Lecture 89

89. Pleasure, Joy, and Motion in the Soul

Summary
This lecture explores the nature of pleasure (delectatio) and joy (gaudium) as passions of the soul, distinguishing them from motion and operation. Berquist examines whether pleasure exists in time, how joy differs from pleasure as a species following upon reason, and clarifies that both operate according to different principles—bodily pleasure being successive and in time, while spiritual pleasure and the beatific vision participate in eternity.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Pleasure and Time #

  • Per se vs. Per accidens: Something is in time per se by its very nature (like motion), or per accidens through something else (like human existence)
  • Pleasure’s Nature: Pleasure consists in the good now obtained, which is the term or limit of motion—not the motion itself
  • Conditional Time-Dependence: If the good obtained is subject to change, pleasure will be in time per accidens; if entirely stable, pleasure will not be in time per se or per accidens
  • The Beatific Vision: Seeing God face-to-face involves no change, no before and after, partakes of eternity entirely—never in time

Motion vs. Operation: Two Senses #

  • Motion (Strict Sense): The act of what is imperfect—what exists in potency as such (ἐνέργεια τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ᾗ τοιοῦτον). Always successive and in time
  • Operation: The act of what is perfect—what exists in act. Not successive; not in time per se
  • Key Distinction: When walking home, one has not yet walked home (incomplete); when seeing, one has already seen (complete). When understanding a square, one has already understood it
  • Pleasure as Operation: Since pleasure is the perfection of a suitable operation, it is an operation rather than motion in the strict sense

Joy (Gaudium) as Species of Pleasure #

  • Joy vs. General Pleasure: Joy is a particular kind of pleasure—specifically, pleasure that follows upon reason (ratione)
  • Natural vs. Rational Pleasures: Some pleasures are natural (bodily, sensory); others follow upon reason and are spiritual
  • Definition: Joy pertains exclusively to rational natures; it involves rational apprehension of a good
  • Language Distinction: We speak of joy regarding rational goods (truth, understanding, God); we speak of pleasure regarding bodily satisfactions
  • Application: One might say “I am pleased with philosophy,” but more properly “I have joy in philosophy.” One would not typically say a cat experiences joy, only pleasure

Three Divisions of Pleasure #

  • Pleasures Shared with Beasts: Eating, sensory gratification (bodily pleasures)
  • Pleasures Shared with Angels: Understanding, contemplation of truth, intellectual delights
  • Properly Human Pleasures: Fine arts (music, poetry, visual arts)—too elevated for beasts, too inferior for angels, involving both body and soul
  • Progression: The fine arts serve as a stepping stone from lower bodily pleasures to higher intellectual and spiritual pleasures

Why Spiritual Pleasures Exceed Bodily Ones #

  • Permanence: Bodily pleasure is successive and diminishes (one can only eat so much); spiritual pleasure can be sustained (one can listen to Mozart or read longer than eating)
  • Duration: One can philosophize or listen to opera longer without fatigue than pursue bodily pleasures without diminishment
  • Refinement: Human pleasures in food involve cooking, seasoning, and reason—not raw consumption like animals
  • Nobility of Object and Recipient: The intellect is nobler than the senses; eternal truth is greater than temporal sensory goods

Key Arguments #

Against Reducing All Pleasure to Bodily Appetite #

  • Objection: Locke’s theory reduces pleasure to sensory good, making ethics “a philosophy for beasts”
  • Berquist’s Defense: Humans have pleasures beasts do not share—intellectual pleasures. Sensory pleasures are refined through reason (cooking, seasoning). And spiritual pleasures far exceed bodily ones
  • Consequence: One who ignores higher pleasures will necessarily pursue excess in lower pleasures. Obesity and addiction result from lack of taste for higher goods

The Beatific Vision Cannot Suffer Boredom #

  • Plato’s Problem: If pleasure in eternal things eventually becomes boring, one would wish to return to the changeable body
  • Thomas’s Solution: In the beatific vision, one’s mind is so enlightened that no mistake is possible, no weariness occurs, no before and after exists. It is entirely stable in eternal rest
  • Augustinian Support: “Miserable the man who knows all things but not God; blessed the man who knows God even if he knows nothing else”

Joy and Pleasure Differ Despite Same Object #

  • Objection: Joy and pleasure both have “the good obtained” as object, so they must be identical
  • Response: Though the object may be the same, the apprehension differs. Joy involves rational apprehension; pleasure can be merely sensory. Diversity of knowing pertains to diversity of object (as known).
  • Second Response: The underlying motion differs—concupiscence (bodily desire) corresponds to pleasure; desire (rational appetite) corresponds to joy

Important Definitions #

Delectatio (Pleasure)

  • Motion of the soul and constitution in one’s existing nature arising from joining something suitable that is sensed or known
  • Can be natural (following natural appetite) or non-natural/rational (following reason)
  • Consists in the good now obtained, which is the term or limit of motion

Gaudium (Joy)

  • A species of pleasure that follows reason (secundum rationem)
  • Pertains to rational natures only
  • Involves intellectual apprehension of a good
  • Does not apply to brute animals

Motus (Motion in Strict Sense)

