100. Pain, Sadness, and Their Contrariety to Pleasure

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Distinction Between Pain and Sadness #

• Pain (dolor): More commonly refers to bodily pain; caused by exterior apprehension (external senses); limited to present evil; follows primarily from the sense of touch
• Sadness (tristitia): More spiritual; caused by interior apprehension (imagination or intellect); can concern past, present, or future; follows from all senses
• Augustine distinguishes them: pain is said of bodily things (“dolor in corporibus dicitur”), while sadness is said more of the soul
• Sadness is technically a species of pain—pain is the universal genus, sadness names the interior kind specifically

Interior vs. Exterior Apprehension #

• Exterior apprehension: Through external senses; perceives only what is present here and now
• Interior apprehension: Through imagination or intellect; can perceive present, past, and future
• Whatever falls under exterior grasping also falls under interior grasping, but not vice versa
• Interior apprehension extends to more objects than exterior apprehension

Pleasure and Pain as Universal Terms #

• Pleasure: Universal term for all positive emotional responses from any apprehension
• Joy (gaudium): Specific term for pleasure arising from interior apprehension
• Pain: Universal term for all negative emotional responses
• Sadness: Specific term for pain arising from interior apprehension
• The same word sometimes names both the genus and one species (e.g., “pain” for both the universal and the bodily specific kind)

Contrariety and Form #

• Contrariety is a difference according to form (secundum formam)
• For passions and emotions, the form or species is taken from their object or end
• Pleasure and sadness are contrary because their objects are contrary: a present good (pleasure) versus a present evil (sadness)

Key Arguments #

Article 2: Is Sadness Distinct from Pain? #

Objections presented:

• Augustine says pain is in the body; sadness is in the soul
• Pain concerns only present evil; sadness concerns past (penance) and future (anxiety)
• Pain follows only from touch; sadness follows from all senses

Thomas’s Response:

• The distinction is one of interior vs. exterior apprehension, not body vs. soul
• Both pain and sadness exist in the soul, though pain’s cause may originate in bodily harm
• Exterior sense perceives only present; interior knowing power perceives present, past, and future
• Therefore sadness, naming interior pain, can concern temporal objects beyond the present
• Sadness is a species of pain; both are passions in the soul

Article 3: Is Pain Contrary to Pleasure? #

Objections raised:

• One contrary cannot be the cause of another, yet sadness causes pleasure (Matthew 5: “Blessed are those who mourn… they shall be consoled”)
• One contrary cannot denominate the other, yet pain in spectacles is pleasant (Augustine: people enjoy crying in tragedies)
• One contrary cannot be matter of another, yet in penance one rejoices in one’s sorrow

Thomas’s Response:

• Sadness can be a per accidens (accidental) cause of pleasure, not a per se (essential) cause
• Sadness causes pleasure vehemently in seeking a remedy (thirst makes drinking more pleasant)
• Sadness can cause pleasure because one willingly undergoes it to attain future pleasure
• Pain itself can be pleasant insofar as it has wonder joined to it (in spectacles/tragedies)
• Pain can be pleasant insofar as it makes one recall what is loved (parting is sweet sorrow because it shows love)
• The will and reason can reflect on their own acts; sadness becomes matter for pleasure when taken under the aspect of good
• Example: Rejoicing that one is sad about sin shows the will’s right orientation

Important Definitions #

Key Terms #

• Dolor (pain): Universal term for negative emotional response; more commonly used of bodily pains
• Tristitia (sadness): Interior pain; negative emotional response from interior apprehension
• Gaudium (joy): Pleasure from interior apprehension; properly spiritual
• Delectatio/Delectatio (pleasure/delight): Universal term for positive emotional response
• Apprehensio (apprehension): Grasping or knowing; can be exterior (through senses) or interior (through imagination/intellect)
• Contrariety (contrarietate): Difference according to form; passions are contrary when their objects are contrary
• Laetitia: Joy or exultation of the will in agreement with things willed
• Homonymia (ὁμωνυμία): Greek term for equivocation; having the same name (used by Aristotle in Categories)
• Sunanuma (συνώνυμος): Greek term for univocal naming; named together
• Per accidens: By accident or incidentally (not per se/by essence)

Examples & Illustrations #

Interior vs. Exterior Apprehension #

• Exterior pleasure: Hearing Mozart’s music directly; seeing a painting
• Interior pleasure/joy: Remembering Mozart’s music; contemplating God; understanding an idea
• Animal vs. human pleasure: A cat hears a scratch and responds (exterior, seeking food), but does not rejoice in the sound itself; humans alone can delight in sensible objects (music, painting) for their own sake
• Sensibles of touch: Both disproportionate to the knowing power AND contrary to nature itself (excessive heat or cold kills)
• Sensibles of other senses: Disproportionate to knowing power but not contrary to nature except insofar as they relate to touch

Sweet Sorrow and Pleasant Pain #

• Romeo and Juliet: “Parting is such sweet sorrow”—the sorrow shows love; recognition of love is pleasant
• Tragedy and spectacles: Weeping in tragedy is pleasant because it involves wonder at the downfall of a great man (Othello, Antigone, Oedipus)
• Penance: One grieves over sin (sadness) yet rejoices in this sorrow because it shows right will and merits eternal consolation
• The thirsty man: Sadness of thirst makes the pleasure of drinking more vehement
• Personal example: As a high school student on a draft team, Berquist found more pleasure running eight miles in the sun with friends than walking one mile to the store alone

Equivocation in Naming #

• The word “man”: Equivocally applied to a real man and a statue of a man (different essences, same name)
• The word “animal”: Univocally applied to dog and cat (same essence, same sense)
• The word “Richard”: Equivocally applied by chance when two people are named Richard (independent naming, no reason connecting them)
• The word “pain” and “sadness”: Pain is used both universally (genus) and specifically (bodily pain); sadness names the interior species; they are not named together

Reason’s Temporal Perception #

• A man’s reason says not to drink wine because of future harm, but appetite desires present pleasure
• Reason perceives before and after; imagination and intellect form thoughts and images of absent objects
• Example from students: confusion between idea (a thought) and image in English philosophical language

Questions Addressed #

Q1: Is Sadness the Same as Pain? #

A: No, but sadness is a species of pain. Pain is the universal term applying to negative emotional responses from any apprehension. Sadness specifically names pain arising from interior apprehension (imagination or intellect). The distinction parallels pleasure (universal) and joy (from interior apprehension).

Q2: Why Does Augustine Distinguish Bodily Pain from Spiritual Sadness? #

A: Because pain is more commonly known and spoken of in relation to bodily things, though the basis for the distinction is interior vs. exterior apprehension, not body vs. soul. Both emotions are in the soul; both can be called pain in the universal sense.

Q3: Can Sadness Cause Pleasure? #

A: Yes, but per accidens (accidentally), not per se. Sadness causes pleasure by making one seek remedy more vehemently (thirst makes drinking more pleasant), or by making one willing to undergo sadness to attain future pleasure. Pain in spectacles becomes pleasant through wonder or through recognition of love it signifies.

Q4: Is Pain Properly Contrary to Pleasure? #

A: Yes, according to genus. Both are passions, and one pursues good while the other flees evil. However, the contrariety between specific pains and pleasures depends on their objects—only when objects are the same or contrary are the passions contrary in species.