58. Indifferent Acts and Circumstances in Moral Species

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Acts Indifferent in Species (Article 8) #

• Whether some acts can be morally indifferent by their very nature or species
• The relationship between privation (lack) of good and moral badness
• How reason, as the principle of human acts, determines moral species
• Two types of privation: complete privation (like blindness—nothing remains) and partial privation (like sickness—something remains)
• Acts indifferent in species: those whose object includes nothing pertaining to the order of reason (e.g., picking up a straw)

Acts Indifferent in Individual Instances (Article 9) #

• Whether individual acts can be indifferent even if their species is not
• The distinction between acts proceeding from deliberative reason versus acts proceeding from imagination
• The role of circumstances and intention in determining individual act morality
• How each individual act receives moral character through circumstance or intention from the end
• Acts not proceeding from deliberative reason (e.g., unconscious humming) are not properly moral acts

Circumstances and Moral Species (Articles 10-11) #

• Whether circumstances can constitute new moral species
• The distinction between circumstances as accidental features versus circumstances as essential conditions of the object
• How reason can reconceive a circumstance as a principal condition of the object
• Example: Stealing from a sacred place—place moves from circumstance to essential condition, creating sacrilege as a new species distinct from simple theft
• The principle that “more and less” (intensity) do not diversify species

Key Arguments #

Against Indifferent Acts in Species (Objections to Article 8) #

First Objection—The Privation Argument:

• Bad is the privation of good (Augustine)
• Lack and habit are immediately opposed
• Therefore, no middle ground exists between good and bad
• Conclusion: No act can be indifferent in species

Second Objection—The Object and End Argument:

• Every object and every end has the notion of good or bad
• Human acts have species from the object and end
• Therefore, every human act has moral character
• Conclusion: No act is indifferent in species

Third Objection—The Fullness of Goodness Argument:

• Every act either has the complete fullness of its goodness or lacks something
• If complete: the act is good
• If lacking: the act is bad
• Therefore, necessarily every act is either good or bad in species

Thomas’s Resolution #

On Complete vs. Partial Privation:

• Complete privation (like blindness) leaves nothing and admits no middle—either sight or blindness
• Partial privation (like sickness) leaves something of the good intact
• Bad is a partial privation of good (per Simplicius on the Categories)
• Therefore, a middle ground can exist between complete good and complete bad

On Acts Indifferent in Species:

• An act is indifferent in species when its object does not include anything pertaining to the order of reason
• Examples: lifting a straw from the earth, going to a field, scratching one’s beard
• Such acts have natural goodness but not moral goodness or badness
• Moral goodness/badness pertains specifically to what is related to reason

On Individual Acts:

• Every individual act proceeding from deliberative reason must be either good or bad
• This is because every deliberative act must be ordered to some end
• The act is ordered to a suitable (fitting) end: good
• The act is ordered to an unsuitable (repugnant to reason) end: bad
• Acts not proceeding from deliberative reason (mere imagination or habit) are not properly moral acts

Important Definitions #

Indifferent Act (in species): An act whose object includes nothing pertaining to the order of reason, such that it is neither inherently morally good nor bad in its essential nature. Individual instances may gain moral character through circumstances or intention.

Circumstance (circumstantiae): An accident of an act that can either remain purely accidental or become essential to the object when it regards a special order of reason (ordo rationis). Examples include place, time, manner, and quantity.

Privation (privatio): A lack of something that should be present. Complete privation leaves nothing of the contrary good; partial privation leaves something of the good intact, allowing for degrees and middle states.

Deliberative Reason (ratio deliberans): The faculty by which human acts are properly moral, ordering them to suitable or unsuitable ends.

Order of Reason (ordo rationis): The proper ordering of acts to fitting ends and suitable objects as determined by reason.

Sacrilege: Stealing from a sacred place—the circumstance of place becomes essential to the object, creating a new moral species distinct from simple theft.

Examples & Illustrations #

Indifferent Acts in Species #

• Picking up a straw from the earth
• Scratching one’s beard
• Lifting up one’s hand or foot
• Whistling (though it becomes good or bad when considered in relation to an end)
• Speaking English versus French (indifferent unless done to conceal information from someone, which would add intention)
• Eating at noontime versus evening (indifferent in species, though customs may make one preferable)
• Humming a melody unconsciously (not a properly moral act because it doesn’t proceed from deliberative reason)

Circumstances Affecting Moral Species #

• Theft from Sacred Place: Stealing becomes sacrilege when the place is sacred; place transitions from circumstance to an essential condition of the object
• John Paul II’s Joke: Telling a joke to a college president to discomfort him versus to relax him—same act (telling a joke), different moral character from the end intended
• Praying in Multiple Languages: Saying the rosary in English, Spanish, French, and Hungarian at a March for Life event—the language is indifferent unless it has a particular purpose (to include diverse communities, for example)
• Pilgrimage Distance: Walking one mile versus ten miles in pilgrimage does not change the species of the act, only its intensity
• Theft Amount: Taking $50 versus $100 does not change the species of theft (both remain theft); more and less do not diversify species

Unconscious Acts #

• Humming Mozart automatically after hearing it frequently
• Moving one’s hand or foot without deliberation
• Such acts are “not properly speaking moral or human” because they do not proceed from reason

Notable Quotes #

“A moral act, as has been said, not only has goodness from the object, from which it has its species, but also from circumstances, right? Those trusty, those, you know, those, uh, testy circumstances, yeah.”

“It is necessary that each individual act has some circumstance through which, or by which, it is drawn, either to the good or bad. At least from the side of the intention of the end.”

“If it is not ordered to a suitable end, is from this very fact repugnant to reason. And has a notion of bad. So it’s this question of order to us [the suitable end].”

“The condition of place about the object can be taken as something contrary to the order of reason. For example, the reason orders that one ought not to do an injury in a sacred place. Whence to take something alien from a sacred place adds a special repugnance to the order of reason.”

“The process of the going forward, proceeding of reason, is not determined to something one. But anything being given, it is able to proceed further. And therefore, in one act, that what in one act is taken as a circumstance added to the object, right? Which determines the species of the act. It is also able to be taken by reason, ordering, as a principal condition of the object determining the species of the act.”

Questions Addressed #

Can Acts Be Indifferent in Species? #

Resolution: Yes, acts can be indifferent in species when their object includes nothing pertaining to the order of reason. However, such acts are not properly moral acts in the strict sense. They have natural goodness but lack moral goodness or badness. Individual instances of indifferent acts gain moral character through circumstances and intention.

Can Acts Be Indifferent in Individual Instances? #

Resolution: No. Every individual act proceeding from deliberative reason must be either morally good or bad because it must be ordered to some end. Acts not proceeding from deliberative reason (e.g., unconscious habits or imagination-driven movements) are not properly moral acts and thus fall outside the category of moral classification entirely.

How Do Circumstances Become Essential to Moral Species? #

Resolution: A circumstance becomes essential to the object and creates a new moral species when it regards a special order of reason. When reason can order something contrary or contrary to something (for or against the order of reason), the circumstance becomes a principal condition of the object. Example: stealing from a sacred place adds special repugnance to the order of reason, transforming the moral species from theft to sacrilege.

Do All Circumstances Create New Moral Species? #

Resolution: No. Only circumstances that regard a special order of reason create new species. Circumstances that merely add intensity (more or less of the same thing) do not diversify species. Taking $50 versus $100 does not create different species of theft—both remain theft.