47. Choice, Freedom, and the Will's Determination

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Choice and Its Objects #

• Choice (electio) is distinguished from simple willing: the will intends ends, while choice concerns means toward ends
• The end functions as a premise in practical reasoning, not as a conclusion
• Analogy to speculative science: just as first demonstrative principles cannot themselves be conclusions, the ultimate end cannot fall under choice
• What is an end in one context can become a means in another and thus fall under choice
  • Example: Health is the physician’s end but ordered to the good of the soul, so health can be chosen when considered as means to spiritual welfare

Choice and Human Acts #

• Choice always concerns human acts, not merely things or tools
• When we “choose” medicine, we truly choose to take it (the act), not the medicine itself
• In contemplation, choice involves assenting to one opinion over another—an act of understanding
• Electing a person to office means choosing to establish them in that dignity (a human act involving the chooser’s action)

Choice and Possibility #

• Choice is restricted to things possible to the one choosing
• Reason: The means must be capable of achieving the end; if something is impossible, the end cannot be achieved through it
• In deliberation (consilium), men cease when they discover something is impossible
• Distinction between complete and incomplete willing:
  • Complete will (choice): Only of things possible
  • Incomplete will (wishing/velleitas): Can concern impossible things
  • Example: One may wish to marry someone if it were possible, but cannot choose to marry them if marriage is impossible

Freedom and Necessity in Choice #

• The Problem: Arguments suggesting choice is necessary
  • From necessary premises, necessary conclusions follow; since the end is premise and things chosen are conclusions, choice should be necessary
  • Reason necessarily judges about some things; therefore choice should follow necessarily
  • When two things are equal, one cannot be moved more to one than the other (Buridan’s Ass problem)
• Thomas’s Solution: Man chooses freely, not necessarily
  • What is possible to not be is not necessary to be
  • Man has a two-fold power: to will and not will, to act and not act, to will this or that
  • Reason can apprehend as good not only an action but also not willing and not acting
  • In all particular goods, reason can consider either the good aspect or the defect/evil aspect
  • Therefore, no particular good necessitates the will
• Exception: Only beatitude (perfect happiness) cannot be apprehended under the notion of defect or evil
  • Man necessarily wills beatitude
  • Man cannot will to be miserable
  • Therefore, only beatitude is necessarily willed; particular goods are freely chosen

The Nature of Means and Ends #

• Not every means to an end is such that the end cannot be achieved without it
• Not all necessary conditions for an end necessitate choice of them
• Example: One’s happiness does not depend on reading Homer tonight, so not choosing to read Homer does not eliminate happiness

Key Arguments #

Against Necessity in Choice #

• Logical Structure: The end-means relationship in practical reasoning is analogous to premises-conclusions in theoretical reasoning, BUT this analogy breaks down at the level of necessity

  • Necessary premises yield necessary conclusions only when the premises cannot be true if the conclusion is false
  • An end can be achieved through multiple means; therefore, not every means is necessary for the end
  • This means the inference from end to particular choice is not absolutely necessary

• Reason’s Flexibility: Reason can represent any particular good under the aspect of defect

  • Therefore reason does not necessitate the will toward any particular good
  • Only the universal good (happiness) cannot be represented as defective
  • Thus only happiness is necessarily willed

• Experience and Observation: People frequently choose different paths to the same end

  • One person becomes a philosopher to achieve happiness; another becomes a physician; another a bishop
  • All these choices are free, not necessary, though each assumes happiness is the ultimate end

Against the Buridan’s Ass Objection #

• When two things appear truly equal, some additional consideration always emerges
• One can inspect the books more carefully and find some difference (condition, appearance, etc.)
• This additional consideration provides reason for preferring one over the other
• Therefore, two things are never truly equal in all respects

The Role of Reason in Judgment #

• Reason judges about contingent things that are possible to us
• Such judgments do not yield conclusions of absolute necessity
• Rather, they yield conditional necessity: “If one runs, one moves”
• This conditional necessity does not eliminate the freedom to refrain from running

Important Definitions #

Choice (Electio) #

• Aristotle: “The desire of those things which are in our power” (Ethics III)
• Thomas’s analysis: Choice is substantially an act of the will but formally ordered by reason
• Properties:
  • Concerns means, not ultimate ends
  • Concerns only what is possible to the chooser
  • Concerns only human acts
  • Is free, not necessary (except regarding beatitude which precedes choice)

Willing (Volitio) vs. Choice #

• Willing: Acts of the will regarding ends (intentio, fruition)
• Choosing: Acts of the will regarding means, formally ordered by reason’s judgment

Wishing (Velleitas) #

• Incomplete act of the will regarding impossible things
• Different from choice because choice requires possibility
• Example: Wishing to marry someone becomes wishing (not choice) if marriage is impossible

