57. Species of Moral Acts: Object, End, and Their Hierarchical Relation

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Interior and Exterior Acts in Moral Specification: Human acts contain two dimensions—the interior act of the will and the exterior act of the body. The end is the proper object of the interior act; the external thing is the object of the exterior act.
• Form and Matter in Moral Acts: The interior act (directed to the end) is formal to the exterior act (directed to the object), just as form is formal to matter.
• Formal vs. Material Species: The species of a human act is formally determined by the end, materially determined by the object of the exterior act.
• Per Se vs. Per Accidens Division: The crucial distinction between differences that per se determine a genus versus those that only per accidens come to be ordered to an end.
• Hierarchical Containment of Species: When an object is per se ordered to an end, the species from the end is more particular and is contained under the species from the object as a specialissima under a subalternate genus.

Key Arguments #

Article 6: Do Good and Bad from the End Diversify Species? #

Objections:

• Acts have their species from the object, not the end; the end is extrinsic to the act’s definition
• That which happens to an act (per accidens) does not constitute species
• Multiple acts of diverse species can be ordered to one end

Thomas’s Answer:

• Some acts are called human insofar as they are voluntary, containing both interior and exterior acts
• The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will
• The exterior act has as its object the external thing acted upon
• Just as the exterior act gets its species from its object, the interior act gets its species from the end as its own object
• What pertains to the will itself is formal to what pertains to the exterior act
• The will uses the body as an instrument
• Exterior acts have the character of human acts only insofar as they are voluntary
• Therefore, human acts are formally considered according to the end, materially according to the object of the exterior act

Example: The man who steals in order to commit adultery is per se loquendo more an adulterer than a thief (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V), because the end more formally determines species.

Article 7: Is Species from the End Contained Under Species from the Object? #

First Objection: Just as a thing cannot be in two species one of which is not under the other, so too the species from the end must be contained under the species from the object as species under genus, since the end is last and represents the ultimate difference.

Counter-Objection: Acts of the same species (by object) can be ordered to infinity of different ends; therefore species from the end cannot be contained under species from the object as genus contains species.

Critical Distinction—Per Se vs. Per Accidens Order:

• When the object is NOT per se ordered to the end (e.g., stealing ordered to adultery), the specific differences from object and end are not per se determinative of each other
• The moral act then falls under TWO species as if disparate, not hierarchically related
• When the object IS per se ordered to the end, one difference is per se determinative of the other

Thomas’s Resolution:

• The more formal a difference, the more particular and specific it is
• The end is posterior in execution but prior in intention of reason, by which moral species is determined
• The difference from the end is more formal (connected to the interior act of the will)
• Therefore, the species from the end is more particular
• Since the will is the universal mover of all the powers of the soul, the end gives a more universal genus
• The specific difference from the object, per se ordered to such an end, is more specific with respect to it
• Thus the species from the end is contained under the species from the object as specialissima under a subalternate genus

Logical Principle: When dividing a genus by differences, the differences must per se divide it, not per accidens. Example of faulty division: “Of animals, some are rational and some irrational; of irrational, some are winged and some not.” Winged/not winged do not per se determine irrationality. Correct division: “Of animals, some have feet, some don’t; of those with feet, some have two, some four”—because this per se determines the prior difference.

Important Definitions #

• Interior Act of the Will (ἐνέργεια τῆς βουλήσεως): The volitional act directed toward an end; the formal principle of moral acts
• Exterior Act (ἐνέργεια ἐξωτερική): The bodily action directed toward an external object; the material dimension of moral acts
• End (τέλος): The object of the interior act of the will; that for which the act is performed
• Object (ὁ περὶ ὸν): That about which the exterior act is performed; gives material species
• Per Se Order (κατὰ αὐτό): An order that belongs essentially to a thing by definition (e.g., stealing is ordered to taking another’s thing)
• Per Accidens Order (κατὰ συμβεβηκός): An order that comes to a thing accidentally (e.g., stealing happens to be ordered to adultery)
• Formal Species (species formalis): The species determined by the end through the interior act of the will
• Material Species (species materialis): The species determined by the object of the exterior act
• Specialissima: The most special or particular species
• Subalternate Genus (genus subalternatum): A genus that is itself a species under a higher genus

Examples & Illustrations #

• Stealing to Commit Adultery: Both theft (material species from the object) and adultery (formal species from the end) are present in the same act; the act commits two evils in one act because the object is not per se ordered to the end
• Giving Alms: The exterior act (giving) can be specified more particularly by the end (to praise God, to relieve one’s neighbor, to believe one’s conscience)
• The Purity of Intention: As the saints say, a man cannot look up and down at the same time with two eyes; similarly, one should have one goal, one intention. This illustrates the formal priority of the end in determining the moral act
• Teaching: Teaching for name-glory is not formally the same act as teaching for the students’ benefit, even though the exterior act is materially the same
• Robin Hood Stealing: Stealing from the rich to give alms to the poor; the object (theft) is not per se ordered to the end (charity), so these are two disparate species
• Knocking Someone’s Arm: If someone else knocks my arm and it hits you, this is not a voluntary act (not human), so it lacks the character of a moral act
• The Doctor: Mentioned in reference to acts requiring proper measure (context: one should not drink before surgery)
• Animals with Feet: Used to illustrate proper per se division—distinguishing animals by number of feet is a per se determination, whereas winged/wingless is per accidens to irrationality

Notable Quotes #

• “The man who steals in order that he might commit adultery… per se loquendo is more an adulterer than a thief.” — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics V (cited by Thomas)
• “In war, there’s no substitute for victory.” — MacArthur (used as modern illustration of end determining act)
• “A man cannot look up and down at the same time [with his two eyes].” — Saints (on purity of intention)
• “Form is more like the species.” — Berquist’s pedagogical clarification

Questions Addressed #

Article 6: Do good and bad from the end diversify the species of acts? #

Answer: Yes. The end formally determines the species through the interior act of the will, while the object materially determines the species through the exterior act. What pertains to the will is formal to what pertains to the exterior act.

Article 7: Is the species from the end contained under the species from the object as species under genus? #

Answer: It depends on whether the object is per se or per accidens ordered to the end. When per se ordered, the species from the end is contained under the species from the object as the most particular (specialissima) under a subalternate genus. When per accidens ordered, the two species are disparate and not hierarchically related; the moral act falls under two distinct species.

Pedagogical Observations #

• Berquist emphasizes that understanding per se vs. per accidens distinction is crucial for proper logical division
• He notes that Thomas was “a logician, among other things” and that careful attention to Porphyry’s predicables illuminates moral theology
• Berquist stresses the subtle but essential difference between what formally determines an act (the end, interior) versus what materially determines it (the object, exterior)
• The lecture includes discussion of the value of learning from authoritative sources (Aristotle, Thomas) rather than attempting to discover all truths independently
• Berquist acknowledges the complexity: “I wonder how I, if you’re unwilling to learn from those who already know something, right, you know, it’s better to discover something by yourself than to learn from another, right? It’s a little more worthy of honor and praise, right? But if I tried to discover all these theories by myself, how far would I get in my life?”

Unresolved or Transitional Elements #

• The lecture ends with discussion of how genus can be “more formal” than species in one sense (as being more universal and less contracted) while difference is formal to genus in another sense (as actualizing the genus)—a subtle distinction left for reflection
• The abortion example (the doctor performing abortions for profit) is introduced but not fully developed; it illustrates multiple evil species in one act but appears incomplete in the transcript