18. Beatitude: Whether It Consists in the Act of Will or Intellect

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Central Question #

Whether beatitude consists essentially in an act of the will or in an act of the intellect, with particular attention to the relationship between achieving an end and experiencing delight in that end.

The Five Objections for Will as Beatitude’s Essence #

1. Augustine on Peace: Beatitude is a state of peace, and peace pertains to the will
2. The Good as Will’s Object: The good is the object of the will; therefore beatitude (the highest good) pertains to the will
3. First Mover Principle: As the first mover (will) corresponds to the last end, the will should constitute beatitude
4. Nobility of Loving: The operation of loving God (act of will) is more noble than knowing God (act of intellect)
5. Augustine’s Definition: “Blessed is the one who has everything he wants and wants nothing bad”—this seems to define beatitude through the will

Thomas’s Core Argument Against Will as Beatitude’s Essence #

The fundamental principle: Beatitude is the achievement (consecutio) of the last end, not the act of will itself

• The will is carried toward the end in two ways:
  • When the end is absent: the will desires it
  • When the end is present: the will delights in it and rests
• Desire is not achievement: wanting something is motion toward the end, not possession of it
• Pleasure comes after possession: the will delights because the end is present, not vice versa
• Therefore: something other than the will’s act must make the end present to the will

The Sensible Analogy #

Thomas illustrates with a concrete example:

• A man desiring money cannot obtain it merely by willing it
• He must physically grasp it with his hand
• Only then, when the money is actually present, does he delight in possessing it
• The money’s presence is not caused by his delight; his delight is caused by the money’s presence

Application to the Intelligible End (God) #

The same logical structure applies to the ultimate end:

• One must first attain God through an act of the intellect
• The intellect makes God present to the mind through knowledge
• Only then can the will delight in and rest in God
• Therefore, the essential constitutive element of beatitude is the intellect’s operation, not the will’s

The Three Acts of the Appetite #

Thomas distinguishes three foundational acts:

1. Love/Liking (amor/dilectio): The most basic act; requires the good as present or known
2. Desire (concupiscentia): Arises from love when the loved object is absent; always implies lack
3. Pleasure/Delight (delectatio/gaudium): Arises from love when the loved object is present and possessed

Critical insight: Desire obviously cannot be beatitude because it necessarily involves the absence of what is desired. Even pleasure, while consequent to beatitude, cannot be its essence because the will delights because the end is present, not the reverse.

Why Pleasure Is Not Beatitude’s Essence #

Aristotle’s comparison (from Nicomachean Ethics Book X): “Pleasure perfects the ultimate act as beauty perfects youth.”

• Pleasure is something that falls upon or follows from good activity
• It is not the good activity itself
• It is consequent to, not constitutive of, the end

The Logical Priority of Knowledge #

Principle: The end must be grasped by understanding before the will can be moved toward it

• The good as known becomes the object of the will
• One cannot will what one does not know
• Knowledge of the end is logically prior to desire for the end
• Therefore, the intellect’s act of understanding must precede and constitute the basis for the will’s operation

Key Arguments #

Argument from the Nature of Motion Toward an End #

Premise 1: Desire is motion toward the end (not possession of it)

Premise 2: Motion toward is different from achieving/attaining

Conclusion: Therefore, desire cannot constitute beatitude

Argument from Sensible Ends as Analogy #

Premise 1: In sensible matters, one cannot obtain an end merely by willing it

Premise 2: One must attain the end through sensible means (grasping with the hand)

Premise 3: Only when the end is actually present does delight follow

Conclusion: Similarly, for intelligible ends, the intellect must make God present through knowledge before the will can delight in Him

Argument from the First vs. Second Letters #

Berquist provides a pedagogical analogy:

• The first letter written cannot be about something in a letter
• Someone must send a letter before one can comment on it
• Similarly, the first act of reason cannot have the act of reason as its object
• One must understand something before understanding one’s own understanding
• Application: The first act of will cannot be the will’s own act; it must have an external object

Important Definitions #

Beatitude (Beatitudo) #

The perfect good that wholly brings the will to rest; the last end of man. Consists essentially in the operation of the intellect (specifically, the speculative intellect’s knowledge of God), while delight in the will is a consequent property that necessarily follows upon this achievement.

