68. Passion in the Soul: Nature and Equivocal Meanings

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Equivocal Nature of Passio (Passion/Undergoing) #

Berquist begins by establishing that ‘passion’ is equivocal by reason (aequivocum secundum analogiam), following Aristotle’s analysis of equivocal terms in the Categories. The term appears in three distinct but related senses:

1. Communiter (Generally): Any reception whatsoever, even when perfecting. The eye receiving light, the ear hearing Mozart—these are undergoings without loss. This is more properly called ‘being perfected’ (perfici) than ‘suffering’ (pati).

2. Properly (Proprie): Reception accompanied by change, with loss of something unsuitable. Example: healing, where sickness is cast out and health received.

3. Most Properly (Propriissimus Modus): Reception with loss of something suitable—the strict sense of suffering. Example: becoming sick, where health is rejected and sickness received. This is the primary meaning from which the word originates.

The Problem of Linguistic Transference #

Berquist explains the difficulty in translating ‘passio’ from Latin/Greek into English. The English word ‘suffering’ remains stuck on the first meaning (with bodily harm and opposition), whereas the Latin/Greek term has been carried over to new meanings. He proposes ‘undergoing’ as a better English equivalent because it retains the original sense less rigidly. The word ‘passion’ itself is a transliteration rather than true translation, inheriting the equivocity of the original Latin term.

The Example of ‘Before’ (Antecedentia) #

Following Aristotle’s Categories, Chapter 12, Berquist illustrates this pattern through the word ‘before’ (prius), which has four chief senses:

• Before in time (today before tomorrow)
• Before in being (one before two; bricks before brick walls; letter C before the word ‘cat’)
• Before in knowledge/discourse of reason
• Before in goodness/worth (what is better is ‘before’ in preference)

These meanings are distinct yet related by ’likeness of ratios’ (similitude rationum). The same pattern applies to ‘passion’: meanings are distinct but connected through an underlying likeness.

Passion Cannot Belong to the Soul (Per Se) with Bodily Change #

Thomas Aquinas’s response to the first objection establishes a crucial distinction:

• Per se (in itself): Passion with bodily change cannot belong to the immaterial soul, because the soul is not material.
• Per accidens (accidentally): The soul can undergo in the sense of receiving intelligible forms (understanding is an undergoing), and it can be moved accidentally when the body moves.

The soul has ‘receptivity’ (passibilitas) even though it is not composed of matter and form. This receptivity belongs to anything existing in potency.

The Composite’s Experience of Passion #

Berquist clarifies that passion with loss/change (the proper sense) belongs primarily to the composite (soul-body union), not to the soul alone. The bodily component is essential to the proprissimus modus of passion. When sadness or joy occurs, the body undergoes real physical change (disturbance of humors, movement of the heart, etc.), while the soul receives these affections per accidens through its union with the body.

Key Arguments #

Objection 1: Passion Belongs to Matter, Not Soul #

• Premise: To undergo is proper to matter; the soul is not material
• Conclusion: Therefore, no undergoing exists in the soul
• Response: Undergoing, taken generally as ‘receiving,’ is not necessarily restricted to matter. The soul has receptivity (passibilitas) insofar as it exists in potency. Understanding itself is an undergoing (as Aristotle states).

Objection 2: Passion is Motion; The Soul is Not Moved #

• Premise: Passion is a motion (per Aristotle’s Physics III); the soul is not moved per se (per De Anima I)
• Conclusion: Therefore, no passion in the soul
• Response: Motion as local movement does not belong to the soul per se, but the soul can be moved per accidens through the body’s motion. Moreover, ‘motion’ in Aristotle’s sense includes qualitative change (passion), which the soul does undergo when receiving intelligible forms.

Objection 3: Passion Leads to Corruption; The Soul is Incorruptible #

• Premise: Every passion, strengthened, leads away from substance (per Aristotle’s Book of Places); the soul is incorruptible
• Conclusion: Therefore, no passion in the soul
• Response: This objection concerns passion in the proprissimus modus (with loss leading to corruption). Such passion cannot belong to the soul per se, but it can belong to the composite per accidens. The incorruptibility of the soul is preserved.

The Authority of Scripture #

Romans 7:5 provides scriptural foundation: “When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law were at work in our members.” This demonstrates that passions (πάθη/pathos) truly affect the soul, even though the soul itself is not material.

Important Definitions #

Passio (Passion/Undergoing): Reception or being acted upon. Has three graduated meanings: (1) any reception, even perfecting; (2) reception with change; (3) reception with loss of something suitable (the primary meaning from which others derive).

Receptivity/Passibilitas: The capacity to receive or undergo; belongs to anything existing in potency, whether material or immaterial.

Per se vs. Per accidens: A fundamental distinction—something belongs to an entity ‘in itself’ (per se) or ‘accidentally’ (per accidens) through something else. The soul undergoes passion per accidens through its union with the body.

Equivocal by Reason (Aequivocum secundum rationem): A word applied to multiple things with related but distinct meanings, where the relation is a ’likeness of ratios’ (similitude rationum) rather than a single shared essence.

Communitaire/Communiter: General or broadly; used when a term applies universally but with variations in intensity or mode.

Proprie/Properly: Applied according to the primary or standard meaning of a term.

Propriissimus Modus: The most proper or strict sense; the original meaning from which a term’s other senses derive.

Examples & Illustrations #

• Hearing Mozart: The ear undergoes (receives sound) and is perfected; this is passion communiter (general sense) without loss or harm
• Seeing a Beautiful Sunset: The eye is perfected through reception of the sunset’s form; pure reception without loss
• Becoming Sick: The body receives sickness while health is rejected; this is passion in the proprissimus modus (with loss of what is suitable)
• Receiving Medical Treatment: A doctor acts upon the patient, expelling sickness and restoring health; this is passion proprie (with change but toward improvement)
• Sticking Someone with a Pin vs. Seeing Them: Being stuck makes one acutely aware of being acted upon (bodily change), whereas merely seeing someone is a perfecting reception not typically recognized as passion
• The Greek Word ‘Before’: Demonstrates how a single term carries multiple distinct but related meanings (time, being, knowledge, worth)

Questions Addressed #

1. Does passion exist in the soul? Yes, but equivocally. In the general sense (reception), yes; in the proper sense (with bodily change), it belongs to the composite. The soul can undergo reception of intelligible forms per se and bodily affections per accidens.

2. How can the immaterial soul undergo passion if passion is proper to matter? The soul, though immaterial, has receptivity (passibilitas) as it exists in potency. Passion, taken as mere reception, is not restricted to material things; understanding itself demonstrates reception in an immaterial power.

3. How does the meaning of ‘passion’ shift when applied from sensible to spiritual realities? Through translationes nominis (‘carrying over of the name’), dropping certain aspects of the original meaning (bodily change, material harm) while retaining others (reception, being acted upon). This parallels how Aristotle’s term ‘before’ undergoes similar transference across different domains.

4. Why is the proprissimus modus (strict sense with loss) the primary meaning? Because we tend to name and notice what is more manifest to us. Bodily harm or loss is more obvious than mere reception; thus the term originates there and extends to other meanings.