45. Intention, Choice, and the Acts of Will

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Unity of Intention and Choice #

• Intention and choice can appear as two distinct motions of the will when considered absolutely
• However, when the will is carried toward means on account of an end, intention and choice become one motion in subject, differentiated only by reason
• When one intends the means as a way of achieving the end, the motion is unified: the will tends toward the end through the means
• Example: Taking medicine for health is one act of the will, not two separate acts

Parallel Structure: Will and Understanding #

• The relationship between intention and choice mirrors the relationship between premises and conclusion in reasoning
• When one considers the premise and conclusion absolutely and separately, they are distinct acts of understanding
• But when one understands the conclusion as following from the premises, it becomes one act of understanding that grasps both together
• This parallels how God understands all things in one eternal act

Multiple Intentions Unified Under Common Aspects #

• Many things secundum rem (in reality) can be taken as one secundum rationem (according to reason)
• Multiple intentions can be unified when:
  • One thing is ordered to another (proximate to ultimate end)
  • Two things integrate into a single whole (e.g., hot and cold together produce health)
  • Two things fall under one common concept (e.g., wine and vestment both fall under “acquiring wealth”)
• Example: Going to the car, leaving the car, going to work—all these are one intention insofar as they are ordered to making money

Understanding and the Unity of Objects #

• One cannot understand what a dog is and what a cat is by a single act—understanding a dog is not understanding a cat
• However, when one understands “a dog is not a cat,” the dog and cat are being understood together in one act
• Comparison of two things (e.g., two students’ essays, two playwrights) involves knowing them simultaneously in a single act of comparison
• Acts are distinguished by their objects, yet reason can unite objects through ordering or common aspects

Whether Brute Animals Intend the End #

Objections:

• Nature intends an end even in things lacking knowledge (Physics II)
• Fruition belongs to brute animals as they rest in the end
• Brute animals act for an end (seeking food, etc.), so they must intend the end

Resolution:

• “To intend” can mean two distinct things:
  1. To be moved toward an end (passive sense)—applies to nature and brute animals
  2. To order one’s motion to an end (active sense, requiring reason)—applies only to rational creatures
• Brute animals are moved toward their ends by natural instinct, as an arrow is moved by the archer
• Only reason can order something to an end, so brute animals do not intend the end in the proper and chief sense
• Animals are products of divine art and are moved by God toward their ends, not by their own ordering

Divine Art in Animal Behavior #

• Nature is understood as a kind of art put into things by God
• Animals’ intelligent-appearing actions reflect the divine intellect, not the animal’s own mind
• Example: The wasp paralyzes its victim by squeezing the head just enough to induce a coma—precise but programmed behavior
• When Fabre cut off an insect’s antennae (its usual grasping point), it could not adapt its behavior, revealing it was following a predetermined pattern rather than reasoning
• Animals are said to “intend the end” in a metaphorical sense because they are moved toward ends, but the real intending belongs to their Creator

Fruition vs. Intention #

• Fruition (fruitio) involves absolute rest in the end without implying ordering
• Intention implies ordering something to an end as a means
• Both can involve natural instinct, but only intention requires the notion of ordering
• Animals possess fruition (resting in acquired ends) more readily than intention in the proper sense

Key Arguments #

Argument from Augustine (Trinity XI) #

• Seeing a window is distinct from seeing through the window to those passing by
• The will toward seeing the window differs from the will toward seeing passersby through the window
• These appear to be two different acts of the will
• Resolution: Augustine speaks of the will in both considered absolutely, not as ordered one to the other. When one sees through the window as a means of seeing passersby, it is one ordered act.

Argument from the Unity of Motion #

• A single motion can have many limits if ordered to one another (proximate and ultimate ends)
• Two unordered terms cannot constitute one motion
• But what is not one in reality (secundum rem) can be one in reason (secundum rationem)
• Therefore, multiple things can be unified as one intention when understood under a common rational aspect

Argument from Acts Distinguished by Objects #

• Acts are distinguished by their objects
• The end and the means are diverse objects
• Therefore, intending the end and willing the means must be two different acts
• Resolution: While the end and means are different objects materially, they have one object formally insofar as the means is understood as ordered to the end. The end is the reason (formal cause) for willing the means.

Argument from Animal Agency #

• Brute animals perform acts ordered to an end
• The deer is moved to acquire food, the cat to hunt or rest
• Action for an end appears to require intending the end
• Resolution: Animals are moved toward ends, but they do not themselves order their actions to ends. The ordering originates from divine art.

Argument from Aristotle’s Physics II #

• Aristotle observes that bees and other insects perform intelligent acts
• This intelligent-appearing action makes people wonder whether such creatures have a mind
• Yet the insects cannot adapt when conditions change (e.g., the wasp when antennae are removed)
• Resolution: The intelligence in animal action reflects the divine intellect impressed in nature, not the animal’s own mind. Animals are moved by another (God) toward ends ordered by another’s intelligence.