Consecutio #

The “achievement” or “attainment” of the end. Not merely motion toward it, but actual possession and presence of the end to the intellect.

Delectatio / Gaudium #

Pleasure or delight; the joy (gaudium) that follows upon beatitude. Augustine defines beatitude as gaudium de veritate (joy in truth), but this defines it by what follows upon it rather than by its essence.

Speculative Intellect #

The intellect ordered toward knowing truth for its own sake, particularly the knowledge of God. This is the higher and more noble intellect, as opposed to the practical intellect ordered toward action.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Steak Example #

• A man desires steak (it is absent from him)
• When the steak is placed before him, he can now delight in eating it
• The steak’s presence is not caused by his delight; rather, his delight is caused by the steak being present
• His act of choosing steak over salmon shows that something other than his will’s act (namely, the sensible presence of the steak) makes the end present to him

Solid Geometry and Imagination #

Berquist reflects on his own experience learning solid geometry from Euclid:

• Imagining 12-sided figures and other solid shapes requires phantasms (mental images)
• When imagination fails, he constructed little cardboard models hung from a light
• This illustrates that the intellect, even in this life, depends on sensible phantasms to understand material things
• Application: By analogy, the will depends on the intellect making its object present through knowledge

The Guardian Angel’s Perspective #

Berquist humorously reflects: “I imagine my guardian angel calling other angels over, saying, ‘Come look at this—he’s trying to understand us, and he doesn’t even know what an angel is.’”

• This illustrates the immense difficulty of human understanding attempting to know purely spiritual realities
• It underscores that even our highest natural knowledge falls infinitely short of God’s reality

Notable Quotes #

“It is manifest from the foregoing that beatitude is the consecutio, the attaining of the last end. But the consecutio, the achievement of the end does not consist in the act itself of the will.”

“The will is carried towards the end both when it is absent, when it desires it, and when it is present, when resting in it, it is delighted. It is manifest that the desire for the end is not the achievement of the end, but it is a motion to the end.”

“It is necessary for something other than the act of the will, through which the end itself is present to the will. And this manifestly appears concerning sensible ends.”

“The end is first grasped by the understanding than the will. So the good as known is the object of the will.”

“You first, you might say, attain God as he is in himself by the act of the reason. When you see God as he is, right? And now you arrive at the good, there’s every good, right? And then you have a complete rest in your will.”

“Thus, therefore, the essence of beatitude consists in the act of the understanding. But to the will pertains the delight followed upon beatitude.”

Questions Addressed #

Q: Can the will’s act of loving constitute beatitude? #

A: No. While love is more fundamental than desire (since love is the principle from which both desire and pleasure arise), love itself does not require that the beloved be possessed or present. One can love what is absent. Therefore, love cannot constitute beatitude, which is the actual achievement and possession of the end.

Q: What about Augustine’s statement that “beatitude is joy in truth” (gaudium de veritate)? #

A: This definition names beatitude by what follows upon it, not by its essence. Gaudium (joy/delight) is the consequent property of beatitude, something that necessarily attends it. But if one asks what makes something beatitude in the first place, the answer is not the joy but the possession of the good—and this possession, for an intelligible end, is the act of the intellect.

Q: If the intellect’s act is beatitude’s essence, why does the problem of evil or suffering arise? #

A: This lecture does not fully address theodicy, but the foundation laid here suggests that beatitude is objectively defined by union with God through knowledge, independent of emotional comfort. The will’s delight (gaudium) follows necessarily upon this knowledge in a state of true beatitude, but the essence is prior.

Q: Can someone who understands God intellectually still fail to be beatified? #

A: In the present life, yes—because the beatific vision (seeing God face to face as He is in Himself) has not yet occurred. In the next life, no—because the intellect’s continual operation in knowing God would ipso facto cause the will to rest perfectly in Him, making the person blessed.

Q: Is motion toward the end (desire) entirely excluded from beatitude? #

A: It is excluded as constitutive of beatitude’s essence, but Berquist’s framework allows that antecedently (in this life), the operation of the will in desiring the end participates in an imperfect beatitude. The motion of desire is presupposed to perfect beatitude, but is not beatitude itself.