32. Violence, Fear, and the Will's Involuntariness

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Violence and the Will (Article 4) #

The Central Thesis: Violence cannot be imposed on the will itself, though it can affect commanded acts (acts performed through other powers).

The Fundamental Distinction:

• Elicited acts of the will: Direct acts of willing (e.g., the act of loving, wanting). These cannot be violated because the will’s act is an inclination from an interior beginning
• Commanded acts: Acts performed through other powers at the will’s direction (e.g., walking, speaking). These can be subjected to violence

The Reason for This Distinction: The act of the will is nothing other than an inclination proceeding from an interior, knowing beginning. What is forced or violent proceeds from an exterior beginning. Therefore, violence is against the very definition of the will’s act—to be coerced contradicts its nature as something from within.

Analogy to Natural Motion: Just as a stone can be thrown upward violently but this violent upward motion cannot be natural to the stone, so a person can be forced to walk but this forced motion cannot be voluntary in the sense of proceeding from the will.

Divine Action and the Will #

God, though infinitely more potent than the human will, does not move the will through violence. Rather:

• God moves the will as its source (not as an external force)
• God is “closer to the will than the will is to itself”
• This is illustrated by Proverbs 21:1: “The heart of the king is in the hand of God, and in whatever way he wishes, he turns it”
• God’s motion of the will is non-violent because it proceeds from the will’s intrinsic nature

Violence and Involuntariness (Article 5) #

The Relationship: Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, just as it is opposed to the natural. In things without knowledge, violence causes motion against nature. In knowing things, violence causes something against the will. Therefore:

• What is against nature is called unnatural
• What is against the will is called involuntary

Clarification: Violence causes involuntariness only regarding commanded acts. The will’s own acts cannot be made involuntary by violence because they cannot be violated at all.

Fear and Involuntariness (Article 6) #

The Apparent Contradiction: Objections claim fear causes involuntariness simply, just as violence does. The resolution requires the crucial simpliciter/secundum quid distinction.

The Key Distinction:

• Simpliciter (absolutely): Acts done through fear are more voluntary than involuntary because the will consents to them as means to avoid evil
• Secundum quid (in a qualified sense): The act is involuntary if considered abstractly, apart from the circumstances of fear

Why Fear Acts Are Voluntary in Context: Unlike violence (where the will contributes nothing), in fear the will does something—it consents to the act as a means to repel the feared evil. The source of the act is within the will, even though prompted by fear.

The Crucial Point: Acts done through fear possess the notion of the voluntary because “the source of it is within.” The will’s consent (even under constraint) makes it voluntary in the actual circumstances.

Example: A merchant throwing cargo overboard in a storm:

• Absolutely: Does not want to lose his goods
• In the actual circumstances: Chooses to save the ship
• Conclusion: The act is voluntary in context, involuntary if abstracted from circumstances

The Result: Those who acted under persecution (abandoning faith to save their lives) are not said to have acted purely voluntarily, but they are admitted back into the Church with penance because the act was not simply involuntary.

Key Arguments #

Article 4: Can Violence Be Imposed on the Will? #

Objection 1 (from potency):

• Everything more potent can coerce what is less potent
• God is more potent than the human will
• Therefore, even God can force the will

Objection 2 (from passivity):

• Everything passive is coerced by active power when changed
• The will is passive (a “moved mover”)
• Therefore, the will can be forced

Objection 3 (from contrary motion):

• Violent motion is against nature
• The will’s motion sometimes is against nature (as in sinning)
• Therefore, the will can be forced

Thomas’s Response: Two-fold is the act of the will:

1. The will’s own act (elicited), which proceeds from an interior knowing beginning
2. Acts commanded by the will through other powers

Violence cannot affect the will’s own acts because they are intrinsic inclinations. Violence only affects commanded acts by impeding the exterior members.

Resolution of the Potency Objection: God, more potent than the will, moves it—but not violently. God moves the will as its source and interior principle, not as external force. This is non-violent motion.

