Lecture 121

121. Boldness and Courage: Analysis of Audacity in Danger

Summary
This lecture examines whether the bold are more prompt at the beginning of dangers or within dangers themselves, exploring the distinction between boldness as a sudden sense-judgment and courage as reasoned virtue. Berquist analyzes how boldness arises from hope, how anger provokes boldness, and why the bold may tremble at the outset while faltering in actual danger, contrasting this with the brave who deliberate carefully and persist through virtue. The lecture includes extended discussions on logical fallacies (secundum quid to simpliciter), the role of reason in moderating passions, and the philosophical importance of logic and careful reasoning in recognizing and avoiding errors.

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Article Four: Boldness and Danger #

Question: Are the bold more prompt at the beginning of dangers than in the dangers themselves?

Objection: The bold sometimes tremble in the beginning (as Aristotle notes in the Problems), which seems to indicate they are less prompt initially.

Response Structure: Thomas distinguishes between boldness as passion (following sudden sense-judgment) and courage as virtue (following reason’s deliberation).

Boldness vs. Courage: Two Different Approaches #

The Bold (Acting from Passion):

  • Follow sudden grasp of the imagination (subitum iudicium)
  • The sensory knowing power is not collective; it grasps things suddenly without considering all implications
  • Initially bold due to hope and underestimation of danger
  • May tremble at the beginning due to natural physiological response (heat withdrawing from exterior to interior)
  • Fail when unforeseen difficulties arise because they encounter something not predicted

The Brave/Courageous (Acting from Virtue):

  • Follow reason’s deliberation (ratio disgustat omnia)
  • Reason considers all things that bring difficulty to the action beforehand
  • May seem less passionate initially (remissius) because they approach with due deliberation, not sudden passion
  • Do not experience unforeseen events; what they encounter is often less than what they anticipated
  • Persist through virtue itself (ex bono virtutis ipsius), not merely through hope or passion

Causes of Boldness #

Passion-Based Causes:

  • Sudden sense-judgment: The imagination grasps without comprehensive analysis
  • Hope: Boldness presupposes hope of victory; when hope is exceeded by danger, boldness diminishes
  • Anger: When anger follows from injury, it provokes boldness (Aristotle: anger is audacious, protective of audacity)
  • Ignorance of danger: The inexperienced are bold because they don’t recognize true difficulty

Physiological Effect of Boldness:

  • Heat is called back to the heart
  • Distinguishable from fear: in fear, heat descends to lower parts (causes voiding of bowels)
  • Bold person may have white fear (pallor from internal heat withdrawal) while experiencing boldness

The Object of Boldness #

Composition of the Object:

  • The object of boldness is composed of good and bad
  • The good that makes danger worth facing (victory, honor, justice)
  • The bad that creates the danger (difficulty, harm, death)
  • Motion of boldness presupposes motion of hope in the good

Increase of Boldness:

  • When difficulty increases but remains within bounds of hope, boldness increases
  • When danger exceeds hope, boldness does not increase; rather it diminishes
  • Example: A stronger opponent increases boldness if there’s still hope of victory; overwhelming superiority eliminates boldness

Key Arguments #

On Logical Fallacies and Everyday Error #

The Fallacy of Secundum Quid to Simpliciter:

  • Moving from something being good in some limited way (secundum quid) to saying it’s good simply (simpliciter)
  • Example: Poison that tastes good is good in one respect (taste) but bad simply (when considering the whole picture)
  • Example: Not studying is bad in one way (prevents going to party) but good simply (for education)
  • This fallacy occurs constantly in human life, affecting decisions about what to do and what to avoid

De Sophisticis Elenchis Reference:

  • Author disputes authenticity of the work (possibly not Aristotle)
  • De Sophisticis Elenchis states we go from secundum quid to simpliciter
  • Albert the Great notes we usually make this mistake going from secundum quid to simpliciter, but sometimes the reverse

On Directed Inquiry and Knowledge #

Resolving Meno’s Paradox:

  • Meno argues: how can we seek what we don’t know? If not known simply, it can’t even be known in some way.
  • This commits the fallacy of secundum quid to simpliciter in reverse (not known simply → can’t be known in some way)
  • Example: Counting students without knowing the number beforehand
    • I directed myself to the number 23 by counting
    • I could do this because I knew 23 was the number I sought (though not which number that was)
    • I knew I was looking for “the number of students”
    • This general knowledge directed me to the specific unknown
  • Application: Scientists searching for causes (e.g., cancer) can succeed by knowing what they seek generally, even if they don’t know the specific answer

On the Importance of Logic #

Logic’s Paradoxical Difficulty:

  • Thomas Aquinas: Logic has maximum difficultatum (greatest difficulty)
  • Unique exception to rule that easy subjects precede difficult ones
  • Must learn logic early to proceed in all philosophy, yet it’s extremely difficult
  • Deals with non-sensible, non-imaginable things
  • Geometry and natural philosophy seem easier, but logic teaches the way of proceeding

Modern Dismissal of Logic:

  • Modern philosophers claim logic is from “dead white males” and can be bypassed
  • Berquist: This is “shooting themselves in both feet”
  • Modern philosophers rarely discuss logical fallacies
  • Result: Modern philosophy is “one after another” filled with errors of secundum quid to simpliciter
  • Without recognition and experience with these errors, people are “bound to fall into these things”

