56. Object, Circumstances, and End as Sources of Moral Goodness

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Fourfold Goodness of Human Acts #

Thomas identifies four sources of moral goodness:

1. From genus: The act considered simply as an action, as a being
2. From species: Determined by the object’s suitability to reason
3. From circumstances: Accidents of the act that, when per se to reason, affect moral species
4. From end: The relation of the act to its ultimate purpose as a formal cause

Good and Bad as Related to Reason #

The fundamental principle: good is accorded with reason; bad is outside reason. Berquist emphasizes Dionysius’s teaching that “the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, and bad is to be outside of reason.” This means a good human act is a reasonable act; a bad human act is unreasonable.

Bad as Deficiency, Not Absolute Non-Being #

Bad is not simple non-being but a privation—a lack of order and measure in a subject capable of possessing it. Example: taking a pen from a store is bad not because the act is nothing, but because it lacks the suitable proportion to reason (the pen belongs to another). Similarly, drinking wine excessively is bad not because drinking is non-being, but because it lacks the measure reason should impose.

The Object as Primary Determiner of Species #

The object of an act gives it primary species, just as the term of motion specifies the motion. A suitable object is necessary for an act to be good from its genus. However, the object is “matter about which” the act operates (not “matter from which”), and thus has the character of form in giving species to the act.

Circumstances as Per Se Accidents #

While circumstances are accidents of acts, they are not wholly extrinsic. When circumstances are compared to reason, they become per se determinative. For example, the time of taking one’s principal meal (noon vs. evening) does not seem to change the species of eating; but drinking before operating an airplane does lack the order reason requires and thus affects the moral act’s species.

The End as Formal Cause #

The end is the proper object of the interior act (the will). While extrinsic in one sense, it is formal to the act in determining its orientation. An act is simply good only when all four sources of goodness concur: good in genus, species, circumstances, and end.

Key Arguments #

Against the View That Bad Acts Are Bad Only in Use, Not in Object #

• Objection: Exterior things are good in themselves; only their misuse by sinners makes them bad
• Thomas’s Response: Although things are good in themselves, they may lack suitable proportion to a particular action. A pen is good as a pen (it writes well), but unsuitable for one to take home when it belongs to another. The goodness lies not in the thing itself but in its proportion to the act of reason.

Against the View That Circumstances Are Merely Accidental to Moral Goodness #

• Objection: Circumstances are accidents; goodness belongs to acts according to their substance, not accidents
• Thomas’s Response: While circumstances are accidents in themselves, they can become per se determinative when referred to reason. The fullness of an act’s goodness includes not only its species but also the suitable circumstances that reason prescribes. Circumstances thus lie “in the thing” as accidents but affect moral species when per se to reason.

Against the View That End Does Not Determine Goodness #

• Objection 1: Dionysius says all things desire the good; if goodness comes from the end, no act would be bad
• Objection 2: The end is extrinsic; goodness is intrinsic to the act
• Objection 3: A good act can be ordered to a bad end (alms for vainglory); a bad act to a good end (theft to help the poor)
• Thomas’s Response: The goodness of things depends on their end just as being depends on its causes. However, an act is simply good only when all four goodnesses concur. An act may have one goodness while lacking another (good object but bad end, or vice versa).

Against the View That Good and Bad Do Not Diversify Moral Species #

• Objection 1: A good man and bad man remain the same species (human)
• Objection 2: Bad is privation (non-being); non-being cannot be a difference; differences constitute species
• Objection 3: The same effect (human generation) follows from both adultery and matrimonial intercourse
• Objection 4: Good and bad sometimes come from circumstances, which are accidents and don’t give species
• Thomas’s Response: Good and bad, insofar as they are referred to reason, do diversify species in moral acts. The difference between a reasonable and unreasonable act is per se to reason. A reasonable conjugal act and an unreasonable adulterous act differ in species because one is ordered to reason and one is not. Even a living body and dead body differ in species, though the difference appears to be merely accidental.

Important Definitions #

Good (Bonum) #

The fullness of being appropriate to a thing according to its nature and form. Good is convertible with being—insofar as something has being, it has goodness. In moral acts, the good is that which is accorded with reason.

Bad (Malum) #

A privation or deficiency of order and measure that a thing capable of possessing should have. Bad is not simple non-being but non-being in a subject; it is the lack of suitable proportion to reason. Bad implies a positive act or subject that lacks something it should possess.

Object (Obiectum) #

That about which an exterior act operates. The object is “matter about which” (not “matter from which”) and thus functions like form in giving species to the act. The object is the primary determinant of an act’s moral species.

Circumstance (Circumstantia) #

Accidents of an act that stand around it, existing outside its essential character. However, when a circumstance is referred per se to reason, it becomes determinative of the act’s moral species. Circumstances include when, where, how, and other such qualifications.

End (Finis) #

The goal or purpose toward which an act is directed; the proper object of the will. The end is a formal cause of human acts insofar as it orders the interior act (willing) which is formal to the exterior act (bodily movement).

