Lecture 61

61. Erroneous Conscience and the Moral Will

Summary
This lecture examines Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of whether a will in discord with or in agreement with erroneous reason constitutes a bad or good will (Articles 5-6 of Summa Theologiae II-II, Question 19). Berquist explores the distinction between voluntary and involuntary ignorance, the binding force of erroneous conscience, and the principle that moral goodness requires integral causation while evil arises from any singular defect. The lecture addresses the apparent paradox that a person seems perplexed no matter whether they follow or reject erroneous reason, and how Thomas resolves this through careful analysis of different types of errors.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Fundamental Question: Erroneous Conscience and Moral Obligation #

Thomas addresses whether the will becomes bad when it acts against erroneous reason, and whether it becomes good when it acts in accordance with erroneous reason. This leads to the apparent paradox that a person with erroneous reason seems “perplexed” (perplex)—having no way to act rightly.

The Role of Reason as Rule of the Will #

  • Reason is the rule (regula) of the human will, insofar as it is derived from eternal law
  • The will should follow reason; when it departs from reason, it acts against its proper order
  • Even erroneous reason proposes itself as true and consequently as derived from God, the source of all truth

Voluntary vs. Involuntary Ignorance #

Thomas distinguishes three types of ignorance:

Directly Voluntary Ignorance (ἀγνοία εὐθέως θελητή)

  • An act of the will is directly responsible for the ignorance
  • Does not excuse the will from moral badness

Indirectly Voluntary Ignorance

  • Through negligence (negligentia) in not learning what one is obliged to know
  • Does not excuse the will from moral badness
  • Example: Young people who refuse to hear Church teaching say “I don’t want to hear it,” thereby choosing ignorance

Involuntary Ignorance

  • Ignorance of circumstances that one could not reasonably know
  • Causes the act to be involuntary (involuntarium)
  • Excuses the will from moral badness

The Distinction of Three Genera of Acts #

Thomas (following earlier discussion) identifies three types of acts:

  1. Per se good acts (e.g., believing in Christ)
  2. Indifferent acts (e.g., raising a straw from the earth)
  3. Per se bad acts (e.g., fornication, murder)

The binding force of erroneous reason varies by type of error and voluntariness of ignorance.

The Principle of Integral Causation (Dionysius) #

  • Bonum ex integra causa—Good arises from an integral (whole) cause
  • Malum ex singulari defectu—Evil arises from any singular defect
  • For the will to be good, BOTH must be right:
    1. The object willed must be good in itself, AND
    2. The object must be willed under the aspect of goodness
  • For the will to be bad, only ONE defect is needed:
    1. Either the object is bad in itself, OR
    2. The object is willed under the aspect of badness

The Will Cannot Have a Bad Object Except Under Aspect of Badness #

  • The will is always of the good (voluntas est boni)
  • When the will chooses something objectively bad, it does so under the aspect of badness as proposed by reason
  • The will’s badness consists not merely in the object but in how reason grasps and presents it

Key Arguments #

Article 5: Will in Discord with Erroneous Reason #

Objections claiming the will is NOT bad:

  1. Erroneous reason is not derived from eternal law, so it does not bind us (like the proconsul vs. emperor)
  2. A will departing from erroneous reason cannot be reduced to a species of wickedness
  3. Every bad will must be reduced to some species of badness, but these conditions are not met

Thomas’s Resolution:

  • Every will in discord from reason is bad, whether reason is correct or erroneous
  • This is because the will should follow reason as its rule and measure
  • To act against reason is to act against the order that reason should provide
  • The badness consists in the lack of conformity to reason, not in the content of reason itself
  • Conscience (conscientia) is the application of knowledge to an act, and acting against conscience is always sinful (Romans 14: “Everything that is not from faith is a sin”)

Article 6: Will in Accord with Erroneous Reason #

Objections claiming the will IS good:

  1. By parallel logic to Article 5, if discord with erroneous reason is bad, then accord with it should be good
  2. The will in agreement with God’s precept and eternal law is always good; erroneous reason supposedly presents the eternal law to us
  3. If both following and rejecting erroneous reason make the will bad, the person is perplexed with no escape

Counterargument from Scripture:

