46. Choice as an Act of Will and Reason

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Nature of Choice (Electio) #

• Choice involves both reason and will but is formally distinguished as an act of one power
• Aristotle defines choice as “the desire of those things which are in our power” (Ethics III)
• Choice is described by Aristotle as “either an understanding desiring, or a desirable understanding” (Ethics VI)
• The term electio in Latin carries the sense of “taking before” or preferring one thing to another
• Choice follows upon a practical judgment or sententia, but the substance of the act belongs to the will

Material vs. Formal Distinction in Acts #

• When two powers or principles concur to constitute a single act, one is formal with respect to the other
• The substantia of an act—its material component—may belong to one power while its forma—its ordering principle—belongs to another
• Example: When a person takes medicine for health, the act is materially an act of the will (desiring to take medicine) but formally an act of reason (reason perceives the ordering of medicine to health)
• This mirrors the composition of a living thing from body and soul: neither element alone constitutes the whole, but both together
• Analogy: A virtuous act under a vow (e.g., abstaining from food under obedience) is materially an act of temperance but formally an act of obedience

Reason’s Role in Ordering the Will #

• Reason precedes and orders the will’s act
• The will’s object is the good as apprehended by reason
• The vis apprehensiva (grasping power or knowing power) represents the object to the vis appetitiva (desiring power)
• Reason apprehends the ordo (order or proportion) of means to an end
• The knowing power operates by drawing things into itself (like grasping with the hand), while the will goes out to rest in the object itself
• This creates a kind of “contrariety” between how reason and will function

Choice and Brute Animals #

• Brute animals do not possess choice proper, despite appearing to select among things
• Animals are determined by nature to particular goods; their appetite is naturaliter determinata to specific objects
• When sense or imagination presents an object to which the animal is naturally inclined, it is moved without choice
• Fire moves upward by nature, not by choice; similarly, animals are moved to their natural ends without deliberation
• The appearance of intelligent action in animals (bees, spiders, dogs) reflects divine art working through natural instinct, not the animal’s own reason
• All animals of a given species operate in the same manner, unlike humans who act differently according to deliberation
• True choice requires discretio (discrimination) among multiple possibilities—something only rational creatures possess

The Divisive Syllogism in Animal Action #

• Berquist illustrates animal reasoning with the example of a dog following a deer
• The dog uses what is called a syllogismus divisivus (divisive or either-or syllogism)
• When tracking by scent, the dog explores three possible paths
• Upon finding the scent is not on the first or second path, it proceeds to the third without further exploration
• This appears to involve reasoning: “The deer went this way or that way or the third way; not this way, not that way; therefore, this way”
• However, this is natural instinct mimicking reason, not actual reasoning

Divine Art in Natural Things #

• Nature itself is a kind of divine art (ars divina) ordered into created things
• Aristotle illustrates this: if the art of shipbuilding could be implanted in wood, the wood would build itself into a ship—this would be like nature
• Just as the motion of an arrow reflects the archer’s art (even though the arrow lacks reason), so natural motions reflect divine ordering
• The ordo appearing in animal behavior is placed there by God’s providential design, not by the animal’s own deliberation
• Because all animals of a kind operate identically, their actions manifest natural determination rather than free choice

Key Arguments #

Argument 1: Choice appears to be an act of reason (not the will) #

• Objection: Choice implies collatio (comparison or bringing-together), which is a function of reason
• Collatio means to bring things alongside one another for comparison
• Reason is collativus and discursivus—it brings together premises and discourses to a conclusion
• Just as reason brings together genus and differences in definition, it brings together alternatives in choice
• Resolution: While choice involves the intellectual operation of comparison, it is formally an act of the will because it issues in desire and motion toward the chosen object. Comparison precedes choice but is not identical with it.

Argument 2: Choice appears to be an act of reason (from syllogism) #

• Objection: To syllogize and to conclude are acts of reason. But choice is like a conclusion in practical matters (as Aristotle says in Ethics VII), so choice must be an act of reason.
• Resolution: The conclusion of practical reasoning (sententia or judicium) pertains to reason, but choice follows upon this conclusion as the will’s assent to what reason has judged. The formal perfection of choice—the actual motion toward the chosen good—belongs to the will.