Important Definitions #

Intentio (Intention) #

• The motion of the will toward an end
• Can exist even before the means are determined
• Is one unified act when the means are grasped as ordered to the end
• Distinguished from fruition by its character of ordering/tending toward

Electio (Choice) #

• The motion of the will toward means as ordered to an end
• Presupposes that means have been determined or deliberated upon
• When means are chosen as ways to achieve an intended end, choice and intention become one act in subject

Secundum rem (According to reality) #

• Things as they exist materially distinct

Secundum rationem (According to reason) #

• Things as they are unified under a rational aspect or ordering

Examples & Illustrations #

Medicine and Health #

• One wills to take medicine on account of health
• These are materially two different things (medicine is not health)
• But rationally they are one intention, unified by the ordering of means to end
• One motion of the will covers both

Going to Work to Make Money #

• Getting in the car, getting out of the car, going to work are all ordered to making money
• Materially, these are three different actions
• Rationally, they form one unified intention toward the end (earning money)
• One could even have multiple distinct ends (buying wine and a vestment) unified under one common end (acquiring wealth)

Comparing Essays #

• When a teacher reads two students’ essays to compare them for an award, both essays are being considered in one act
• One does not first consider essay A entirely, then essay B; rather, one holds them together for comparison
• This shows that multiple things can be grasped in one act when brought under a rational order (comparison)

The Two Cats #

• Tabitha eats, then goes outside to hunt in a wooded lot
• Moppet eats, then jumps to the windowsill to watch the world
• Both animals act for an end, but by natural instinct and predetermined inclination
• Each cat follows the same pattern daily without choosing alternatives
• The difference between the cats reflects different natural inclinations, not different choices

The Wasp and Its Prey #

• The wasp must precisely squeeze its victim’s head to induce a coma without killing it
• If the victim died, it would corrupt and become unsuitable food for the wasp’s larvae
• If the victim remained too active, it could escape
• The wasp performs this delicate operation with surgeon-like precision
• However, when Fabre experimentally removed the prey’s antennae (which the wasp normally grasps), the wasp could not adapt
• The wasp would drag the victim by a different body part, then return and fill the hole without the victim
• This reveals the wasp’s behavior is programmed, not reasoned—it cannot improvise when the normal method fails

The Migrating Birds #

• Flocks of birds migrate hundreds of miles and return to the same spot
• They fly in formation with coordination approaching radio communication
• The front bird sometimes changes, and others fall back in organized fashion
• The birds’ coordinated behavior and navigation display apparent intelligence
• Yet this reflects natural instinct and divine art, not the birds’ own reasoning

The Divisive Syllogism in Animal Cognition #

• A dog following a deer comes to a fork in the road
• It explores the first path by smell: nothing
• It explores the second path by smell: nothing
• It proceeds directly into the third path without further exploration
• This appears to use a divisive syllogism: “The stag went this way, that way, or the third way; not the first; not the second; therefore the third”
• Yet this reflects the dog’s natural instinct ordered by divine art, not its own reasoning

Notable Quotes #

“Nature is something of an art put into things.” — Aristotle, Physics II (referenced by Berquist)

“So much does action for an end appear in the bees and ants that people wonder whether they have a mind.” — Aristotle, Physics II (Berquist’s interpretation: Aristotle does not assert they have a mind, only that the action is so ordered that people wonder)

“Looking before and after.” — Shakespeare (used by Berquist to characterize reason’s proper function of establishing order from beginning to end)

Questions Addressed #

Can One Act of the Will Cover Both Intention of the End and Choice of Means? #

Question: Are the intention of the end and the willing of the means two different motions of the will, or can they be one?

Answer: They can be considered as two motions when viewed absolutely and separately, but they become one motion in subject when the will is directed toward the means on account of the end. When one understands the means as a way to achieve the end, intention and choice unify into a single act, though they remain distinct by reason (one aspect regards the end, the other the means ordered to it).

Can Multiple Things Be Intended Simultaneously? #

Question: Can the will be directed toward multiple distinct ends at the same time?

Answer: Yes, if they are unified rationally. Multiple things can be intended as one if:

• They are ordered to each other (e.g., acquiring a tool as a means to an ultimate end)
• They integrate into a single whole (e.g., hot and cold producing health)
• They fall under a common rational aspect (e.g., wine and vestment both acquired for wealth)

What is many in reality can be one in reason.

Do Brute Animals Intend the End? #

Question: Since brute animals act for an end and display intelligent-appearing behavior, do they possess intention in the proper sense?

Answer: No, not in the proper and chief sense. Brute animals are moved toward an end, but they do not order their actions to an end. Intention in its proper sense requires reason to order something to an end. Animals are products of divine art, moved by God toward ends ordained by divine wisdom. They intend the end only in a secondary, metaphorical sense—as that which is moved toward an end, not as that which orders itself toward an end.

How Does Divine Art Operate in Animal Behavior? #

Question: If animals lack reason, how do they perform such precisely ordered and intelligent-appearing actions?

Answer: Nature is divine art put into things by God. Animals possess natural instincts and inclinations ordered by the divine intellect toward appropriate ends. Their behavior is programmed and determined by nature, not reasoned or chosen. The intelligence apparent in their actions reflects the divine Mind that designed them, not the animal’s own intellect. This is evident from the fact that animals cannot adapt when their normal patterns are disrupted (as with Fabre’s wasp experiment).