  • John 16:2—Those who kill the apostles think they render service to God (erroneous conscience)
  • Yet their will is bad
  • St. Paul before conversion: persecuted Christians thinking he served God; his will was objectively disordered despite his erroneous conscience

Thomas’s Resolution:

  • The question of whether the will following erroneous reason is good is the same as asking whether erroneous conscience excuses (excusat)
  • This depends entirely on whether the ignorance is voluntary or involuntary

Case 1: Error about Things Per Se Bad (e.g., murder, fornication)

  • If reason errs due to ignorance of divine law that one is obliged to know, the error is voluntary (directly or indirectly)
  • The will is bad; ignorance does not excuse
  • Example: St. Paul’s persecution of Christians—his ignorance about God’s law was culpable to some degree

Case 2: Error about Things Per Se Good (e.g., believing in Christ)

  • If reason errs by proposing something objectively good as bad, and the error is voluntary, the will is bad
  • The will wills the good thing under the aspect of badness
  • Example: Forcing someone to renounce Christ under false belief that this serves God

Case 3: Error about Indifferent Things

  • If reason errs due to involuntary ignorance of circumstances (not negligence), the error excuses
  • The will is not bad
  • Example: A man approaches a woman believing her to be his own wife due to ignorance of circumstances (like the Genesis case of Jacob, Leah, and Rachel), the will is excused

The Resolution of the Perplexity Objection #

The Apparent Problem:

  • If following erroneous reason makes the will bad, and rejecting it also makes the will bad, is the person not in an impossible situation with no escape?

Thomas’s Solution (using syllogistic analogy):

  • Just as in syllogisms, one unsuitable premise leads to other unsuitable conclusions, so too in morality
  • If someone seeks empty glory (vana gloria), whether they act or refrain, they sin—but they are NOT perplexed
  • Why? Because they can abandon their bad intention of seeking empty glory
  • Similarly, one with voluntary (culpable) ignorance is not perplexed because they can inform themselves and correct their error
  • The doors are not truly closed; the person has the power to escape by changing their will

Important Definitions #

Conscientia (Conscience)

  • The application of knowledge to a particular act (applicatio scientiae ad actum)
  • Binds the will to its dictate
  • Can be erroneous but still binding if the error is involuntary

Involuntarium (The Involuntary)

  • An act caused by ignorance of circumstances without negligence
  • Removes the quality of being a voluntary act
  • Removes moral goodness or badness from the act

Aspectus (Aspect)

  • The manner in which reason grasps and presents an object to the will
  • The will wills things not merely as they are in themselves, but as they appear to reason
  • Example: Fornication presented as good (false aspect) vs. presented as bad (true aspect)

Integra causa (Integral Cause)

  • The complete set of conditions necessary for goodness
  • For the will to be good: both object and aspect must be good

Singularis defectus (Singular Defect)

  • A single failure in the conditions for goodness
  • For the will to be bad: only one defect is needed (either object or aspect)

Examples & Illustrations #

The Case of Involuntary Ignorance: The Wrong Bride #

  • If a man approaches a woman believing her to be his wife due to ignorance of circumstances (she is veiled, or twin sisters exchange places), his will is excused from badness
  • The ignorance is involuntary and unavoidable
  • This excuses the act, making it involuntary and therefore not morally bad

The Persecutor with Erroneous Conscience #

  • John 16:2: “Everyone who kills you will think that he renders service to God”
  • St. Paul before conversion: persecuted Christians in good conscience (according to his belief)
  • Yet his will was objectively ordered toward evil
  • His ignorance, while binding his conscience at the time, did not make his will good
  • The will is evaluated partly by whether the ignorance is culpable

Raising a Straw from the Earth (Indifferent Act) #

  • Raising a straw is indifferent in itself
  • If erroneous reason says it is prohibited, the will following this becomes bad
  • The badness does not come from the act itself but from willing it under the aspect of badness
  • The will is carried toward the straw-raising as if it were bad

Abstaining from Fornication (Per Se Good) #

  • Abstaining from fornication is per se good
  • If erroneous reason (due to voluntary ignorance) proposes this as bad, the will following it is bad
  • The will wills the good act under the aspect of badness
  • The badness is not in the act but in how reason grasps it