Argument 3: Choice involves ignorance, which belongs to knowledge #

• Objection: Ignorance pertains to the knowing power, not the will. But there is an “ignorance of choice” mentioned in Aristotle’s Ethics III. Therefore, choice pertains to reason.
• Resolution: When we speak of “ignorance of choice” (ignorantia electionis), we mean ignorance of what should be chosen, not that choice itself is a form of knowledge. Ignorance affects the rational apprehension that guides choice, not the choice itself.

Argument 4: Choice appears to belong to brute animals #

• Objection: Choice is desire of things for an end. But brute animals desire things for an end (they act for a purpose). Therefore, animals have choice.
• Objection: Choice means taking one thing before another. Animals take one thing before another (a sheep eats one plant, uses another). Therefore, animals choose.
• Objection: Prudence belongs to well-choosing. But prudence is attributed to brute animals (bees, apes are called prudent in Aristotle’s Metaphysics I). Therefore, animals can choose.
• Objection: Animals display remarkable wisdom in their works (bees build combs, spiders make webs, dogs hunt with apparent reasoning). This suggests choice.
• Resolution: The apparent wisdom in animal behavior is divine art manifested through natural instinct, not the animal’s own reason. Because all animals of a kind act identically, their action is naturally determined rather than freely chosen. True choice requires multiple possibilities and discretio—the ability to discriminate among them.

Important Definitions #

Choice (Electio) #

• Aristotle’s definition: “desire of those things which are in our power” (Ethics III)
• Alternative formulation: “either an understanding desiring, or a desirable understanding” (Ethics VI)
• Formally, an act where reason orders and the will desires
• Materially, the substance of the act belongs to the will (the motion toward the good)
• Formally, the act receives its intelligibility from reason’s ordering

Comparison (Collatio) #

• Latin ferre (to bring) + cum (with) = conferre (to bring together)
• The intellectual operation of placing two things alongside one another for evaluation
• Involves discursus (reasoning, literally “running through”)
• Necessary but not sufficient for choice—comparison precedes the decision

Discretion (Discretio) #

• The ability to distinguish one thing from another
• Required for true choice—one must be able to discriminate among multiple possibilities
• Present only in rational creatures
• Absent in brute animals, which are determined by natural inclination

Grasping Power (Vis Apprehensiva) #

• The knowing power that grasps its object
• Operates by drawing the object into itself (as a hand grasps what it holds)
• Represents objects to the desiring power (vis appetitiva)
• Contrasts with the will, which goes out to rest in the object itself

Desiring Power (Vis Appetitiva) #

• The willing power that tends toward its object
• Moves toward and rests in the external good
• Depends on what the knowing power presents to it
• The will is “indeterminate” with respect to particular goods, determined only by nature to the good in general

Natural Determination (Determinatio Naturalis) #

• The way appetites of brute animals are fixed by nature to particular objects
• Fire is naturally determined to move upward, not downward
• Animals are naturally determined to foods, habitats, and behaviors proper to their kind
• Contrasts with the will’s openness to multiple goods

Divisive Syllogism (Syllogismus Divisivus) #

• A form of reasoning that proceeds by elimination
• Either A or B or C; not A; not B; therefore C
• Can appear in animal behavior when the animal’s natural instinct follows a pattern resembling such reasoning
• Does not constitute true reasoning in the animal

Divine Art (Ars Divina) #

• God’s providential ordering of natural things
• Manifest in the ordered behavior of creatures who lack reason
• Similar to how an archer’s art appears in the arrow’s flight
• Just as human art shapes inanimate matter, divine art shapes natural kinds toward their proper ends

