152. Notional Acts and the Necessity of Divine Generation

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Notional Acts and Their Attribution to Divine Persons: Whether acts like generation, breathing (spiration), and nativity properly pertain to the persons and distinguish them
• Two Orders of Origin: The distinction between (1) creatures proceeding from God (essential acts, common to all three persons) and (2) divine persons proceeding from one another (notional acts, pertaining to relations)
• Necessity vs. Voluntariness of Generation: Whether the Father necessarily generates the Son or does so by choice; whether this makes the Son a creature
• Nature vs. Will as Principles of Action: How God’s nature is determined to one action (understanding and loving Himself), while will is open to opposites regarding creatures
• The Mode of Signifying vs. The Mode of Being: How we must understand one reality (divine procession) through two distinct concepts (as act and as relation) because we know God through creatures

Key Arguments #

Objections to Notional Acts #

• Boethius’s Principle: All genera, when predicated of God, are converted into divine substance except for relativity; since action belongs to the substance (not relation), notional acts should not be attributed to persons
• Augustine’s Principle: Everything said of God pertains either to substance or to relation; there is no room for notional acts as a third category
• The Passion Objection: Action naturally infers passion; since there is no passivity in God (pure act), there should be no notional acts

Thomas’s Central Response #

• Origin Must Be Designated by Act: The only way to express how one divine person proceeds from another is through some form of act; therefore, notional acts must be attributed to persons
• Two Distinct Origins: The proceeding of creatures from God is designated by essential acts (creating, etc.) that pertain to the divine essence and are common to all three persons. The proceeding of one person from another is designated by notional acts that pertain to relations
• Distinction of Signification, Not of Reality: Notional acts (like generation) and notions (like fatherhood) signify the same reality in God differently—one as an act, one as a relation—because we understand God through creatures, where these are really distinct

On Necessity and Voluntariness #

• Two Senses of “by the will”: (1) “according to one’s will” (cum voluntate)—something is in harmony with one’s will; (2) “by the will as source” (a voluntate)—the will is the beginning or cause of something
• The Father’s Generation Is Natural, Not Voluntary: The Father generates the Son naturally (by His nature), not by will as a principle of causation. This does not mean generation is against His will—it is in perfect harmony with His nature
• Nature vs. Will: Nature is determined to one effect (fire naturally heats); will is open to opposites (the artist can make a stool or not). God necessarily understands Himself and loves Himself by nature
• Why This Matters: To say the will is the source of generation would make the Son a creature (proceeding from nothing by choice), which is heretical (the Arian error)
• Hillary’s Clarification: When Hillary says the Father does not generate “by natural necessity,” he means not against His will (nolente), not that there is no natural necessity at all

Important Definitions #

Notional Acts (Actus Notionales) #

Acts that designate the origin of one divine person from another. They are called “notional” because the notions (relationes) of persons are their mutual relations. Example: generatio (generation).

Essential Acts vs. Notional Acts #

• Essential Acts: Designate the proceeding of creatures from God; pertain to the divine essence; common to all three persons (e.g., creating)
• Notional Acts: Designate the proceeding of one person from another; pertain to relations; proper to certain persons

Nature and Will as Principles #

• Nature (φύσις): Determined to one effect; the agent produces effects according to what it is (such as the agent is, so it makes)
• Will (θέλησις): Open to opposites; the agent produces effects according to what it understands and wills (proportioned to knowledge, not being)

Two Senses of “Necessary” #

• Per se necessary: Cannot not be; intrinsic necessity
• Per aliud necessary: Made necessary through an external agent (violence) or through an end (means to an end)

The Mode of Signifying (Modus Significandi) vs. The Mode of Being (Modus Essendi) #

We must understand divine realities through two concepts not because God is composite, but because we know Him through creatures. In creatures, generation and fatherhood are really distinct; in God, they are identical. Truth does not require that the mode of understanding match the mode of being.

Examples & Illustrations #

• Dogs Producing Dogs: “Such as that thing is, so does it make. So dogs naturally give rise to dogs. And cats to cats, right? Horses to horses”—illustrating that nature is determined to one effect
• The Artist and the Stool: An artist can make a stool or not make a stool; his will (open to opposites) is the principle. This contrasts with nature, which is determined to one
• Fire and Paper: When fire is present to combustible matter, it naturally heats it; it does not choose. This illustrates natural necessity
• Human Generation: A human father generates a son from his own substance; the son shares the father’s nature. This is contrasted with creation, where God makes creatures from nothing
• Glass Reflecting Light: When I see glass, grammatically speaking I see it (active), but in reality the glass acts upon my eyes through reflected light. This illustrates that grammatical form can be reversed from reality
• Shakespeare’s Coriolanus: Berquist quotes a passage noting that “nature” is “not to be other than one thing,” illustrating Aristotle’s principle that nature is determined to one

Notable Quotes #

“Origin cannot be designated suitably except through some kind of act. Designating, therefore, the order of origin in divine persons, it was necessary to attribute to the persons notional acts.” — Thomas Aquinas (cited by Berquist)

“The Father generates the Son not by will, but by nature.” — Thomas Aquinas

“The answer should be said that every origin is designated by some act.” — Thomas Aquinas

“[W]e are not able to speak [about divine and understandable things] except according to the way of sensible things, from which we receive knowledge.” — Thomas Aquinas

“Truth does not require that the way we understand be the way things are; in fact, truth requires that we don’t confuse the two.” — Duane Berquist (paraphrasing Thomistic epistemology)

Questions Addressed #

Article 1: Should Notional Acts Be Attributed to Persons? #

Resolution: Yes. Although all things said of God pertain to substance or relation, origin cannot be designated except through act. Since divine persons are distinguished by their origins, notional acts must be attributed to them. These acts differ from essential acts: notional acts designate interpersonal processions and pertain to relations; essential acts designate the proceeding of creatures and pertain to the essence.

Article 2: Are Notional Acts Necessary or Voluntary? #

Resolution: Notional acts are necessary according to nature, not voluntary by choice. The Father necessarily understands Himself (generating the Son as Word) and necessarily loves Himself (breathing the Holy Spirit as Love). This is not against His will; it is His nature. The Arian error was to make the will (as a principle of choice) the source of generation, which would make the Son a creature. Hillary correctly clarified that generation is not against the Father’s will (nolente), not that there is no necessity.