Counsel (Consilium) #

• An inquiry of reason about means to an end
• Presupposes doubt about how to achieve the end
• Ceases when something is discovered impossible
• More properly an act of reason than will, though will is involved as matter and motive

Examples & Illustrations #

The Philosopher’s Vocation #

• One chooses to be a philosopher as a means to happiness
• One does not choose happiness itself—one wills it necessarily
• The choice is free because being a philosopher is not the only path to happiness (physician, bishop, other vocations also lead to happiness)
• One’s reasoning: “I believe being a philosopher will lead to my happiness; therefore I choose this path”

Medicine and Health #

• Taking medicine is materially an act of will (desiring) but formally an act of reason (seeing the order to health)
• One does not choose medicine for its own sake
• One chooses to take medicine (the act) as means to health
• Health itself, as the physician’s end, is not chosen—it is intended

Books at a Bookstore #

• When two books appear equal, inspection reveals some difference
• One has better condition, fresher appearance, better placement
• The difference provides reason to choose one over the other
• Truly equal things never present themselves in choice

Milk at the Grocery Store #

• Consumers inspect packages to find fresher milk in the back
• This shows customers making a judgment that the milk in back is fresher (even if actually equal)
• The judgment provides reason for choice
• The example illustrates that reason always finds some ground for preferring one thing

The Superior’s Command #

• St. Benedict’s Rule: If a prelate commands something impossible, the subordinate must still try
• One chooses to attempt the impossible because obedience is the good aimed at
• The attempt (the human act) is what is chosen, not the impossible outcome itself
• This illustrates that choice concerns the act (attempting) even when the result is impossible

Teaching Calculus #

• A Superior commands a sister to teach calculus (though she lacks preparation)
• The sister chooses to obey by making the attempt
• The choice concerns the act of obedience, not the impossible result (becoming a calculus expert instantly)

Questions Addressed #

Whether Choice Concerns Ends or Only Means #

• Answer: Choice concerns means only; the end is willed but not chosen
• Reasoning: In practical reasoning, the end functions as premise, not conclusion. Just as first principles in science are not conclusions, the ultimate end is not chosen
• Qualification: What is an end in one context can be a means in another (e.g., health ordered to spiritual good), and can then fall under choice
• Necessary Result: The ultimate end (beatitude) cannot fall under choice, only under the will’s necessary act

Whether Choice Concerns Only Human Acts #

• Answer: Yes, choice always concerns human acts
• Reasoning: When we appear to choose tools or things, we are really choosing the act of using them. When we choose a person for office, we choose to establish them (an act of will). In contemplation, we choose to assent to an opinion (an act of understanding)

Whether Choice Concerns Only Possible Things #

• Answer: Yes, choice is limited to what is possible to the chooser
• Reasoning: Choice presupposes the ability to achieve the end through the means. If something is impossible, the end cannot be achieved, so counsel ceases. Impossible things may be wished for (velleitas) but not chosen
• Distinction: Complete willing (choice) is only of possible things; incomplete willing (wishing) can concern impossible things

Whether Man Chooses Necessarily or Freely #

• Answer: Man chooses freely; he does not choose of necessity (except regarding beatitude)
• Reasoning from freedom: What is possible to not be is not necessary to be. Man has power to will and not will, to act and not act
• Reasoning from reason’s flexibility: Reason can apprehend any particular good under the aspect of defect or lack. Therefore, no particular good necessitates the will
• Exception: Beatitude (the perfect good) cannot be apprehended under the notion of evil or defect. Therefore man necessarily wills beatitude; he cannot will to be miserable
• Consequence: Since particular goods (philosophy, medicine, various virtues) are not necessary for happiness, choosing any particular good is free, not necessary

Notable Quotes #

“The end and things to be done is like the principle or premise. And not as conclusion as the philosopher says in the second book of the physics.” — Berquist, explaining Thomas’s teaching on practical reasoning

“If you have the virtue of what? Temperance, right? You choose to eat and drink. Modely, right? Enough to sustain you, but not to get drunk, etc.” — Berquist, illustrating that virtues concern choice of means

“I didn’t choose to be happy, right, huh? But I didn’t think I could be happy by being a politician… So I didn’t think I’d be happy by being a businessman, right? I didn’t think I’d be happy by being a lawyer or a medical doctor, right?” — Berquist, explaining that one chooses vocation as means to the end (happiness) one necessarily wills

“Man does not of necessity choose, right? And this because what is possible to not be, right, huh? is not necessary to be, huh?” — Berquist, articulating Thomas’s fundamental principle of human freedom

“Reason can apprehend as good, not only this which is to will or to do, but also to not will and to, what, not do, right?” — Berquist, explaining why no particular good necessitates choice