aristotle’s Physics III) #

• “My kicking you” and “your being kicked by me” are the same act in reality
• But they differ in definition: kicking is named from the agent (me); being kicked from the patient (you)
• Similarly: generation (active) and nativity (passive) are the same procession, but differ in how they are signified
• Yet both are necessary for complete understanding of the distinction

Fatherhood vs. Generation #

• Generation as mere relation: The Father is father because he generated; the relation is founded on the act
• Fatherhood as constitutive: The Father must exist before he can generate; his personhood constitutes him as capable of generating
• Resolution: Both are true in different respects. Generation (origin) provides a secondary basis for distinction; fatherhood (relation) is the constitutive principle

Contrast with Creatures: A Philosopher and a Soldier #

• Two human persons are distinguished by absolute attributes intrinsic to them (one is a philosopher, one is a soldier)
• These are better distinguishing principles than the fact that one generated the other
• In God, no such absolute attributes distinguish the persons
• Therefore, relations must serve this function

The Tree of Porphyry #

• As you ascend toward the root, categories become more unified (substance encompasses all divisions below)
• As you descend, multiplicity increases
• The very first distinction in a hierarchy is the closest to unity and therefore smallest
• The distinction of divine persons is the first distinction, thus closest to unity, requiring the minimal principle

Notable Quotes #

“Sola Relatio multiplies the Trinity” — Boethius, De Trinitate (affirming Thomas’s position)

“Whence, since the three persons come together according to the unity of the essence, it is necessary to seek something by which they are distinguished.” — Thomas Aquinas (cited by Berquist), on why relations are necessary

“The persons are subsisting relations. Whence it is not repugnant to the simplicity of divine persons that they be distinguished by relations.” — Thomas Aquinas, response to the simplicity objection

“Although they are distinguished in both ways [origin and relation], nevertheless, before and chiefly through the relations.” — Thomas Aquinas, allowing some truth to the origin position while maintaining relations as primary

Questions Addressed #

Q: Can relations be the distinguishing principle if they are not intrinsic to the person? #

A: Relations in God are intrinsic—they are subsisting forms that constitute the persons. They differ from accidental relations in creatures, which inhere in a pre-existing subject. In God, what is signified as a form (fatherhood) is intrinsic and constitutive.

Q: How can relations distinguish if the definition of relation requires two distinct things already? #

A: This objection applies only to accidental relations. When relations are subsisting, they do not presuppose prior distinction but bring it with themselves. The correlatives (Father-Son) are understood together as natural pairs, neither prior to the other.

Q: Why not use origin (generation) as the primary distinguishing principle? #

A: Origin presupposes the person already constituted. The Father must exist before generating. Origin is extrinsic (proceeding from or to the person) rather than intrinsic. Relations are more fundamental because they constitute; origins manifest what relations constitute.

Q: If the absolute is prior to the relative, shouldn’t the first distinction be absolute, not relative? #

A: The more prior a distinction is, the closer it is to unity. The first distinction is the smallest. An absolute distinction would be further from unity than a relative one. The minimal distinguishing principle—relation—is appropriate for the very first distinction.