53. Command, Use, and the Order of Voluntary Acts

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Command and Use: Their Ordering and Relationship #

• Use of means toward an end precedes choice and therefore precedes command
• Use of the executive power (actual carrying out of what is chosen) follows upon command
• Command naturally precedes the act commanded, establishing the temporal priority despite certain acts of will preceding command
• The key distinction: use can be considered in two ways—as the will using reason for commanding (which precedes command) and as the will using the executive power (which follows command)

Can the Will Command Itself to Will? #

• Augustine’s Paradox: The soul commands itself to will, yet sometimes it does not will
• Resolution: Imperfect command occurs when reason is moved in diverse directions and does not perfectly command itself. Perfect command would result in willing
• The will reflects upon its own acts just as reason reflects upon its own acts
• Examples of imperfect command: wanting to be a saint while also wanting other things; the struggle in Romans 7 between willing the good and doing evil

Are Acts of Reason Subject to Command? #

• Reason can command its own acts insofar as it reflects upon itself
• Two distinct considerations:
  • Regarding exercise of the act: Always subject to command (one can be commanded to pay attention and use reason)
  • Regarding the object: Not always in our power. Some truths are grasped through natural or supernatural light and cannot be commanded. First principles (e.g., “quantity equal to the same equals each other”) naturally compel the intellect and are not subject to command
• For things that do not necessarily convince the understanding, assent or dissent is in our power and falls under command
• The distinction mirrors Augustine’s teaching on Rome and doctrinal assent

The Unity of Command and the Act Commanded #

• Objection: Command and the act commanded must be diverse because they come from different powers (reason and executor) and can be separated temporally
• Resolution: Just as a natural whole (e.g., human being) is one in substance yet composed of many parts (body and soul), command and the act commanded form one human act with multiple parts
• When one power moves another, their acts are one in a unified way, not simply diverse
• Analogy: Just as the act of the mover and the moved are one (per Physics III), so too command and execution

Key Arguments #

On Command Preceding Use (Third Objection) #

• Objection 1: Use precedes command because use is an act of will, and command presupposes an act of will
• Objection 2: Of things ordered to an end, use is the more formal act
• Objection 3: Every act of a power moved by the will is called use; command is an act of reason moved by the will; therefore command is itself a use, and the common (use) precedes the proper (command)
• Counter-argument: Damascene says the impetus to operation (which comes through command) precedes use
• Thomas’s Resolution: Use of what is toward the end (in reason) precedes choice and therefore precedes command; but use of what is toward the end insofar as it is subject to the executive power follows upon command. Command is not together with the act commanded (as when one commands another), but naturally precedes it

On Command and Act Commanded Being One Act (Fourth Question) #

• Objection 1: Diverse acts come from diverse powers; command comes from reason, the commanded act from another power; therefore they are diverse
• Objection 2: Things separable from each other are diverse; command and act can be separated (command given but not obeyed); therefore diverse
• Objection 3: Things with before and after are diverse; command precedes the act; therefore diverse
• Response: Just as things can be “simply many” yet “according to something one” (e.g., one human who is geometer and white), so command and act commanded are one as a whole with many parts. The act of a lower power has itself like matter to the form which is the act of the superior power

On the Will Commanding Itself (Fifth Question) #

• Objection 1: Augustine says the soul commands that it will, yet it often does not will; therefore the will cannot be commanded
• Objection 2: If one act of will is commanded, all must be; this leads to infinite regress
• Objection 3: The will cannot command because commanding belongs to reason, not will; they are different powers
• Response: Reason orders about acts of the will just as it can judge it good to will something and can order by commanding that one will. Imperfect command (not resulting in willing) occurs from reason being moved in diverse directions. When reason perfectly commands itself to will, then it wills

On Acts of Reason Being Commanded (Sixth Question) #

• Objection 1: Reason commands; it would be unfitting for reason to command itself
• Objection 2: Powers reasoned by participation (not essentially) are commanded; reason is essential, not participated; therefore reason’s acts are not commanded
• Objection 3: Acts commanded are in our power; grasp of truth is not always in our power; therefore acts of reason are not commanded
• Response: Reason reflects upon itself and can order its own acts. Two modes of consideration: (1) exercise of the act—always commandable; (2) object of the act—not always commandable. We cannot command assent to what does not convince us, nor understanding of what is unintelligible. We can command suspension of judgment

Important Definitions #

• Command (Imperium): An act of reason ordering something to action through intimation or declaration. It presupposes the will as first mover and is characterized by reason’s ability to order and look before and after
• Use (Uti): The application of a power or thing to an operation; primarily an act of the will, secondarily of reason as directing, and of other powers as executing
• One act “simply” vs. “according to something” (simpliciter vs. secundum quid): A distinction allowing that things can be many in parts but one in their unified form. Command and the act commanded are one human act simply, but many according to their parts
• Natural ascent: The necessary inclination of the intellect toward first principles, which is not subject to command but happens “in the order of nature”
• Imperfect command (imperium imperfectum): Command arising when reason is moved in diverse directions and does not perfectly command itself, resulting in the will not following
• Matter and form analogy: The act of a lower power (matter) receives form from the act of a superior power; command (form) orders the executive act (matter)

Examples & Illustrations #

• Getting out of bed: The struggle to command oneself to get out of bed tomorrow illustrates the difficulty of imperfect command when the will is divided
• Sitting vs. ceasing to be: Discussion of how one ceases to be sitting (per accidens) without ceasing to be (simpliciter)—illustrating accidental vs. substantial predication
• Body members and natural powers: The heart pulsing and the eyes closing involuntarily are not subject to reason’s command because they proceed from natural powers, not sense powers
• Eye directing the foot: Romans 12:5 citation exemplifying how body members work together—the eye directs the foot (they are members of each other in different ways)

Notable Quotes #

“The soul commands that the will, but nevertheless does not make it do that.” — Augustine, Confessions 8, on the paradox of imperfect command

“That where one is an account of another, there is one only.” — Aristotle (via Thomas), principle that command and commanded act are one

“Being simply is substance, but being according to something is accident.” — Thomas, distinguishing modes of being and unity

“The understanding understands not only for itself but for all the powers, and the will wills not only for itself but for all the powers.” — Thomas, on the universal character of reason and will’s operations

“The first act of the will is not from the ordering of reason but from the instinct of nature or of a higher cause.” — Thomas, explaining why infinite regress of commands does not occur

Questions Addressed #

1. Does use precede command or vice versa? Use of means precedes command; use of the executive power follows command. Command naturally precedes the act commanded.

2. Are command and the act commanded one act or diverse acts? They are one human act as a unified whole with multiple parts (like substance with matter and form), not simply diverse.

3. Can the will command itself to will? Yes, but imperfectly when reason is divided. Perfect command would result in willing; imperfect command (from distracted reason) explains Augustine’s paradox.

4. Can reason command its own acts? Regarding exercise: yes, always. Regarding the object: only for contingent matters of assent; not for necessary truths or matters not intelligible to that person.

5. Why does infinite regress not occur if acts of will are commanded? Because the first act of the will (to happiness, natural desire) is not from the ordering of reason but from nature or a higher cause.