151. Abstraction, Hypostasis, and Notional Acts in the Trinity

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Abstraction and the Remaining of Hypostasis #

• The Question: Whether hypostases remain in understanding when divine relations/properties are abstracted
• Two Types of Abstraction:
  • Universal abstraction: removes particular difference from universal (e.g., removing “rational” from “man” leaves only “animal”; the particular instance does not remain)
  • Form-matter abstraction: removes form from matter while both remain understood separately (e.g., removing form of circle from bronze leaves both circle and bronze understood apart)
• Application to God:
  • God has no universal, particular, form, or matter in reality (secundum rem)
  • But by way of signification (per modum significandi), likenesses of these distinctions are found
  • When personal relations are removed by universal abstraction, only the common divine essence remains, not the particular hypostasis/person
  • When non-personal properties are removed by form-matter abstraction, the hypostases remain

The Nature of Hypostasis and Person in God #

• Personal Relations: Relations that constitute and distinguish particular persons (fatherhood for Father, sonship for Son)
  • Cannot be abstracted from understanding without removing the hypostasis itself
  • Are subsisting relations that bring their own underlying subjects
  • Constitute the persons intrinsically, not accidentally
• Non-Personal Relations: Relations that do not constitute any particular person (common breathing)
  • Can be abstracted while hypostases remain
  • Are identical with persons only by denying substance-accident composition
• Every hypostasis of rational nature is a person: By Boethius’s definition, hypostasis cannot exist without personhood in rational nature

Relations and Notional Acts #

• Notional Acts: Acts of origin (generation, breathing, being breathed) that designate procession
• Two Perspectives on Relations:
  • Relations simply as relations: Founded upon and presuppose notional acts (as all relations are founded on quantity or action-passion)
  • Relations as constituting persons: Presuppose the person as existing before acting (a person must exist before they can act)
• The Father’s Case: Fatherhood can be understood both after and before generation depending on perspective
  • After: if considering fatherhood merely as a relation founded on the act of generating
  • Before: if considering fatherhood as constituting the person of the Father (the person is understood before their actions)
• The Son’s Case: Differs from Father because sonship is understood as resulting from and proceeding from the Father’s generation
  • Birth (passive) is a way TO the person of the Son, not something proceeding FROM the Son
  • Therefore generation (as actively proceeding from Father) presupposes the personal property of the Father

Key Arguments #

Objections and Their Resolution #

Objection 1: Person adds to hypostasis (as rational difference adds to animal); therefore hypostasis remains when person is removed

• Response: Person adds not an absolute distinguishing property but a property “pertaining to dignity.” This entire property functions as a single difference. Removing it removes the hypostasis because in God, relations both distinguish and constitute persons. Only removing rationality from the nature (not the personal property) would leave hypostasis remaining.

Objection 2: From fatherhood, the Father is not only father but also someone (aliquis). Therefore removing fatherhood leaves hypostasis remaining.

• Response: By fatherhood, the Father is a person AND a hypostasis—these are not separate. The son does not cease to be a hypostasis or person just because fatherhood is removed; likewise the Father does not cease to be someone when fatherhood is removed.

Objection 3: Augustine says the Father remains ungenerated even if he had not generated the Son; therefore removing fatherhood still leaves hypostasis.

• Response: Augustine does not mean fatherhood constitutes the ungenerated nature. “Ungenerated” is said negatively and means God is not from another (understood by Jews and non-believers). This distinguishes the Father from creatures, not from other persons. Removing fatherhood removes the hypostasis as distinguished from other persons.

Objection 4 (Regarding Notional Acts): Relations presuppose the acts they are founded on; therefore notional acts precede relations.

• Response (First Part): If considering fatherhood simply as relation, it follows the act of generation. But the distinction must be used: relations constitute persons, so fatherhood as constituting the Father must precede generation (as person precedes action).

Objection 4 (Second Part): Just as birth presupposes sonship, generation presupposes fatherhood.

• Response: The cases are not alike. Birth is a way TO the person of the Son (understood as resulting from generation). But generation proceeds FROM the person of the Father, so it presupposes the Father as a constituted person.

Thomas’s Distinction on Relations and Acts #

• Origins Signified Passively (birth, being breathed): Simply precede the personal properties, because they signify the way to the person being constituted
• Origins Signified Actively (generation, breathing): Presuppose the personal property of the originating person (the Father must be constituted as Father before actively generating)
• The Subtle Distinction: Personal properties can be considered in two ways:
  1. Simply as relation → presupposes notional act (relation founded on action)
  2. As constitutive of person → precedes notional act (person precedes action)

Important Definitions #

Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις): An individual substance. In God, a subsisting subject that is constituted and distinguished by personal relations. Every hypostasis of rational nature is a person.