Per Se (Essentially/Intrinsically) #

That which belongs to something by its nature or essence, as opposed to per accidens (accidentally). A difference that is per se diversifies species; a difference that is per accidens does not.

Per Accidens (Accidentally/Extrinsically) #

That which belongs to something not by its nature but contingently. Accidents are per accidens to substance; however, accidents can become per se determinative when referred to reason.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Pen #

Berquist opens with a personal anecdote: he took a pen from a store while signing a form and put it in his pocket. The pen itself is a good pen (it writes well), so the goodness of the pen as pen is evident. However, taking it home is unsuitable because it belongs to the store. The act lacks the suitable proportion that reason should give it—specifically, respect for another’s property.

Adultery vs. Matrimonial Intercourse #

Both acts produce the same effect in species (human generation). However, they differ in moral species because one is reasonable and the other is not. A conjugal act is ordered to procreation within the bounds of reason; adultery is disordered. Thomas clarifies that God cooperates with the physical act (nature) but not with the moral act (the sin). The distinction shows that the same physical outcome can result from acts of different moral species.

Alms for Vainglory #

Giving alms (the object is good) but for the sake of empty glory (the end is bad). The act has goodness from its object but lacks goodness from its end. Thus it lacks the fullness of goodness required for the act to be simply good.

Theft to Help the Poor (Robin Hood) #

Stealing (the object is bad, lacking property rights) ordered to a good end (helping the poor). The act has badness from its object but goodness from its end. Neither alone makes the act simply good or bad.

Drinking at Unsuitable Times #

Drinking wine is not inherently bad; the wine is good, and the act of drinking can be reasonable. However, an airplane pilot drinking before a flight lacks the measure of reason (temporal order). A monk practicing the rule not to drink before noon is recognizing that the suitability of the act depends on when it is performed. Conversely, in times when water was unsafe, drinking small beer at breakfast was reasonable.

The Blind Man #

Thomas uses this example to clarify privation: a blind man is bad not because he is nothing, but because he lacks sight which a man by nature should have. Similarly, a bad act is not simple non-being but a being that lacks the order reason should give it. The act itself is something positive (one is performing an action), but it lacks the suitable proportion to reason.

Notable Quotes #

“The good of man is to be in accordance with reason, and bad is to be outside of reason.” — Dionysius, cited by Thomas (fundamental principle of Thomistic moral theory)

“Good and being are convertible.” — Thomas Aquinas (following Aristotle)

“Any individual defect causes the bad, but the good is caused from an integral cause.” — Thomas Aquinas, citing Dionysius (explaining why an act requires all four sources of goodness to be simply good)

“The virtuous man acts according as he ought, when he ought, where he ought, and according to the other circumstances.” — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (establishing the role of circumstances in virtue)

“The good to which someone looking operates is not always a true good, but sometimes it is a true good and sometimes it is an apparent good.” — Thomas Aquinas (resolving the objection from Dionysius)

Questions Addressed #

How can an act be bad if all things tend toward the good? #

Resolution: Not all goods that people pursue are true goods; some are only apparent goods. A murderer may pursue the elimination of annoyance (a real good), but the act of murder lacks suitable proportion to reason and is therefore truly bad.

Can the object of a moral act be a physical thing, or must it be something immaterial? #

Resolution: The object is indeed a material thing (e.g., taking another’s possession in theft). However, what specifies the moral act is not the physical thing as such but its relation to reason—whether it is suitable or unsuitable to reason.

Do circumstances affect the moral species of an act? #

Resolution: Yes, but only when they are per se to reason. A circumstance that lacks suitable proportion to reason becomes per se determinative of the act’s moral species. Circumstances that have no bearing on reason’s ordering do not diversify species (e.g., the time of one’s principal meal in ordinary circumstances).

How can good and bad diversify species if bad is merely a privation? #

Resolution: Bad is not simple non-being but a positive act or subject lacking the order reason should give it. The act of taking another’s property is something positive, but it lacks suitable relation to reason. This lack attached to a positive act constitutes a different species from the act performed with proper regard for reason.

If the same physical act (conjugal intercourse) can result from both marriage and adultery, why do they differ in species? #

Resolution: Species in moral acts are determined by relation to reason, not by physical outcome. One act is reasonable (ordered to procreation within proper bounds); the other is unreasonable (disordered). God cooperates with the physical nature of the act but not with the moral disorder of the sin.

Pedagogical Points #

Berquist emphasizes the principle that higher knowledge can distinguish lower orders, but lower knowledge cannot distinguish itself from higher knowledge. Just as reason can distinguish between sight and hearing, but neither sense can make that distinction, theology (as higher wisdom) can properly distinguish between philosophy and theology, but philosophy alone cannot. This principle underlies the Thomistic ordering of knowledge.

Berquist also stresses the importance of seeing the distinction between the physical and the moral. God’s cooperation with creation (infusing rational souls) does not constitute cooperation with sin. The moral disorder is entirely the creature’s responsibility, while the physical being of the act (as nature) remains a creature’s participation in God’s creative power.