101. Pleasure, Sadness, and Contrariety in the Passions

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Contrariety and Form #

• Contrariety is a difference according to form (φορμή/forma)
• Form can be both universal/general and special/particular
• Some things are contrary according to the form of the genus (e.g., virtue and vice)
• Other things are contrary according to the form of the species (e.g., justice and injustice)
• Example: Cowardice and temperance are opposed according to genus (virtue vs. vice) but not according to species

Absolute vs. Relative Specification of Things #

• Absolutely specified things: Substances and qualities receive their species from absolute forms

  • Example: Dog, cat, white, black
  • Species within contrary genera are not necessarily contrary according to species
  • Example: Intemperance (vice) and justice (virtue) are both contrary in genus but not in species; rather, intemperance is contrary to temperance

• Relatively specified things: Passions and motions receive their species from their objects/ends (ἀδ ἀλιεϊδ/ad aliquid)

  • Objects can relate to each other in different ways
  • When objects are the same: species are contrary according to species
  • When objects are diverse but not opposed: species are disparate
  • When objects are contrary: species have affinity and agreement rather than contrariety

The Distinction in Contradictories vs. Contraries #

• In affirmation and negation of the same thing (contradictories): white and not-white have true opposition
• In affirmation of one opposite and negation of another: black and not-white have agreement/similitude
• This principle extends to emotions relative to their objects

Pleasure and Sadness as Passions #

• Both are passions of the soul (πάθη/pathos)

• According to genus, they have contrariety because:

  • Pleasure pertains to pursuit (pursuit in the appetite)
  • Sadness pertains to flight (flight in the appetite)
  • These relate like affirmation and negation in the reason (yes/no)

• Therefore:

  • Pleasure and sadness about the same object: contrary according to species
  • Pleasure and sadness about diverse objects (not opposed): disparate, not contrary
  • Pleasure and sadness about diverse contrary objects: have affinity/agreement, not contrariety
  • Example: Rejoicing about good and sadness about evil have affinity to each other

Reason and the Perception of Distinctions #

• Reason (λόγος/ratio) is the ability to perceive “before and after” (πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον/prius et posterius)
• Before and after require a distinction: nothing can be before or after itself
• Example: Today can be before tomorrow and after yesterday, but not before/after itself
• Therefore, reason must necessarily see distinction before it can perceive before and after
• Corollary: Reason enables perception of divisions and definitions, which involve distinctions

Key Arguments #

The Question: Does Every Sadness Oppose Every Pleasure? #

Initial Objection (faulty reasoning):

• Whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color
• Whiteness and blackness are universally opposed
• Therefore, pleasure and sadness (being contrary species of passion) should be universally opposed

Counter-argument (from Scripture and experience):

• From Romans 12:15: Charity causes one to rejoice with those rejoicing AND weep with those weeping
• Therefore, not every sadness is contrary to every pleasure
• From the same habit (charity), both joy and sorrow come forth about different objects

Thomistic Solution:

1. Whiteness and blackness have their species from absolute forms (qualities), not from external relation
2. Pleasure and sadness, being passions, have their species from their objects (ad aliquid/relative specification)
3. Because passions depend on objects for their specification, and objects can relate in multiple ways, the opposition between pleasure and sadness varies
4. This is why the initial objection fails: it overlooks the fundamental difference in how absolute qualities vs. passions are specified

The Question: Is Every Pleasure a Medicine Against Every Sadness? #

Objection:

• Medicines work through contraries
• A parent gives ice cream to a lost child to calm him
• Pleasure is a medicine against sadness
• Therefore, every pleasure should be contrary to every sadness

Response:

• Genus is taken from matter (as in the Eighth Book of the Metaphysics)
• For accidents, the subject takes the place of matter
• Pleasure and sadness are contrary according to genus, not necessarily according to species
• In every pleasure: the appetite accepts that which it has
• In every sadness: the appetite flees from that which it has
• On the side of the subject’s disposition, every pleasure is a medicine against every sadness
• But this operates at the level of genus/subject-disposition, not necessarily at the level of species

Important Definitions #

• Contrariety (contrarietascontrarium): The farthest apart forms within the same genus; there can only be two ultimate contraries, like the two endpoints of a line
• Form (forma): Can be either absolute (not dependent on relation) or relative (specified in relation to something external)
• Ad aliquid (ἀδ ἀλιεϊδ): Towards-another; relative specification; species determined by relation to an external object
• Πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον (prius et posterius / before and after): A fundamental distinction that presupposes the perception of non-identity
• Passions (πάθη/passiones): Emotions of the sense appetite that involve some defect or molesting, specified by their objects
• Genus (genus): The more general form that can contain contrary species; in accidents, analogous to matter