  • Act of what is imperfect—what exists in potency as such
  • By definition incomplete and successive
  • Always in time

Operatio (Operation)

  • Act of what is perfect—what exists in act
  • Not successive; totum simul (all at once)
  • Not in time per se

Titsia, Exultatio, Iocunditas

  • Various effects or manifestations of joy/pleasure
  • Titsia: named from dilation of the heart
  • Exultatio: outward signs of interior pleasure bursting forth
  • Iocunditas: special effects or signs of joy (used in liturgy and Scripture)

Examples & Illustrations #

Time and Pleasure #

  • Mozart After Years: Learning to appreciate Mozart through repeated listening shows that rational pleasure grows; initial sensory pleasure fades
  • Steakhouse Conversation: When told “we’re having steak tonight,” the cat seems to understand—yet this is pleasure, not joy, because the cat lacks rational apprehension
  • Beatific Vision: No fatigue, no passage of time, no temptation to return to body or seek change—partaking of eternity itself

Motion vs. Operation #

  • Walking Home: While walking, I have not yet walked home (incomplete motion). When I’ve walked home, I’m no longer walking home. The motion is over when complete
  • Hearing Mozart: When I’m hearing Mozart, I have already heard (it)—the operation is complete within itself
  • Understanding a Square: When understanding what a square is, one has already understood it. The operation includes its completion

Spiritual vs. Bodily Pleasure #

  • Thanksgiving Excess: People eat too much, become uncomfortable, cannot sleep. Bodily pleasure diminishes quickly
  • Novel Reading: One can read a novel for three or four hours sitting down; the imagination sustains engagement longer than bodily appetite
  • Philosophy vs. Food: One tires quickly after eating a fine meal; one can contemplate for hours without similar fatigue
  • Cooking vs. Raw Consumption: Humans cook, season, and prepare food with reason; cats eat mice raw. Human pleasure is refined through intellect

Examples of Joy vs. Pleasure #

  • Favorite Food: One might say “I’m pleased” about steak or apple pie, but would not naturally say “I have joy” in eating
  • Understanding God: “Seeing God face-to-face”—this is joy, not mere pleasure, because it is rational apprehension of the highest good
  • Pope’s Election: Berquist describes being “euphoric” when Pope Benedict XVI was elected—this was joy, not pleasure, because it involved rational apprehension of a significant spiritual good
  • Truth: Augustine says beatitude is “gaudium de veritate” (joy in truth), not delectatio in pleasure

Human Pleasures as Middle Ground #

  • Fine Arts: Music, poetry, visual art are neither brute sensory pleasure nor pure intellection. They engage imagination and reason together
  • Shakespeare: Reading Shakespeare requires intellectual work and reason; it is a rational pleasure but not purely contemplative
  • Mirth vs. Merriment: Mirth names the inner passion; merriment the outward signs. The fine arts engage both inner and outer dimensions

Notable Quotes #

“For pleasure is in the good now obtained, which is as the term or limit or end of the motion.”

“So there won’t be any before and after in the beatific vision… you’re partaking of eternal life.”

“Tom says, well, never be bored. You can never make the mistake of thinking you’d better go back to the body.”

“Miserable the man who knows all the things but not God; blessed the man who knows God and if he knows nothing else.”

“The pleasures of the fine arts are too high for the beasts and too low for the angels, but they’re the human pleasures.”

“No man can live without pleasure; so if you don’t appreciate the higher pleasures, you’re going to go to excess in the lower pleasures.”

“When I’m seeing you, have I seen you yet? Yes. But when I’m walking home, have I walked home yet? No.”

Questions Addressed #

Is Pleasure in Time? #

  • Question: If pleasure is a motion, and motion is in time, then pleasure must be in time. But doesn’t it seem to transcend time?
  • Answer: Pleasure is not motion in the strict sense but the perfection following motion (the resting in the good obtained). It is not in time per se. If the good obtained is subject to change, pleasure is in time per accidens. The beatific vision, being eternal and unchanging, is not in time at all—neither per se nor per accidens.

How Do Joy and Pleasure Differ When They Share the Same Object? #

  • Question: Both joy and pleasure have the good obtained as their object. How can they be different passions?
  • Answer: The diversity of knowledge (how the good is apprehended) pertains to diversity of object as known. Joy involves rational apprehension; pleasure can be merely sensory. Additionally, the motion underlying them differs: concupiscence (bodily desire) underlies pleasure; intellectual desire underlies joy.

Why Do We Not Attribute Joy to Animals? #

  • Question: If joy and pleasure are so similar, why not speak of a cat experiencing joy?
  • Answer: Joy requires rational apprehension of a good. Animals lack reason, so their pleasures remain sensory and bodily. We attribute to animals only what they can possess: pleasure in eating, comfort, etc. Joy belongs exclusively to rational natures.

Can Spiritual Pleasure Ever Bore Us? #

  • Question: After infinite time in the beatific vision, won’t we grow bored and want to return to change and novelty?
  • Answer: No, because in eternity there is no before and after, no succession, no weariness. One’s intellect is so enlightened that no mistake is possible, and no fatigue occurs. One cannot wish to return to the changeable body because one sees (contemplates) the highest good perfectly and eternally.