Article 5: Does Violence Cause Involuntariness? #

Objection 1 (from emotional response):

• Involuntary means accompanied by sadness
• One can undergo violence without sadness
• Therefore, violence doesn’t cause involuntariness

Objection 2 (from voluntary components in violence):

• Some violent acts come from the will (as when flexing limbs against their natural flexibility)
• What comes from will cannot be involuntary
• Therefore, violence doesn’t cause involuntariness

Thomas’s Response: Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as it is opposed to the natural. Both “natural” and “voluntary” mean inclination from an interior beginning. Violence, by definition, comes from an exterior beginning. Therefore:

• In natural things: Violence causes something against nature = unnatural
• In knowing things: Violence causes something against the will = involuntary

Nuance: This applies only to commanded acts. The will’s elicited acts cannot be made involuntary because they cannot be violated.

Resolution of Objection 2: Natural things can be said natural in two ways:

1. From nature as active principle (e.g., fire naturally burns)
2. According to passive aptitude (e.g., the sky’s natural aptitude to be moved by separate substances voluntarily)

Similarly, something can be called voluntary in two ways:

1. According to action (when one wishes to do something)
2. According to passion (when one wishes to undergo from another)

When one wishes to undergo, and the action comes from outside, the remaining inclination in the one undergoing is not simply violent—it is not involuntary.

Article 6: Does Fear Cause Involuntariness? #

Objection 1 (from similarity to violence):

• Violence is with respect to present contrary action
• Fear is with respect to future evil contrary to will
• Violence causes involuntariness simply
• Therefore, fear causes involuntariness simply

Objection 2 (from property preservation):

• What is involuntary in itself remains involuntary when fear approaches
• Things done through fear are involuntary in themselves
• Therefore, fear causes involuntariness simply

Objection 3 (from conditional necessity):

• What is conditional is secundum quid; what is unconditional is simply
• Acts from fear are involuntary absolutely only under condition of fear
• Without that condition, they would be voluntary
• Therefore, they are involuntary secundum quid, not simpliciter

Thomas’s Response (the decisive answer):

For acts done through fear: “Each thing simply is said to be according as it is an act. But according as it is only in apprehension, it is not simply, but secundum quid.”

Critical Point: Acts are found in the singular, here and now. An act is an act according as it is here and now under its individual conditions. Therefore:

• As an act here and now (considering actual circumstances with fear): The act is voluntary because the will’s source is within—the will consents to repel the feared evil
• As considered abstractly (outside this case, imagining the act without fear): The act would be involuntary because it is against the will

Therefore: Acts done through fear are simply voluntary, though secundum quid involuntary (when considered outside their actual circumstances).

The Will’s Contribution: Unlike violence (where the will contributes nothing), fear allows the will to contribute something through its consent to the act as a means to avoid evil. This consent, proceeding from within, suffices for voluntariness.

The Distinction from Violence:

• Violence: The will does not consent; it is altogether against the motion of the will
• Fear: The will consents to the act, although not for the act’s own sake, but to repel evil

Key Principle: The will not only wills what we will for itself as an end, but also what we will for another as a means to an end. Therefore, fear-driven acts are voluntary because they are willed as means.

Important Definitions #

Voluntary: An act whose source is within the agent, proceeding with knowledge. For human acts, this means an inclination from an interior knowing beginning.

Involuntary: An act that is contrary to the will or proceeds without the will’s consent. In violence: the will contributes nothing. In fear: the act is involuntary only when considered abstractly, outside actual circumstances.

Elicited act of the will (actus elicitus): A direct act of willing, such as the act of loving or intending. These cannot be subjected to violence.

Commanded act (actus imperatus): An act performed through another power at the direction of the will, such as walking or speaking. These can be subjected to violence.

Violence (vis): Motion or action whose source is external and to which the subject contributes nothing. Defined by its external origin (contra naturam, against nature; contra voluntatem, against the will).

Simpliciter (simply, absolutely): Considered in itself, according to its essential nature and actual conditions.

Secundum quid (in a qualified sense, in some respect): Considered under particular or abstracted conditions.

Natural motion (motus naturalis): Motion whose source is intrinsic to the thing moved, proceeding from its nature as interior principle.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Stone Thrown Upward #

A stone can be thrown upward by violence. However, this violent upward motion:

• Cannot be natural to the stone (natural motion would be downward)
• Remains contrary to the stone’s nature
• Illustrates why violence and the will’s act are incompatible: as violence is to nature, so violence is to the will—both require intrinsic principle

The Child Forced to Bed #

A child who does not want to go to bed is picked up and carried there:

• The will is not violated—the child’s unwillingness remains
• The commanded act is violent—the bodily motion to the bedroom is against the child’s will
• The child did not voluntarily go to bed (the motion came from outside)
• Result: The act is involuntary

Contrast: If the child wants to be picked up and carried, this same physical motion becomes voluntary.