Belief in Christ (Per Se Good and Necessary for Salvation) #

  • Belief in Christ is per se good and necessary for salvation
  • If erroneous reason proposes it as bad, the will following this erroneous reason is bad
  • The will is not carried toward it except according as it is proposed by reason
  • Thus if reason proposes it as bad, the will is carried toward it as bad—not because belief is bad in itself, but because of the way reason grasps it

Young People Refusing to Hear Church Teaching #

  • Some young people say “I don’t want to hear it” when the Church teaches about sexual morality
  • This constitutes directly voluntary ignorance (actus voluntatis)
  • They are choosing ignorance
  • Such ignorance does not excuse; their will following this erroneous conscience is bad
  • Berquist notes many in the Church today exhibit this pattern

The Scrupulous Nuns in Confession #

  • Father Baumgartner’s comment about hearing nuns’ confessions: many are scrupulous and drive confessors crazy
  • They debate about whose turn it is to confess to him, saying “I did it last week”
  • Suggests confusion about prudent discernment in moral matters
  • Illustrates how erroneous conscience can make people anxious and perplexed

The Paradox of Empty Glory #

  • Someone seeks empty glory (vana gloria)
  • Whether they perform an act or refrain from it, they sin (because the intention is disordered)
  • Yet they are NOT perplexed without escape
  • Why? They can abandon their bad intention of seeking empty glory
  • This shows that perplexity is resolvable if the will is changed

Notable Quotes #

“The judgment of reason and error although it is not derived from god right nevertheless reason in air proposes its judgment as true and consequently proposes it as being derived from god from whom is all what truth.” — Thomas Aquinas (on why erroneous reason still binds the will)

“Good is caused from a what? Integral cause, huh? But bad from, what? Singular defects, huh?” — Dionysius (cited by Thomas and Berquist)

“It requires this integrity, right? That in both ways it be, what? Good, right? Yeah. It’s got to be a good act, and you’ve got to know that it’s good, right?” — Berquist (explaining Dionysius’s principle)

“Because he can, what? Dismiss his bad intention of seeking, what? Yeah, yeah. So if I want to, you know, get praised for my charitable giving, right? I stalled my horn. Well, whether I give or don’t give, I’m going to be, what? Yeah. But that can give up intention of seeking, being glory, right?” — Berquist (explaining resolution to perplexity objection)

“You tell these girls, these young girls, you know, they go in to have their abortion, you know, that just, you know, a blob of tissue or something, you know? I don’t know how they can be so ignorant, but, you know?” — Berquist (on directly voluntary ignorance in contemporary culture)

“Saying against stupidity, the very gods themselves could tend to invade.” — Berquist (quoting maxim on combating willful ignorance)

Questions Addressed #

Article 5: Is a Will in Discord with Erroneous Reason Bad? #

Question: If reason errs, can the will be bad for departing from it?

Answer: Yes, always. The will is bad when it departs from reason, whether reason is correct or erroneous. The binding force comes from reason’s role as rule of the will, not from whether reason happens to be materially correct.

Reasoning:

  • Reason is the rule of the will, derived from eternal law
  • Acting against reason is acting against the proper order
  • The will should conform to reason as such
  • Conscience is the application of knowledge to an act, and acting against conscience is sinful (Romans 14)

Article 6: Is a Will in Accord with Erroneous Reason Good? #

Question: By symmetry, should not a will following erroneous reason be good?

Answer: It depends entirely on whether the ignorance is voluntary or involuntary.

Resolution:

  • If voluntary ignorance: The will is bad even when following erroneous reason
    • Directly voluntary: the will actively causes the ignorance
    • Indirectly voluntary: through negligence in not learning required knowledge
  • If involuntary ignorance: The will is excused and not bad
    • The ignorance must be of circumstances unavoidable through negligence
    • Example: Ignorance of a veiled woman’s identity

The Problem of Perplexity (Perplex) #

Question: If both following and rejecting erroneous reason make the will bad, is the person not stuck with no escape?

Answer: No, the person is not perplexed because they retain the power to correct the underlying condition:

  • They can abandon bad intentions (e.g., seeking empty glory)
  • They can inform themselves and remedy voluntary ignorance
  • The doors are not truly closed; the will retains agency

Key Principle: Just as in syllogisms one unsuitable premise leads to unsuitable conclusions without making the reasoner entirely perplexed (they can correct the premise), so too in morality the person with erroneous reason can remedy the underlying error of will.