Examples & Illustrations #

From Shakespeare #

• Henry V, Act II, Scene III: The Hostess describes Falstaff’s death: “his nose was as sharp as a pen” - Theobald’s emendation from “a table of green fields” to “a babble o’ green fields”
• Henry IV, Part One: Prince Hal observing a man (possibly Falstaff) who has lost his horse: “if it’s not for laughing, I should pity him” - illustrating how laughter (joy) can eliminate pity (sadness) in relation to the same event

From Homer’s Iliad #

• Book III, line 109: Hector speaks of the elder man among warriors who “looks behind him and in front” (ὀπίσσω τε προσσέ τε ἰδού/opissō te prosse te idoú) - showing the perception of before and after

  • Context: Hector proposes that either Alexander or Menelaus should fight to determine Troy’s fate
  • The elder (Priam or observer) who looks before and after can judge more wisely than the young, who are frivolous in their wits

• Book XVIII, line 250: Patroclus is described as the one who “alone of them looked before and behind him” (ὀπίσσω τε προσσέ τε ἰδού)

  • Context: Patroclus urges the Trojans to retreat inside the city walls after the appearance of Achilles
  • His ability to perceive past and future makes him prudent, while Hector’s pride causes him to overrule the cautious advice

Theobald’s Editorial Achievement #

• The emendation of “table” to “babble” in the Falstaff death scene is praised as “the happiest emendation in all literature”
• White (editor): “the most felicitous, conjectural emendation ever made of Shakespeare’s text”
• New Hudson Shakespeare: “perhaps the happiest emendation in all literature”
• Kittredge: “a stroke of genius”
• The emendation is justified by the preceding phrase “play with flowers,” which suggests babbling (chattering) rather than a table

The Connection Between Homer and Shakespeare #

• Both poets use the phrase “looking before and after” to characterize wisdom and reason
• Homer uses it of warriors (Hector, Patroclus) who can perceive temporal relationships and judge accordingly
• Shakespeare uses it to define reason itself in Hamlet’s soliloquy as the distinguishing faculty of mankind
• This demonstrates that both great poets recognized the same essential feature of human reason: the perception of temporal relations

Notable Quotes #

“For from charity, it happens that one rejoices with those rejoicing and weeps with those weeping, as is said in Romans 12, 15.” — Aquinas, discussing how the same habit can produce both joy and sadness about different objects

“Such latitude of comprehension, such power of reviewing the past and anticipating the future.” — Samuel Johnson’s paraphrase of Shakespeare’s “large discourse, looking before and after,” highlighting the temporal dimension of reason

“Looking before and after is an expression purely Homeric.” — Lewis Theobald, noting the connection between Shakespeare’s phrase and Homer’s Iliad

“He looks behind him and in front.” — Homer, Iliad III.109, of the wise elder who perceives temporal relationships

Questions Addressed #

Primary Question: Whether Every Sadness Is Contrary to Every Pleasure #

Resolution: No. Sadness and pleasure are contrary according to their genus (one in pursuit, one in flight), but their contrariety according to species depends on the objects:

• Same object: Contrary according to species (e.g., pleasure and sadness about the same event)
• Diverse, non-opposed objects: Disparate, not contrary (e.g., sadness about a friend’s death and pleasure in contemplation)
• Diverse, contrary objects: Have affinity/agreement, not contrariety (e.g., joy about good and sadness about evil come from the same source and relate similarly to their contrary objects)

Secondary Questions Explored #

1. Why does the whiteness/blackness analogy fail?

   • Whiteness and blackness are absolutely specified (as qualities); pleasure and sadness are relatively specified (from their objects)
   • Since their objects can have different relationships, the passions cannot have the same universal opposition as colors

2. How can pleasure be medicine against sadness if not every pleasure opposes every sadness?

   • At the level of genus and subject-disposition, every pleasure does oppose every sadness
   • But at the level of species, only pleasure about the contrary object provides the medicine
   • Example: Ice cream soothes a lost child by providing contrary pleasure regarding the disposition of the subject

3. What is the philosophical significance of “before and after”?

   • Before and after requires non-identity (nothing is before/after itself)
   • Therefore, reason (which perceives before and after) necessarily perceives distinction
   • This makes reason the faculty of perceiving divisions and definitions—the fundamental distinguishing power of the intellect