Lecture 102

102. Sadness and Contemplation: Articles 5-6

Summary
This lecture examines whether sadness is opposed to the pleasure of contemplation (Article 5) and whether pain should be fled more than pleasure desired (Article 6). Berquist explores the distinction between contemplation as cause versus object of pleasure, the immateriality of intellectual knowledge, and the fundamental principle that what is per se is stronger than what is per accidens. The lecture demonstrates how the mind’s lack of bodily organs allows contemplative pleasure to avoid certain impediments that affect sensory pleasures.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Article 5: Is Sadness Opposed to Contemplative Pleasure? #

The Question: Can sadness be truly contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?

Key Distinction: Thomas distinguishes two ways to understand delectatio contemplationis (pleasure of contemplation):

  • First way: Contemplation is the cause of pleasure, not the object. The pleasure is about the thing contemplated, not about contemplation itself. In this sense, sadness can be contrary (e.g., contemplating something harmful causes sadness).
  • Second way: Contemplation is both the object and the cause of pleasure—when one delights in the very act of contemplating itself. In this sense, no sadness is contrary to it per se.

The Critical Principle: To the object of contemplation, nothing is contrary, because “the reasons, definitions of contraries, according as they are apprehended, are not contrary. But one contrary is the reason of knowing the other.”

This means: knowledge of virtue helps us know vice; they are not contrary in the mind as they are in matter. The mind is immaterial and does not exclude contraries as bodily things exclude each other (health excludes sickness in the body, but knowing beauty helps knowing ugliness in the mind).

Why Interior Pleasure Avoids Sadness: The mind (mens) has no bodily organ, so it avoids:

  • Bitterness from contrary sensible objects (like bitter taste)
  • Weariness from continuous activity (like sensory fatigue)

However, sadness may be joined to contemplation per accidens (incidentally) through:

  1. Impediment to contemplation itself (causing sadness about not understanding)
  2. Bodily weariness affecting the sensory powers the mind uses

But these are not per se contrary to contemplative pleasure.

Article 6: Should Pain Be Fled More Than Pleasure Desired? #

The Question: Is the flight from sadness stronger than the desire for pleasure?

Per Se Answer: No. Pleasure should be desired more strongly because:

  • The good (object of pleasure) is desired for itself (per se)
  • The bad (object of sadness) is fled from only as a lack of good (per accidens)
  • Fundamental principle: “What is per se is stronger than what is per accidens” (quod per se, potius est quam quod per accidens)

Evidence from Natural Motion: Natural motion intensifies as it approaches its proper term (a stone falls faster as it nears the ground). This shows that nature tends more strongly toward what is suitable than it flees from what is contrary.

Per Accidens Qualifications: However, pain may be fled more than pleasure is desired per accidens due to three factors:

  1. Apprehension/Sensation: Need produces a stronger sensation of love. Sadness from loss of a loved good is more acutely felt than pleasure from acquiring it.
  2. The Cause: Bodily integrity (health) is more loved than bodily pleasure (food). Thus fear of whipping (contrary to integrity) causes flight from food’s pleasure.
  3. Universal Effect: Sadness impedes all pleasures, not just one. Interior pain prevents enjoyment of anything.

Appetitive vs. Sensory Motion:

  • Appetitive motion is from within (from soul to things) and tends more strongly toward the good per se
  • Sensory motion is from without (from things to soul) and is more intensified by contrary stimuli

Key Arguments #

On Contemplation and Sadness (Article 5) #

Objection: Sadness according to God works penance (2 Corinthians). Contemplation pertains to higher reason. Therefore sadness opposes contemplative pleasure.

Response:

  • Sadness secundum Deum is about sin (an object contemplated), not about contemplation itself
  • The reasons of contraries in the mind are not contrary; rather, knowing one helps know the other
  • Therefore, sadness cannot be per se contrary to pleasure in contemplation

Scriptural Authority: Wisdom 8:16 states wisdom “has no bitterness nor weariness, but laetitia [joy].”

