76. Love as Passion: Nature, Distinctions, and Definitions

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Love as Passion: Whether amor constitutes a passio (undergoing/suffering) and how it relates to the desiring power (appetitive power)
• The Two Effects of Love: How the desirable object first produces agreement/conformity in the appetite (amor), from which follows motion toward the object (desire), and finally rest in the object (joy)
• Distinctions Among Names for Love: The relationship and differences between amor, dilectio, caritas, and amicitia
• Passion vs. Virtue: The apparent contradiction between love being a passion and being called a virtue by Dionysius
• Philosophical Language and Translation: How Greek and Latin terms must be extended in English to preserve philosophical meaning

Key Arguments #

Is Love a Passion? #

Against love being a passion:

• Objection 1: Virtues are not passions; Dionysius says love is a virtue; therefore love is not a passion
• Objection 2: Love is a union or relation, not a passion
• Objection 3: Passion implies motion of the desiring power, but love is the beginning of motion (desire is what moves)

Thomas’s Resolution:

• Passio (passion/undergoing) is an effect of an agent upon a patient—a change in the patient caused by the agent
• A natural agent produces two effects: first, it gives form; second, it gives the motion that follows upon that form
• Example: When fire generates heat, it gives weight/gravity and then the motion following from gravity
• Similarly, the desirable object acts upon the appetite in two stages:
  1. First effect: The appetite is conformed/adapted to the desirable (this is amor—love/agreement)
  2. Second effect: From this conformity follows motion toward the object (this is desire)
• Therefore, love (stricto sensu) is a passion because it involves a change of the appetite caused by the desirable object making an impression upon it
• The circular motion: Something desirable acts upon the appetite, conforming it; the appetite then tends toward the object in reality; what began as the agent (acting upon) becomes the end (pursued)

Resolution of Dionysius’s “virtue”:

• Dionysius uses “virtus” to mean principium motus (source/principle of motion), not virtue in the strict sense
• Love is the beginning or source of desire and other motions

Amor, Dilectio, Caritas, and Amicitia #

Four names pertain to love in different ways:

• Amor (love): The most general term; applies to any appetite (natural, sensible, or rational)

  • Example: “My love is my weight” (Augustine)—a stone’s natural inclination to its place
  • Not limited to rational or sensible love

• Dilectio (chosen love): Adds the element of choice (electio) preceding the love

  • Comes from electio—choice, election
  • Pertains only to the rational will (not to sensible appetite or natural appetite)
  • Involves judgment and reason
  • Example: Marriage involves expressing choice (“do you choose this person as your spouse?”), not merely warm feelings
  • Requires deliberation about what is good and a commitment to choose it

• Caritas (charity): Adds the perfection of love as virtue

  • Estimates what is loved as having great price/worth (from carus—dear, costly)
  • Can be considered as a habit (theological virtue) or as an act
  • The highest form of love in the theological tradition

• Amicitia (friendship): A habit rather than an act or passion

  • From Aristotle’s Ethics VIII-IX, which Thomas considers definitive
  • Belongs to ethics as either virtue or akin to virtue
  • Involves mutual wishing of good to the other

Relationship of the four:

• Every dilectio is an amor, but not every amor is dilectio
• In the intellectual appetite, amor and dilectio are essentially the same
• In the sensible appetite, only amor applies (not dilectio, which requires choice/reason)
• Amor is more general than dilectio because amor extends to more objects

Important Definitions #

• Passio (Passion/Undergoing): An effect of an agent upon a patient; involves a real change in the patient’s condition caused by the agent acting upon it. Not merely a transitive action, but a receptive change.

• Principium (Beginning/Principle): From Greek archē; has multiple senses:

  • First three senses: the beginning is in that of which it is the beginning (point in line, line in surface, surface in body; foundation in house)
  • Fourth sense: the beginning is not in that of which it is the beginning (e.g., the father/maker is the beginning of the son/artifact)
  • Fifth sense: the principles of science (axioms, definitions) as beginnings
  • In English, the word “beginning” must be extended to capture later senses

• Virtus (as used by Dionysius): Source or principle of motion/action, not virtue in the strict ethical sense

• Conformatio/Agreement: The adaptation of the appetite to the desirable object; the appetite being “fitted” to the object so that it finds the object pleasing

• Electio (Choice): An act of will involving reason; deliberation about what is good followed by commitment to pursue it

• Carus (Dear/Costly): From which caritas derives; indicates great worth or price

Examples & Illustrations #

• The Stone and Gravity: When fire generates a stone, it gives the stone weight/gravity and then the motion following from gravity toward the stone’s natural place. Similarly, a desirable object gives the appetite conformity/adaptation to itself, from which follows motion toward the object.

• Impression on the Heart: A young person at a party: someone makes “an impression upon” them—a soft heart receives the impression, conforming to the object (amor). Because the heart has been conformed to that person, the person then pursues them (desire follows).

