111. Hope, Desire, and the Irascible Appetite

Subscribe in Podcast App | Download Transcript

Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Hope vs. Desire (Cupidity) #

• Augustine sometimes uses “cupidity” where Thomas uses “hope,” creating apparent conflation
• Both concern future goods, but they differ fundamentally in structure
• Desire (cupiditas) concerns any future good absolutely
• Hope concerns a future good that is difficult (arduous) to obtain
• This difference makes hope proper to the irascible appetite, not the concupiscible
• The key distinction: hope requires the condition of arduousness/difficulty

Four Conditions of Hope’s Object #

For something to be properly an object of hope:

1. It must be good (distinguishes hope from fear, which concerns evil)
2. It must be future (distinguishes hope from joy, which concerns present good)
3. It must be difficult/arduous (distinguishes hope from desire, which concerns any future good)
4. It must be possible to obtain (distinguishes hope from despair, which concerns the impossible)

The Irascible vs. Concupiscible Appetites #

• Both are appetitive powers, but they differ by their objects
• The concupiscible (ἐπιθυμία/epithumia) concerns good and evil absolutely
• The irascible (θυμός/thumos) concerns what is difficult/arduous and its overcoming
• The irascible presupposes the concupiscible: one must first desire something good before hoping to obtain it despite difficulty
• This explains why passions of the irascible (hope, despair, fear, boldness, anger) presuppose passions of the concupiscible (joy, sadness, love, hate, desire, aversion)

Passion Distinguished from Action #

• Thomas emphasizes the distinction between the motion of appetite and the action of knowledge
• Action of knowing power: perfected according to things known being in the knower
• Motion of appetite: constitutes an extension toward its object
• Hope is properly a motion of the appetitive power, not a knowing act
• However, the knowing power precedes hope by representing the object under diverse aspects (present/future, absolute/difficult, possible/impossible)

Expectation (Expectatio) and Confidence (Fiducia) #

• Hope sometimes manifests as expectatio (expectation/looking-for)
• Properly speaking, one “expects” (expectat) what one hopes to obtain through another’s power (per alienum virtutem)
• The etymology: ex + spectare (to look from/look for)
• Confidence (fiducia) is the appetitive emotion denominated from preceding knowledge
• One estimates oneself able to obtain something, and from this knowledge-based faith arises the appetitive motion called confidence
• Though denominated from knowledge, confidence remains an appetitive passion

Hope in Brute Animals #

• Objection: Animals lack intellectual knowledge of the future and cannot grasp possible/impossible as differences of true/false
• Thomas’s Resolution: Brute animals possess hope through natural instinct, moving toward distant goods “as if” foreseeing them
• The sensitive appetite of animals follows an apprehension that imitates understanding
• Natural things and animal instincts imitate the operations of art, just as art imitates nature
• Example: A dog seeing a distant bird does not move toward it (difficulty/impossibility perceived naturally), but seeing a nearby bird moves as if hoping to catch it (proximity/possibility)

Key Arguments #

Argument 1: Hope is Not Identical to Desire #

Objection (from Augustine): Both hope and cupidity regard a future good; therefore hope is the same as desire.

Counter-argument:

• Passions differ according to their objects
• The object of hope is not merely a future good (the object of desire) but a future good that is difficult yet possible
• Since objects are diverse, the passions must be diverse species
• Different powers possess different passions: hope in the irascible, desire in the concupiscible

Resolution: Augustine’s conflation occurs because goods not arduous are regarded as nothing, so cupidity seems to tend toward arduous goods. But this similarity masks a real distinction that Thomas establishes through the framework of appetitive powers.

Argument 2: Hope Pertains to the Desiring Power, Not the Knowing Power #

Objection: Hope seems to involve expectation and confidence, which appear to be acts of knowing.

Counter-argument:

• Hope implies an extending (extentio) of appetite toward its object
• The good as such is the object of the desiring power, not the knowing power
• Knowledge moves the desiring power by representing objects under different aspects
• From apprehension of a future good arise diverse motions of appetite (hope vs. desire vs. joy vs. sadness, depending on the aspect grasped)

Resolution: While the knowing power precedes and moves the desiring power, hope itself is a motion of appetite. The knowing power represents the object; the appetite responds according to the aspect under which it is represented.

Argument 3: Brute Animals Possess Hope Despite Lacking Intellectual Foresight #

Objection: Animals have only sense knowledge and cannot know the future or grasp the impossible; therefore they cannot hope.