On Pain vs. Pleasure (Article 6) #

Objection: Augustine says no one flees pain more than they desire pleasure (natural consensus = natural law).

Response:

  • Per se: pleasure is desired more strongly because the good is stronger than the bad
  • The bad has power only through the good; it has no independent force
  • Per accidens: pain may be fled more due to stronger sensation of need, greater importance of threatened good, or universal impediment to all pleasures

Example: A soldier voluntarily undergoes bodily pain to avoid interior sadness about lost honor or life itself.

Important Definitions #

Per Se vs. Per Accidens #

  • Per se (per se): Through itself; what belongs to something by its own nature and essential character
  • Per accidens (per accidens): Through another; what belongs incidentally or accidentally
  • Principle: What is per se is always stronger, prior, and more knowable than what is per accidens
  • Example: Salt is salty per se; sweetened coffee is sweet per accidens (through the sugar)

Sadness/Sorrow (Tristitia) #

  • Interior pain caused by apprehension of a present evil
  • Object: one’s own evil (as opposed to envy or mercy, which concern another’s good or evil)
  • Differs from bodily pain (dolor), which follows exterior sense, especially touch

Contemplation (Contemplatio) #

  • Perfect operation of the intellect on true things
  • Does not involve generation or coming-to-be, but actualization of what already is
  • Can be found even in God, indicating its perfection

Examples & Illustrations #

On Contemplation and the Mind #

  • A student reading philosophy gets tired and looks at a beautiful painting to refresh the imagination (which is the slave of reason and has a bodily organ)
  • The mind has no bodily organ, so it avoids the bitterness and weariness that affect sensory activity

On Pain vs. Pleasure #

  • A young man endures physical hardship on a track team because the pleasure of friendship (a greater loved good) outweighs bodily fatigue
  • Thirst-quenching: the first sip of beer provides the greatest pleasure because it satisfies urgent need

On Natural Motion #

  • A stone falls faster and faster as it approaches the ground (its natural term)
  • Violent motion (throwing a stone upward) is fastest at the beginning and slows as it opposes nature

On Intellectual Knowledge #

  • Understanding Mozart’s music cannot be shared with animals (unlike sensory pleasure)
  • The knowledge of virtue contributes to understanding vice; they are not mutually exclusive in the mind

Notable Quotes #

“The good is stronger than the bad. Because the bad has power only through the good.” — Thomas Aquinas

“What is per se is always more so than what is per accidens.” — Principle cited from Aristotle

“To the object of contemplation, nothing is contrary. For the reasons, definitions of contraries, according as they are apprehended, are not contrary. But one contrary is the reason of knowing the other.” — Thomas Aquinas

“The contemplation of mind has neither bitterness nor weariness.” — Thomas Aquinas (citing authority)

“The knowledge of contraries is one knowledge.” — Plato and Aristotle, emphasized throughout

Questions Addressed #

Article 5: Is Sadness Opposed to Contemplative Pleasure? #

Question: Can sadness be truly contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?

Answer: No, per se. When contemplation is itself the object of pleasure (delighting in the act of understanding), no sadness is per se contrary to it because the mind has no bodily organ and contemplative objects (definitions of contraries) are not contrary in the intellect. However, sadness may join contemplation per accidens through bodily weariness or impediment to understanding, and sadness may be contrary when the object contemplated is evil (first sense of delectatio contemplationis). But the pleasure of contemplation itself—as a perfect operation—carries no intrinsic sadness.

Article 6: Should Pain Be Fled More Than Pleasure Desired? #

Question: Is the flight from pain stronger than the desire for pleasure?

Answer: Per se, no—pleasure should be desired more strongly because the good is intrinsically stronger than the bad. The bad has power only insofar as it represents a lack of good. However, per accidens, pain may be fled more strongly due to: (1) stronger sensation produced by need and loss, (2) greater importance of what is threatened (bodily integrity more loved than food), and (3) the fact that sadness impedes all pleasures universally, not just one.