Examples & Illustrations #

The Dog Following the Deer #

• A dog tracks a deer by scent
• When the scent leads to three possible paths, the dog explores the first: no scent
• The dog explores the second path: no scent
• The dog then proceeds directly to the third path without further exploration
• This appears to be reasoning: “The deer went one of three ways; not this one, not that one; therefore, the third”
• However, the dog is following its natural instinct to track scent, not exercising reason
• The dog cannot adapt if circumstances change (unlike reasoning creatures)

The Farmer’s Cats #

• Berquist had two cats: Tabitha and Moppet
• After breakfast each day, Tabitha went directly to the front door to hunt in a nearby field
• On the same schedule, Moppet jumped to the windowsill to watch the world pass by
• Both animals repeated this behavior consistently every day
• The consistency suggests natural inclination rather than deliberate choice
• Though there are individual differences among animals, these do not constitute choice

Medicine for Health #

• A person chooses to take medicine to achieve health
• The act of desiring to take medicine is materially an act of the will
• But the act is formally an act of reason because reason apprehends the ordering of medicine to health
• The person does not choose health itself—health is the end that reason perceives
• Rather, the person chooses the medicine as a means to health ordered by reason
• If medicine tasted good on its own, the choice would be different (one might choose it for its taste)
• Since the medicine does not taste good, only reason’s apprehension of its utility motivates the choice

Individual Differences in Animal Behavior #

• Some animals prefer certain foods over others (one cat hunts, another watches from a window)
• Some humans like licorice, others dislike it; these preferences vary
• Some people are allergic to hazelnuts naturally
• Custom and habit shape food preferences (Minnesotans prefer walleye pike; coastal peoples prefer ocean fish)
• Yet these natural inclinations and habits, though varying among individuals, do not constitute choice
• One does not choose to like or dislike something; preferences are given by nature or shaped by custom

Fire’s Natural Motion #

• Fire moves upward by nature, not downward
• This movement is determined by the nature of fire itself
• Fire does not choose to go up; it is necessitated by its nature
• Similarly, animals are determined by their nature to certain ends
• Just as fire cannot choose otherwise, animals cannot choose against their natural inclinations

The Bees and the Order of Nature #

• Bees build their cells in an orderly, geometrical manner
• All bees build in the same way—no variation for deliberation or circumstance
• This remarkable order suggests intelligence
• But because all bees act identically, their behavior manifests natural determination, not free choice
• If one bee acted differently than another of the same species, this might suggest choice
• The uniformity points to divine art working through natural instinct

Questions Addressed #

Question 1: Is Choice an Act of the Will or of Reason? #

• Central Question: Does choice belong to the will (as desire) or to reason (as comparison and judgment)?
• Arguments for reason: Choice involves comparison; comparison is reason’s function; therefore choice is reason’s act.
• Argument for will: Aristotle says choice is “desire of those things in our power”; desire is will’s act; therefore choice is will’s act.
• Resolution: Choice is materially an act of the will but formally an act of reason. The substance of the act—the actual motion toward the chosen good—belongs to the will. But this act receives its form and intelligibility from reason’s prior ordering. They are united as body and soul in a living thing: neither alone, but both together constitute choice.

Question 2: Does Choice Belong to Brute Animals? #

• Central Question: Since animals desire things for an end and prefer one thing to another, do they choose?
• Arguments for animals having choice: Animals desire for an end; they take one thing before another; prudence is attributed to animals in Aristotle; animal behavior displays remarkable wisdom.
• Resolution: Animals do not choose. Choice requires ordering something to an end through reason. Animals are moved by natural instinct as if by another’s reason (God’s providence). The appearance of wisdom in animal behavior reflects divine art, not the animal’s own deliberation. Because all animals of a species act identically, their behavior is naturally determined rather than freely chosen. Only rational creatures, whose actions differ according to deliberation, possess true choice.

Connections to Prior Lecture Material #

• Builds on the distinction between acts of reason and acts of will established in earlier lectures
• Develops the principle of formal causation (one power giving form to another’s act)
• Applies to monastic life: obedience as the formal principle giving form to material acts of abstinence
• Prepares for subsequent questions on counsel (Q. 14), consent (Q. 15), and use (Q. 16)