31. The Voluntary in Animals and Acts of Omission

Summary

This lecture examines Article 2 and Article 3 of Aquinas’s treatment of the voluntary, focusing on whether brute animals possess voluntary action and whether the voluntary can exist without an external act. Berquist clarifies the distinction between perfect and imperfect knowledge of the end, arguing that animals possess voluntary action in an imperfect sense through sensory and instinctive knowledge. He further explores how omission—not acting when one is able and obligated to act—can itself be voluntary, introducing the critical distinction between direct and indirect causation from the will.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Voluntary in Brute Animals: Whether animals possess voluntary action despite lacking reason
Perfect vs. Imperfect Knowledge of the End: The distinction between rational knowledge of the definition and proportion of means to end (perfect) versus mere sensory apprehension of the end (imperfect)
Voluntarium as Denominative: How the term “voluntary” is extended from “will” (voluntas) to things that partake of will in some way
The Voluntary Without External Act: Whether voluntary action can occur through omission—not doing what one is able and obligated to do
Direct and Indirect Causation from the Will: The distinction between what proceeds from the will through acting versus what proceeds from it through not acting

Key Arguments #

Article 2: Whether the Voluntary is Found in Brute Animals #

Objections:

The will is in reason; animals lack reason; therefore animals cannot be voluntary
Animals do not have dominion over their acts; they are acted upon rather than acting (per Damascene)
Praise and blame follow voluntary acts, but animals do not merit praise or blame

Thomas’s Response:

There exists a twofold knowledge of the end: perfect (knowing the definition and proportion of means to end) and imperfect (mere apprehension of the end)
Perfect knowledge belongs exclusively to rational nature
Imperfect knowledge is found in brute animals through sense and natural estimation (instinct)
Therefore, animals possess the voluntary in an imperfect sense
The word “voluntarium” is used denominatively from “voluntas” and can extend to things that partake of will in some way
Animals have some participation in foresight or prudence, similar to how birds migrate in anticipation of winter

Article 3: Whether the Voluntary Can Be Without Any Act #

Objections:

The voluntary comes from the will; nothing comes from the will except through some act
Not to will causes the involuntary, opposed to the voluntary
Knowledge (required for voluntariness) is itself an act

Thomas’s Response:

Something proceeds from a principle in two ways: directly (as from acting) or indirectly (as from not acting)
The voluntary can exist without an exterior act when one does not will to act, provided one is able and should act
Sins of omission are voluntary because the person is able to act and should act but does not
The will’s power to impede what it is able to do makes not willing and not acting imputable as voluntary
Negligence—not considering what one should consider—is also voluntary

Important Definitions #

Voluntas (Will): Reasonable desire; the faculty of desiring that belongs to rational nature. The word names the power rather than a single act, as desire is more like motion than other affections.

Voluntarium (Voluntary): Said denominatively from the will; can be extended to things that partake of the will according to some agreement or commonality with it.

Perfect Knowledge of the End: Knowledge that grasps not only the end itself but also the definition of the end and the proportion or ratio of the act to the end. This belongs only to rational nature and permits deliberation about the end.

Imperfect Knowledge of the End: Mere apprehension of the end without knowing its definition or the proportion of the act to it. Found in brute animals through sense and natural estimation (instinct).

Direct and Indirect Causation: A distinction in how something proceeds from a principle. Directly, as when an agent acts; indirectly, as when an agent does not act, provided it is able and obligated to act.

Examples & Illustrations #

Birds and Winter Migration: Birds flying south in anticipation of winter exemplify how animals participate in foresight or prudence, demonstrating imperfect knowledge of the end
The Guard on Duty: A guard who stays awake and alerts the camp when enemies approach is the cause of the camp’s safety; if he sleeps instead, he is responsible for the camp’s loss because he was able and obligated to act
The Guard Not on Duty: A person not assigned to guard duty who sleeps and fails to alert the camp bears less responsibility because he was not committed to the governing of safety
The Unclean Room: A child who fails to clean his room when able and obligated to do so acts voluntarily by omission
The Father’s Two Sons: The parable of the two sons—one says “yes” but does not go, the other says “no” but does go—illustrates how both action and omission can be voluntary
Snow Peas on a Trellis: Snow peas climb a trellis and turn toward the sun, acting “for an end” to get sunlight, yet without knowledge of that end, demonstrating natural inclination without voluntary knowledge
The Speedometer: A driver who fails to see a speed sign is still responsible because it is knowledge one should have, connecting to sins of omission through negligent failure to consider

Notable Quotes #

“The voluntary is said from the will” — Thomas’s opening to the response on the denomination of “voluntary”

“If you choose not to decide, you have still made a choice” — Modern song lyric cited by Berquist to illustrate voluntary omission

“Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs” — Shakespeare, cited regarding why desire (being more like motion) names even other affections of appetite

“There is not the question why, there is but to do and die” — Tennyson (via Berquist), applied to snow peas acting without knowledge of their end

Questions Addressed #

Do brute animals possess the voluntary? Yes, in an imperfect sense, through sensory and instinctive knowledge of the end, though they lack perfect knowledge of the definition and proportion of means to end.
How is “voluntary” extended to animals if they lack reason? Through denominative use: the word “voluntarium” is drawn from “voluntas” and applied to those things that partake of will in some way, through agreement or commonality with will.
Can the voluntary exist without an external act? Yes. When someone does not act while able and obligated to act, this omission is voluntary. Similarly, not considering what one should consider is voluntary.
What distinguishes responsible omission from non-responsible omission? An omission is imputable as voluntary only when the person is both able and obligated to act. A guard on duty bears responsibility for failing to alert; someone not on duty bears less responsibility.
How does Aquinas avoid excluding animals from voluntariness while maintaining that will requires reason? By distinguishing between the faculty of will (which requires reason) and the word “voluntary” (which can be applied denominatively to those that partake of will through imperfect knowledge of the end).

Connections to Broader Argument #

This lecture bridges Article 1’s establishment of the voluntary in human acts to the fuller treatment of factors affecting voluntariness (violence, fear, ignorance). By establishing that animals possess imperfect voluntariness and that the will can act through omission, Aquinas sets the stage for understanding how voluntariness admits of degrees and how human agency differs from animal agency—a critical foundation for moral theology.