The Merchant in the Storm (Jonah’s Example) #

A merchant loading cargo wants to keep his goods. In a storm, he throws cargo overboard:

• Absolutely speaking: He does not want to lose his goods
• In the actual circumstances: He chooses to save the ship and his life
• The will’s action: The merchant consents to the loss as necessary to preserve what is more valuable
• The source: The act proceeds from within (the merchant’s judgment and will)
• Result: The act is more voluntary than involuntary because it is here and now, with the will’s consent
• If considered abstractly (imagining the loss of goods apart from the storm): It would be involuntary

This is why it’s voluntary simpliciter, not merely secundum quid.

Persecution and Apostasy #

In times of persecution, Christians were forced to choose: deny faith or die.

• Those who denied faith under threat were not said to have acted purely voluntarily
• Yet the Church admitted them back with penance, not treating them as fully involuntary
• The reason: Their acts were more voluntary than involuntary (they consented to save their lives), but not simply voluntary (they would not have done it without fear)
• The distinction: secundum quid involuntary (in abstraction from circumstances), but simpliciter voluntary (in their actual circumstances)

Affected Ignorance and Willful Negligence #

Berquist illustrates that ignorance can be voluntary:

• “I didn’t know the gun was loaded”
• “I didn’t know a red light meant stop”
• These are forms of consequent ignorance (following from voluntary negligence)
• Such ignorance is itself voluntary and does not excuse the act

Questions Addressed #

Can violence be imposed on the will itself? #

Answer: No. The will’s own acts (elicited acts) are inclinations from an interior knowing beginning. Violence, by definition, proceeds from an exterior beginning. Therefore, violence is against the very definition of the will’s act. Violence can only affect commanded acts (acts performed through other powers like the limbs).

Does violence cause involuntariness? #

Answer: Yes, but only regarding commanded acts. Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, just as it is opposed to the natural. What is against the will is involuntary. However, this does not imply that the will itself is made involuntary (which is impossible), but that the acts commanded by the will are made involuntary when violence prevents their execution.

Does fear cause involuntariness simpliciter (simply)? #

Answer: No. Acts done through fear are more voluntary than involuntary when considered in their actual circumstances (simpliciter). The will consents to the act as a means to avoid the feared evil, and this consent (proceeding from within) makes the act voluntary. However, the act is involuntary secundum quid (in a qualified sense) if considered abstractly, apart from the fear—that is, considering the act as such without its circumstances.

How do we avoid the contradiction with Augustine? #

Answer: Augustine says, “If something comes to be by the will, it does not come to be from necessity.” This is true of the will’s own act, which is never necessary. However, commanded acts can be done from fear with necessity (the necessity of the circumstances). The will’s act of consenting to the fearful course remains free and not necessitated, even though the circumstances create practical necessity for the commanded act.

Notable Quotes #

“The act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from a knowing interior beginning. But what is forced or violent is from an exterior beginning. Whence it is against the very definition of an act of the will that it be coerced or violent.” — Thomas Aquinas, summarized by Berquist

“The heart of the king is in the hand of God, and in whatever way he wishes, he turns it.” — Proverbs 21:1, cited by Thomas to show how God moves the will non-violently

“Each thing simply is said to be according as it is an act. But according as it is only in apprehension, it is not simply, but secundum quid.” — Thomas Aquinas, on the simpliciter/secundum quid distinction for fear-driven acts

“Things which are done through fear are more voluntary than involuntary.” — Aristotle and Gregory of Nyssa, cited by Thomas

“Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse.” — Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, cited by Berquist regarding the nature of sin (though Berquist notes the speaker is Friar Lawrence, and humorously observes he is a Franciscan, not a Dominican)

“Not so vile that on the earth doth live, but to the earth some special good doth give. Not so good, but strained from that fair use.” — Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, cited in context of sin’s perversion of good

“That’s a contradiction I’ve learned to live with.” — Berquist’s anecdote of a modern philosopher caught in contradiction at a conference, illustrating the problem with modern philosophy that cannot resolve apparent contradictions