Important Definitions #

Boldness (Audacia) #

  • Motion of the desiring power toward difficult or dangerous things
  • Based on hope of overcoming the difficulty
  • Distinguished by sudden judgment of the imagination rather than reasoned deliberation
  • Object is composed of both good (what one hopes to achieve) and bad (the difficulty/danger)

Courage/Bravery (Fortitudo) #

  • Motion toward dangerous things based on reason’s deliberation
  • Virtue that moderates boldness through rational consideration
  • Persists through virtue itself, not merely through passion or hope
  • Anticipates difficulties beforehand, so unexpected events don’t overcome it

Subitum Iudicium #

  • Sudden judgment of the sensory knowing power
  • Not collective (non colligativa); doesn’t gather together all relevant considerations
  • Characteristic of how imagination grasps things in the moment

Secundum Quid vs. Simpliciter #

  • Secundum quid: In some respect, in some limited way, under certain conditions
  • Simpliciter: Simply, absolutely, considering the whole picture
  • Error: Treating what is true secundum quid as if it were true simpliciter

Examples & Illustrations #

Logical Fallacy Examples #

Delicious Poison:

  • It tastes good (secundum quid: good in taste)
  • It is bad simply (considering the whole effect)
  • A poison-maker seeks poison that tastes good to ensure consumption

Not Studying:

  • Not studying prevents going to the party (secundum quid: bad because it prevents this good)
  • Studying is necessary for education (simpliciter: good considering the whole)
  • Students avoid study by focusing only on what it prevents

Directed Inquiry Example #

Counting Students:

  • Teacher enters class not knowing how many students are present
  • Through counting, discovers 23 students
  • Could direct herself to 23 without previously knowing “23” because:
    • She knew generally what she sought (“the number of students in class”)
    • This general knowledge guided the specific search (counting)
    • Shows knowledge in some way (secundum quid) directs inquiry toward knowledge simply (simpliciter)

Questions Addressed #

Are the bold more prompt at the beginning or in danger? #

The Paradox: Aristotle says the bold are willing before dangers but fail in dangers themselves.

Resolution:

  • Initial state: Bold may tremble (physiological response) but proceed from hope and sudden sense-judgment
  • In danger: Bold fail because:
    • They encounter unforeseen difficulties not included in their sudden judgment
    • When something unexpected occurs, they panic
  • Brave persist because:
    • They deliberate beforehand about what could happen
    • They don’t experience anything unforeseen; actual events are often less than anticipated
    • They act for virtue itself, which perseveres regardless of difficulties

Why do people make the secundum quid to simpliciter fallacy constantly? #

Answer:

  • People avoid doing what they should because “in some ways it’s bad” (focuses on one limited aspect)
  • People do what they shouldn’t because “in some ways it’s good” (focuses on one limited aspect)
  • Without explicit teaching of logic and recognition of this fallacy, people are bound to repeat it
  • Modern philosophers who dismiss logic make themselves more vulnerable to this error

How can we seek what we don’t know (Meno’s Paradox)? #

Answer:

  • We can have general knowledge of what we seek even if we lack specific knowledge
  • General knowledge directs us toward specific inquiry (e.g., knowing “I seek the number of students” directs counting)
  • This resolves the apparent contradiction
  • Those searching for disease causes, for example, can succeed through inquiry because they know generally what they seek

Notable Quotes #

“Trembling is caused from fear. Fear is contrary to boldness. But the bold are sometimes afraid in the beginning, as the philosopher says.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“The bold are willing before dangers but in the dangers themselves they fail.” — Aristotle (via Berquist, Nicomachean Ethics III)

“Logic has maximum difficultatum. It is the exception to the rule that you study the easy before the difficult. Because you have to learn logic pretty early to proceed well in all the parts of philosophy.” — Thomas Aquinas (via Berquist)

“If I want to poison you, I’d probably try to get a poison that tastes good. And then you say, oh yeah, I want one of these. And that finishes you off.” — Berquist (illustrating secundum quid to simpliciter fallacy)

“Modern philosophers say logic is from dead white males and can be bypassed. But that’s shooting themselves in both feet.” — Berquist (on contemporary dismissal of logic)

“When you go to modern philosophers, that’s where it is, one after another—this kind of mistake.” — Berquist (on prevalence of logical fallacies in modern philosophy)

Connections to Previous Material #

Relationship to Passion Theory:

  • Continues systematic treatment of passions of the irascible power
  • Boldness follows hope; both hope and boldness are discussed as ordered per se/per accidens
  • Anger now introduced as another passion that can provoke boldness

Effects of Fear vs. Boldness:

  • Contrasts with previous lecture on effects of fear (contraction, counsel-taking, trembling, impediment)
  • Boldness also can involve trembling but for different reason (heat withdrawal to interior from external parts)
  • Fear causes heat to descend to lower parts; boldness calls heat back to heart

Virtue and Passion:

  • Introduces distinction between passive emotion (boldness from sudden judgment) and virtuous action (courage from reason)
  • Shows how reason moderates and perfects passions through deliberation