• Mozart’s Music: The lecturer’s love of Mozart’s music exemplifies how the music “fits” his heart—he keeps putting it on every morning. This shows the conformity/agreement between the object and the appetite.

• Marriage and Choice: The priest at a wedding asks not “do you have warm feelings?” but “do you choose this person as your spouse?” This expresses choice (dilectio), not merely passionate emotion (amor).

• Samuel Johnson’s Humility: Johnson’s admission of mistakes in his dictionary makes people love him—not because mistakes are good, but because the honesty and humility revealed through those admissions are good.

• The Carpenter’s Roof: Why does the carpenter make the roof sloped rather than flat? His ability extends to both shapes, so we cannot explain it by his power. We must appeal to the end: to shed rain and snow. This illustrates how causes must be understood in their proper order (matter, form, mover, end).

• The Word “CAT” vs. “ACT”: Written on the blackboard, students realize that while the letters C, A, T are necessary, they alone do not explain why they are in that order. A third kind of cause (the maker/mover) is needed. Then, considering why the maker put them in that order (to discuss the cat) introduces the fourth cause (the end). This pedagogical example shows how all four causes must be invoked.

Notable Quotes #

“My love is my weight.” — Augustine, on natural love as the inclination of a thing toward what suits it according to its nature

“Love is a virtus unitiva” (a power that unites) — Dionysius, Divine Names IV

“Union is the opus (work) of love.” — Aristotle, Politics II

“Passion is a certain motion” — John Damascene, Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith II (via Thomas)

Questions Addressed #

Article 2: Is Love a Passion? #

Main Question: If virtues are not passions, and love is called a virtue by Dionysius, how can love be a passion?

Resolution:

• Love is a passion in the strict sense (stricto sensu) when it exists in the sensible appetite, as it involves a real change (passio) of the appetite caused by the desirable object
• Love can be called a passion by extension (per extensionem) when it exists in the will
• Dionysius calls love a “virtue” (virtus) in the sense of principium (source/principle of motion), not in the ethical sense
• The confusion arises from equivocal use of terms; Thomas clarifies the distinctions

Article 3: Is Love the Same as Dilectio (Chosen Love)? #

Main Question: Do the terms amor and dilectio signify the same reality?

Resolution:

• They differ in their formal aspects:
  • Amor is more general and applies to all appetitive powers
  • Dilectio adds the specific note of choice (electio) and applies only to the rational will
• In the intellectual appetite, they may be used interchangeably (both apply to the same act of will)
• In the sensible appetite, only amor applies (choice requires reason)
• Both can be found in Scripture used in good and bad senses; Augustine concludes they are not truly different things but the same reality understood under different formal aspects
• The distinction is more linguistic/conceptual than real

On the Philosophical Use of Language #

Problem: How do we translate philosophical terms from Greek and Latin while preserving meaning?

Resolution:

• Greek archē and Latin principium have multiple senses; English “beginning” must be extended to capture them all
• When we adopt Greek or Latin terms into English, we should not restrict them to their primary meanings
• The primary senses (where the beginning is in what it begins) should be extended to later senses (where the beginning is not in what it begins)
• Example: “The carpenter is the beginning of the house” extends the word’s meaning, but this extension is philosophically necessary
• Students sometimes resist this extension because their “minds are clogged,” as Berquist notes, but it is essential for philosophical precision

Connections #

• To Aristotle’s Metaphysics V: The discussion of archē (beginning/principle) and its multiple senses, which Berquist argues provides philosophical justification for extending English terminology
• To Aristotle’s Physics III: On motion (kinesis) and the correlative concepts of acting upon (poiein) and undergoing (paschein)
• To Aristotle’s Ethics VIII-IX: The foundation for Thomas’s treatment of amicitia (friendship) as a virtue and habit
• To Augustine’s City of God: Cited for the principle that “nothing is loved except the good” and the characterization of love as weight/inclination
• To Dionysius’s Divine Names IV: The claim that love is a virtue and the circular/unified nature of love
• To Shakespeare: Used to illustrate how poets extend language naturally to convey philosophical truths (“revolts from true birth” meaning revolts from true nature/essence)
• To Contemporary Issues: Brief references to modern political situations and media, used to illustrate how love and choice differ from mere feeling or external pressure

Pedagogical Notes #

• Berquist emphasizes that understanding distinctions (especially between sensible and intellectual love) is prerequisite to understanding the proper ordering of the passions
• He stresses that modern students often conflate emotional love with the love that is an act of the will, which has implications for understanding marriage, friendship, and charity
• The lecture demonstrates how systematic philosophical analysis (Thomas) surpasses literary treatment (Plato’s Symposium) in comprehensiveness
• Translation and linguistic precision are treated as central to philosophical understanding, not peripheral matters
• The use of concrete examples (the mixer, Mozart’s music, Johnson’s dictionary) grounds abstract philosophical distinctions in lived experience