Counter-argument:

• Interior passions of animals are apprehended from their exterior motions
• Natural instinct moves animals toward distant goods as if (quasi) foreseeing them
• The sensitive appetite follows an apprehension-like state that imitates intellection
• Just as natural things imitate art, animal instinct imitates the operations of intellect
• No explicit knowledge of “futurity” is required—only a natural inclination structured by instinct

Resolution: Hope in animals is real but operates through natural instinct rather than intellectual foresight. The instinct itself imitates what understanding does.

Important Definitions #

• Bonum Arduum: A good that is difficult to obtain; the characteristic proper object of hope, distinguishing hope from mere desire
• Irascible Appetite (θυμός/thumos): The power of appetite concerned with difficult things (ardua); presupposes and builds upon the concupiscible; includes five passions: hope, despair, fear, boldness, anger
• Concupiscible Appetite (ἐπιθυμία/epithumia): The power of appetite concerned with good and evil absolutely; includes six passions: love, hate, desire, aversion, joy, sadness
• Extentio: The extending or motion of appetite toward its object; characteristic of how appetitive powers operate (contrasted with how knowing powers operate)
• Expectatio: Properly, the looking-for or looking-out-for of what one hopes to obtain through another’s power; involves the knowing power preceding the appetitive motion
• Fiducia (Confidence): The appetitive emotion denominated from and following upon the preceding knowledge of one’s ability to obtain something
• Possible/Impossible: Not merely logical categories but aspects of objects that move the appetite differently; the possible moves hope, the impossible moves despair

Examples & Illustrations #

• Aristotle on Youth and Age: Young men are hopeful (easy to deceive); old men are cautious and fearful. This shows how hope differs from fear through its object (good vs. evil) and its characteristic relation to motion.

• The Dog and the Bird:

  • Seeing a distant bird: the dog does not move toward it (the difficulty/distance makes obtaining it appear impossible, so no hope)
  • Seeing a nearby bird: the dog moves as if hoping to catch it (proximity makes obtaining it appear possible, so hope arises)
  • This illustrates how the aspect of possibility/impossibility naturally moves animal appetite

• Dante’s Gate: “Abandon all hope, ye who enter here” (applied to hell) suggests that in hell, where good is absent, there is no hope. Conversely, in heaven where the good is possessed, one also “abandons hope”—not negatively, but because the condition of futurity/difficulty no longer applies.

• Water-Drinking Example: One does not hope to drink water when already holding a cup—there is no difficulty or futurity. The immediate accessibility to an easy good does not produce hope; it produces simple action.

• The Cat and the Birds: A cat observing birds at a distance does not attempt to reach them, but when birds come to a bird-bath with flowers nearby where she can hide, she moves with hope of obtaining them. The change is from perceived impossibility to perceived possibility.

Notable Quotes #

“Hope presupposes desire, just as all passions of the irascible presuppose passions of the concupiscible.”

“The species of passions are considered from their object…we know the soul through its powers, and the powers through their acts, and the acts through their object.”

“One is not said to hope something minimal, which is at once in his power.”

“Although brute animals do not know the future, nevertheless, from a natural instinct, the animals move towards something in the future as if it foresaw the future.”

Questions Addressed #

1. Is hope identical to desire? No. While both concern future goods, hope adds the essential conditions of difficulty and possibility, making it proper to the irascible appetite rather than the concupiscible.

2. Why did Augustine use “cupidity” instead of “hope”? Because both concern future goods, and because goods not arduous are regarded as nothing. Augustine’s conflation is understandable but masks the real distinction Thomas establishes through the framework of appetitive powers and their proper objects.

3. Does hope pertain to the knowing power or the desiring power? Hope pertains to the desiring power as a motion of appetite. However, the knowing power precedes hope by representing the object under various aspects (future, difficult, possible). The motion itself is appetitive; the representation is cognitive.

4. What is the difference between “hoping” and “expecting”? Properly speaking, one “hopes” what one can obtain through his own power, but “expects” (expectat) what one hopes to obtain through another’s power. Both are aspects of hope, but expectation particularly involves the knowing power’s representation preceding the appetite’s motion.

5. Do brute animals possess hope? Yes, through natural instinct. They move toward distant goods as if foreseeing them, guided by an instinct that naturally imitates the operations of intellect. The dog’s behavior toward a nearby vs. distant bird exemplifies this.