Person (persōna): An individual substance of rational nature. In God, a subsisting relation that both constitutes and distinguishes a hypostasis.

Personal Relation (relātiō persōnālis): A relation that constitutes and distinguishes a particular person (e.g., fatherhood for the Father, sonship for the Son). Cannot be removed by understanding without removing the hypostasis itself.

Non-Personal Relation: A relation that does not constitute any particular person and can be removed by understanding while hypostases remain.

Notional Act (actus nōtiōnālis): An act of origin (generātiō, spīrātiō) that designates the procession or origination of one person from another. Active when proceeding from the originating person; passive when received by the person proceeding.

Two Types of Abstraction:

• Abstractio secundum universale et particulāre: Universal abstraction, removing particular difference from universal; the particular does not remain
• Abstractio secundum formam et matteriam: Form-matter abstraction; both form and matter remain understood apart from each other

Examples & Illustrations #

The Circle and Bronze #

Removing the form of a circle from bronze leaves both the understanding of circle and understanding of bronze remaining in thought, apart from each other—an example of form-matter abstraction.

Man and Animal #

Removing the difference “rational” from “man” leaves only “animal” in understanding—an example of universal abstraction where the particular does not remain.

The Father’s Properties #

• Removing “ungenerated” (negatively understood) from the Father leaves him distinguished from creatures but NOT from other persons
• Removing “fatherhood” from the Father removes the Father as a distinct person
• Removing “breathing” (non-personal) from the Father leaves the hypostasis of the Father still remaining

The Son’s Properties #

• The Son “has nothing except what he has by being born”
• Removing sonship removes the hypostasis of the Son because sonship constitutes the Son
• Birth is understood as the way TO the person of the Son (not proceeding FROM the Son)

Fatherhood: Two Perspectives #

1. As mere relation: Understood as based on the act of generating (relations are founded on action); generation precedes understanding of fatherhood
2. As constituting the Father: The Father as person precedes his action of generating; fatherhood precedes generation

The Distinction of Before and After #

Using the example of philosophy and theology: philosophy can be “before” theology in the order of learning, while theology is “before” philosophy in dignity/worth. Similarly, relations can be understood as both before and after notional acts depending on perspective.

Notable Quotes #

“Person does not add over hypostasis a property distinguishing absolutely, but a property distinguishing that pertains to dignity. And the whole of this is taken in place of one difference.” — Thomas Aquinas, cited by Berquist

“Relations both distinguish and constitute the hypostasis, the persons in God.” — Thomas Aquinas, cited by Berquist

“Every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as is clear at the definition of the great Boethius.” — Thomas Aquinas, cited by Berquist

“By fatherhood, the father is not only a father, but he is a person. And he is a quiss, someone, or a hypostasis.” — Thomas Aquinas, cited by Berquist

“In one way, we understand the father’s fatherhood through the fact that he generates… But another way we understand the father is before generation. If we see fatherhood as constituting a person… the person is understood to be before he does something.” — Duane Berquist, interpreting Thomas Aquinas

“To see the likeness without seeing the difference is going to be a cause of… an even deception.” — Duane Berquist, on the importance of distinguishing cases

Questions Addressed #

Question 40, Article 3: Do Hypostases Remain When Relations Are Abstracted by Understanding? #

The Dispute:

• Position A (Objection): Since person adds to hypostasis (as rational adds to animal), hypostasis should remain when person/relation is removed
• Position B (Thomas): Personal relations cannot be removed by understanding without removing the hypostasis; they constitute the hypostasis. Non-personal relations can be removed while hypostases remain.

Resolution: The key is distinguishing two types of abstraction and recognizing that personal relations are not accidental additions to hypostasis but constitute the hypostasis itself. Only removing rationality from the nature (not the personal property) leaves hypostasis without person.

Question 40, Article 4: Do Notional Acts Precede Relations in Understanding? #

The Dispute:

• Position A (Objection): Relations presuppose the acts they’re founded on; generation presupposes fatherhood; birth presupposes sonship
• Position B (Thomas): Relations as relations presuppose notional acts (founded on action), but relations as constituting persons precede notional acts (persons precede their actions)

Resolution: A crucial distinction must be used: consider whether the relation is understood simply as a relation or as constituting a person. In the first way, it follows the act; in the second way, it precedes the act. The Father must exist as a person before he can generate; the Son is understood as resulting from the Father’s generation.

The Difference Between Father and Son:

• Fatherhood actively proceeds from the Father (he is the agent), so the Father as person must precede generation
• Sonship passively results in the Son (he is the receiver), so the Son can be understood as proceeding from generation
• Birth is a way TO the person of the Son, not something the Son produces