Lecture 43

43. Fruition and Intention: Acts of the Will

Summary
This lecture examines two key acts of the will directed toward the end: fruition (fruitio) and intention (intentio). Berquist explores whether fruition belongs only to rational creatures or also to brute animals, whether it requires actual possession of the end or can occur through intention alone, and whether intention is an act of the will or understanding. The discussion draws heavily on Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae and Augustine’s distinctions between enjoying (frui) and using (uti).

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

  • Fruition (fruitio): The act of the will resting in or delighting in an end for its own sake
  • Perfect vs. Imperfect Fruition: Fruition of the end actually possessed versus fruition of the end intended but not yet possessed
  • Fruition in Brute Animals: Whether non-rational creatures can experience fruition
  • The Last End as Object of Fruition: Whether fruition is limited to the ultimate end or can extend to intermediate ends
  • Intention (intentio): The act of the will tending toward an end as a term or limit of motion
  • Intention as Act of Will vs. Understanding: Whether intention properly belongs to the appetitive or apprehensive power

Key Arguments #

On Fruition and Non-Rational Animals #

Objection 1: Augustine says that men “enjoy and use,” implying animals cannot enjoy anything.

Objection 2: To enjoy belongs to the last end, but brute animals cannot arrive at the last end; therefore they cannot enjoy.

Objection 3: By analogy, if natural appetite (found in plants) is to sense desire as plants are to animals, then plants should also be able to enjoy—which is clearly false.

Counter-objection: Augustine also says in Eighty-Three Questions that enjoying food and bodily pleasure is not absurdly estimated for animals.

Thomas’s Resolution:

  • Fruition properly requires an act of a power commanding the carrying out (execution) of the end, not merely a power arriving at the end
  • Things lacking knowledge have powers that arrive at ends but no power that commands; they are moved by a higher nature
  • Perfect fruition requires perfect knowledge—knowledge not only of what is an end and good, but of the universal notion of end and good (proper to rational nature alone)
  • Imperfect fruition requires only particular knowledge of the end and good, found in brute animals whose desires are moved by natural instinct
  • Therefore: Rational creatures have perfect fruition; brute animals have imperfect fruition; plants have neither

On Fruition and the Last End Simply #

Objection 1: Paul says “I enjoy you in the Lord,” yet man is not Paul’s last end; therefore fruition is not only of the last end.

Objection 2: The fruits of the Holy Spirit (charity, joy, peace) are enumerated as things to be enjoyed, yet these are not the last end.

Objection 3: Acts of the will reflect upon themselves; I can love myself to love and enjoy my own enjoyment; but enjoyment is not the last end, only God is.

Thomas’s Resolution:

  • Two things belong to the notion of fruit: (1) that it be laxed (relaxed/made happy), and (2) that it quiets the appetite by a certain sweetness
  • The last end is twofold: simply (what is not referred to another) and secundum quid (what is last of certain things)
  • Fruition properly applies only to the simply last end, in which something delights as in its last end
  • Things that have pleasure in themselves but are referred to another (e.g., the fruits of the Spirit) can be called fruits improperly
  • When Augustine speaks of perfect fruition, he means of the last end; when of imperfect, of what is ordered to the last end
  • The will rests simply only in the last end; while something is expected, the motion of the will remains suspended
  • Example: When Paul says “I enjoy you in the Lord,” he places the terminus in God, not in the person; the brother is enjoyed as a middle term through which one enjoys God

On Fruition of the End Not Yet Possessed #

Objection 1: Augustine says “to enjoy is to use with joy, not of hope, but of the thing itself”; fruition occurs of what is had, not hoped for.

Objection 2: Fruition is of the last end alone; the appetite rests only when the end is had; therefore fruition requires possession.

Objection 3: To enjoy is to grasp or hold the fruit; one grasps the fruit only when the end is had.

Counter-objection: To enjoy is to adhere by love in something for its own sake; this can occur with a thing not yet had.

