105. The Causes of Sadness: Evil, Desire, and Unity

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

The Evil Joined vs. The Good Lost #

Thomas argues that the bad (evil) joined to one is the more proper cause of sadness than the loss of good. Sadness, as a motion of the appetitive power, per se regards the evil joined—a motion of flight or recoil from what is contrary to desire. The good lost causes sadness only insofar as it is apprehended as something bad. This reflects the principle that what is per se (intrinsically related) is more fundamental than what is per alia (through another).

The Principle of Per Se vs. Per Alia #

What is per se is always more fundamental and prior to what is per alia. In sadness: the evil joined is per se the object; the loss of good is per alia (only causes sadness through apprehension as bad). In natural motion: a heavy body per se tends downward; it per alia withdraws from above (as consequence). This principle applies across all causal analysis.

Concupiscence (Desire) as a Cause #

Concupiscence properly causes sadness when impeded or prolonged, delaying attainment of the desired good. However, love is the more fundamental cause—desire follows from love of the good. Augustine sometimes uses “concupiscence” to mean love itself, making love the universal cause underlying all emotions. The impediment to motion is contrary to the motion itself, and what opposes appetitive motion is saddening.

The Desire for Unity as a Cause #

The good of each thing consists in a certain unity—the unity of elements that constitute its perfection. Therefore, the desire for unity (insofar as it perfects the thing) causes sadness when prevented. However, not all union is perfective; only that which genuinely constitutes the thing’s perfection. Separation from harmful things is pleasant because it removes impediments to perfection.

Greater Power as a Cause #

A power greater than one’s own can impose something contrary to one’s inclination, causing sadness. Sadness requires resistance: the appetite must still incline toward the contrary while the greater power opposes it. If the greater power changes the appetite’s inclination entirely, sadness no longer follows. The greater power acts according to its actuality (not merely its potentiality) to cause the evil joined.

Key Arguments #

Argument 1: The Per Se Object of Sadness #

Question: Is the evil joined or the good lost the more proper cause of sadness?

Objection: The good lost seems greater since sadness opposes pleasure, and pleasure concerns the good.

Thomas’s Response:

• The bad is the privation of good; in reality they are the same thing
• In apprehension, privation has the character of a “being of reason” (ens rationis)
• Sadness follows upon apprehension as a motion of flight/recoil
• Per se, sadness flees the evil joined, just as pleasure per se regards the good obtained
• The good lost is per alia a cause, only through apprehension as something bad
• Analogy: Heavy body per se tends downward; per alia withdraws from above

Argument 2: Concupiscence as Cause of Sadness #

Question: How can desire (about the future good) cause sadness (about the present bad)?

Objection: Concupiscence regards the good (future), not the bad (present), so cannot cause sadness.

Thomas’s Response:

• Love is the first inclination of appetite to the good
• Concupiscence is a first effect of love
• Augustine uses “concupiscence” sometimes to mean love itself, making love the universal cause
• Properly speaking, concupiscence causes sadness when impeded or prolonged
• The impediment to motion opposes the motion and is therefore saddening
• Thirst can cause pain when delayed; unrequited love causes suffering

Argument 3: The Desire for Unity #

Question: Can the desire for unity be the cause of sadness?

Objection: Not all union is desirable (e.g., overeating causes sadness, not joy).

Thomas’s Response:

• The good of each thing consists in the unity of its perfective elements
• The desire for perfective unity is therefore a cause of sadness when prevented
• Not every union perfects; only that from which the thing’s perfection depends
• Separation from harmful things is pleasant as it removes impediments to perfection
• The Platonists identified the One itself with the Good

Argument 4: Greater Power as Cause #

Question: How can a greater power cause present pain when it is not yet present?

Objection: Pain regards a present evil, but a greater power is future.

Thomas’s Response:

• The greater power acts according to its actuality (not mere potentiality) in imposing the evil
• Sadness requires resistance: the appetite must still incline toward the contrary
• If the greater power entirely changes the appetite’s inclination, sadness ceases
• Example: A sailor forced to hear loud music cannot escape it and is saddened by resistance to the imposed evil

Important Definitions #

Sadness (Dolor/Tristitia): A motion of the appetitive power in recoil from or flight away from an evil joined to one; per se regards a present evil rather than a lost good.

Concupiscence (Cupiditas): Properly, the desire or wanting for a good that is absent; sometimes used by Augustine to mean love itself, making it universal to all emotional motions.

Per Se vs. Per Alia: Per se means intrinsically and directly related; per alia means indirectly or through another. The per se cause is always more fundamental. Example: The evil joined is per se the object of sadness; the loss of good is per alia (only through apprehension as bad).

Being of Reason (Ens Rationis): Something having being only in the mind, not in external reality. Example: The loss or privation of good has no being in reality but has being in apprehension and reason.

Perfective Unity: Not all union perfects a thing; only that unity which genuinely constitutes the thing’s perfection. Separation from what opposes perfection is therefore pleasant.

Examples & Illustrations #

Election Depression: People saddened by an election outcome imagine their situation in a certain way. This interior apprehension causes sadness through reason and imagination, not exterior bodily injury.

The Lottery Winner: A man wins a massive lottery. Once he sees the numbers confirmed, he possesses the money in a sense through apprehension and certainty, even before collecting it. This shows how what is desired can be “present” through hope, causing joy rather than sadness.

Separation from Harmful Things: Father Boulaye at a restaurant sends money to the band to stop playing horrible music. The separation from the bad music is pleasant because it removes what opposes the perfection of the dining experience.

Unrequited Love and Thirst: Prolonged thirst causes pain. Similarly, the pains of unrequited love come from desire that is impeded—the good desired is absent and unattainable, causing sadness through the impediment to motion.

The Loud Music in the Navy: A sailor in the Navy hears loud music all night long; unable to escape it, he even sleeps in the shop where he works. An exterior power imposed against his inclination causes sadness through his resistance to the imposed evil.

Friendship and Another’s Good Fortune: A roommate gets a good job or attractive partner. If you are envious (sad about their good fortune), this destroys friendship. True friendship requires rejoicing in the good that happens to your friend, not being saddened by it.

Notable Quotes #

“Every plague is the sadness of the heart, and all malice, the iniquity of a woman.” — Ecclesiasticus 25 (cited by Thomas Aquinas)

“Nothing is good or bad, but thinking makes it so.” — Hamlet (cited by Berquist to illustrate how interior apprehension affects sadness)

“A will resisting a greater power makes pain.” — Augustine (cited by Thomas on how resistance generates sadness)

“The good of each thing consists in a certain unity.” — Thomas Aquinas (reflecting Platonic philosophy)

Questions Addressed #

Q1: What is the primary cause of sadness—the evil joined or the good lost? A: The evil joined is the more proper cause because sadness per se is a motion of flight/recoil. The good lost causes sadness only per alia, through apprehension as something bad.

Q2: How can desire (about future good) cause sadness? A: When desire is impeded or prolonged, it delays attainment of the desired good. The impediment opposes the motion itself and is therefore saddening.

Q3: Can the desire for unity be a cause of sadness? A: Yes, insofar as unity perfects the thing. Sadness arises when perfective unity is prevented. However, not all union perfects; only that which constitutes the thing’s genuine perfection.

Q4: How does a greater power cause sadness? A: By imposing something contrary to the appetite’s inclination. Sadness requires resistance—the appetite must still incline toward the contrary. If the greater power changes the inclination entirely, sadness ceases.