Thomas’s Resolution:

  • Intention has a certain comparison of the will to the last end according as the will has something for the last end
  • The end is had in two ways: perfectly (not only in intention but in reality) and imperfectly (in intention only)
  • There is perfect fruition when the end is had really; imperfect fruition when the end is had in intention only
  • Augustine speaks of perfect fruition; the rest of the will is impeded in two ways: (1) the object is not the last end but ordered to another, or (2) the end is not yet obtained
  • What is not the last end makes fruition spoken of improperly; an end not had allows fruition properly but imperfectly
  • Example: St. Bernard describes the bride in the Song of Songs as experiencing fruition while contemplating the absent groom—imperfect fruition because she does not really possess him

On Intention as Act of Will vs. Understanding #

Objection 1: The eye signifies intention; the eye is a tool of sight and grasping power; therefore intention is an act of understanding, not the will.

Objection 2: Intention designates ordering toward the end; ordering is an act of reason; therefore intention is of the understanding.

Objection 3: The act of the will is only of the end or of things toward the end; with respect to the end, the will’s acts are voluntas or fruition; with respect to things toward the end, another act is needed—but this seems to be an act of reason, not the will.

Thomas’s Resolution:

  • Intention signifies tending toward something (from in-tendere): a kind of directing or ordering
  • In motion, both the mover and the moved tend toward an end, but the motion of the moved proceeds from the mover
  • The will moves all other powers toward their ends as an appetitive power commanding
  • Therefore, intention properly pertains to the will, though it presupposes knowledge
  • The eye is used metaphorically for intention; knowledge is presupposed but not identical with intention
  • The will’s act regarding things toward the end is intention—the will commands the intellect and other powers to move toward the end
  • Objection about Augustine’s quote on “light” conflates intention with knowledge; intention presupposes but is not identical to understanding

Important Definitions #

  • Fruition (fruitio): An act of the will by which it delights in or rests in an end for its own sake; to use with joy
  • Fruit (fructus): That which is last expected from something, perceived with sweetness or pleasure; that which quiets the appetite
  • Perfect Fruition: Enjoyment of the last end when it is possessed in reality, not merely in intention
  • Imperfect Fruition: Enjoyment of the last end when it is possessed in intention only, not yet in reality
  • Intention (intentio): An act of the will tending toward an end as a term or limit of motion; a directing of the will toward an end
  • Last End (finis ultimus): That which is not referred to another; that in which the will ultimately rests and comes to quiet
  • Perfect Knowledge: Knowledge not only of what is an end and good, but of the universal notion of end and good (proper to rational nature)
  • Imperfect Knowledge: Particular knowledge of the end and good (found in brute animals)

Examples & Illustrations #

  • The Dog and the Bed: A dog enjoying a warm, comfortable bed has imperfect fruition; it delights in the bed but does not know what “an end” is as a universal notion
  • The Apple Tree vs. the Worm vs. Man: The apple tree does not enjoy its apples (no knowledge); the worm does enjoy the apple (particular knowledge of good); man does (universal knowledge)
  • Eating an Apple Pie with a Worm: A worm in the apple detracts from perfect fruition (humorous illustration of the hierarchy of enjoying)
  • The Bride in Song of Songs: St. Bernard describes the bride experiencing imperfect fruition while contemplating the absent groom; she is not disturbed in her contemplation but does not yet fully possess him
  • Paul and the Brother: When Paul says “I enjoy you in the Lord,” the brother is a middle term; fruition terminates in God, not in the person

Notable Quotes #

“To enjoy is to use with joy, not of hope, but of the thing itself.” — Augustine, Tenth Book of the Trinity

“Our hearts are restless until they rest in Thee.” — Augustine (referenced as motivation for why rest occurs only in the last end)

“I enjoy you in the Lord.” — St. Paul, Epistle to Philemon

“If your eye is simple, your whole body will be lucid.” — Gospel of St. Matthew, Chapter 6

“One does not enjoy that which one takes for the use of the will, for the sake of something other than itself.” — Augustine, Tenth Book of the Trinity

Questions Addressed #

  1. Does fruition belong to brute animals?

    • Brute animals have imperfect fruition based on particular knowledge of the good; rational creatures alone have perfect fruition based on universal knowledge of the end
  2. Is fruition only of the last end simply?

    • Properly, yes; improperly, things with pleasure in themselves but referred to another can be called fruits
  3. Can one have fruition of an end not yet possessed?

    • Yes, imperfectly. One can have imperfect fruition of the last end when possessed in intention but not in reality
  4. Is intention an act of understanding or the will?

    • Intention is properly an act of the will, though it presupposes knowledge. The will commands motion toward the end