122. Anger as a Special Passion: Nature and Composition

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

Is Anger a Special Passion? #

• Objections: The irascible power encompasses many passions (not just anger); every special passion has a contrary, yet anger seems not to; anger includes other passions (sadness, delight, hope), so it cannot itself be special.
• Thomas’s Resolution: Anger IS a special passion, though confusion arises from two senses of “general”:
  • Universale in predicando (general by predication): Like genus to species; applied universally to all members
  • Universale in causando (general by causation): Like the sun causing all generation; a universal cause of diverse effects
• Anger is general only in the second sense—caused by the concurrence of multiple passions, not a genus containing them.
• The irascible power is named from anger because anger is its most manifest motion, though not every motion of the irascible is anger.

Anger’s Composition from Multiple Passions #

• Anger arises from the coming together (concurrence) of contrary passions:
  • Sadness: Provoked by the injury or insult suffered
  • Hope: Of being able to punish or avenge the wrongdoer
  • Desire: For vindication and revenge
• These components are essential: without hope of punishing, one experiences only sadness and fear, not anger.
• If the offender is vastly superior in power, only sadness and fear remain; anger cannot arise.
• Anger is thus general in a third way: caused from the convergence of diverse causes, analogous to how an individual person is caused from the convergence of paternal and maternal traits.

Why Anger Lacks a Simple Contrary #

• Unlike love (contrary: hate), desire (contrary: aversion), and hope (contrary: despair), anger has no simple contrary.
• Reason: Anger internally contains contraries (hope of good and sadness of evil), similar to middle colors, which are mixtures of simple contraries (black and white, hot and cold).
• Composites of contraries do not have contraries outside themselves.

Anger and the Irascible vs. Concupiscible #

• Distinction by object:
  • Concupiscible: Good and bad absolutely (food, pleasure, pain)
  • Irascible: Good and bad with difficulty or elevation (things hard to attain or overcome)
• Anger requires a certain magnitude: One does not become angry at mosquito bites or trivial offenses.
• Therefore anger belongs to the irascible power, not the concupiscible (contra objections citing Cicero and Augustine).

Anger and Reason #

• Anger is cum ratione (with reason), though not perfectly or as commanded.
• Reason operates in anger through manifestation (showing the injury) rather than command.
• Anger involves a kind of syllogism: “This injury must be opposed; this person has injured me; therefore I must oppose this person.”
• This requires collatio (bringing together, comparison)—a rational act.
• Brute animals have anger-like motions through natural instinct, which is like reason but not deliberative.
• Moderate drunkenness impedes reason but allows imperfect reason to operate, thus intensifying anger; excessive drunkenness impedes reason entirely, preventing anger.

Key Arguments #

Thomas’s Two Senses of “General” #

• Universal by predication: Animal is universal to all animals; genus contains species within itself (per predicationem)
• Universal by causation: The sun causes all generation in lower things; a general commands an army; the sun is not a soldier but universally causes all motion (per causationem)
• Application: Anger is not general by predication (desire ≠ anger; pleasure ≠ anger; fear ≠ anger) but by causation—it is caused by hope, sadness, and desire converging.

Why Hope Is Necessary for Anger #

• The philosopher (Aristotle) teaches that the angry man has the hope of punishing.
• Without this hope, sadness and fear replace anger.
• This reveals hope as more primary than anger; anger is an effect of hope’s presence combined with sadness.

Genus and Species: The Matter-Form Analogy #

• Genus is to species as matter is to form.
• Matter can be formed in different ways; genus can be “formed” by different differences into different species.
• Genus contains many species in ability (in potentia), not in actuality.
• This reflects the passive sense of power/ability (ἐνέργεια/dunamis).

Important Definitions #

Anger (Ira) #

A passion of the irascible appetite involving the desire for revenge against one who has caused injury, composed of sadness at the injury, hope of punishing, and desire for vindication. Requires a certain magnitude in both the injury and the capacity to avenge it.

Universale in Causando #

Something that is “general” or universal by being a cause of many diverse effects. Example: The sun causes all generation in lower things; a general commands and moves an entire army. Contrasts with universale in predicando.

Universale in Predicando #

Something that is “general” or universal by predication—a term said of many. Example: “Animal” is said of all animals; a genus is predicated of all its species.

Collatio #

The bringing together or comparison of things; a rational act essential to anger’s formation. Involves comparing the injury received to the need for punishment or opposition.

Irascible Power (Potentia Irascibilis) #

The appetitive power concerned with goods and bads that present difficulty or elevation. Named from anger because anger is its most manifest passion. Includes: hope, despair, fear, boldness, anger.

Concupiscible Power (Potentia Concupiscibilis) #

The appetitive power concerned with goods and bads absolutely, without regard to difficulty. Includes: love, hate, desire, aversion, pleasure, sadness.

Examples & Illustrations #

Trivial Offenses #

One does not become truly angry at a mosquito bite or very small insults. Anger requires magnitude in the offense—this distinguishes anger from mere annoyance.

Superior Offender #

If someone vastly superior in power harms you, you experience sadness and fear, not anger. You cannot hope to punish them, so anger does not arise. A slave beaten by a master experiences fear and sadness, not anger (cannot retaliate).

Family Resemblance #

Berquist describes how others observe him running like his father, or his sister-in-law noting his brother runs like their father. This illustrates how an individual is caused from the convergence of paternal and maternal traits—just as anger is caused from multiple passions converging.

Political Systems and Anger #

In democracies and republics, citizens can express anger through voting; there is hope of punishing injustice. In totalitarian regimes, citizens cannot hope to punish injustice, so anger is replaced by despair and sadness. Berquist notes the emotional gray character of Soviet experience reflects this absence of hope.

Drunkenness and Anger #

A man drinks wine, becomes bold and angry, ready to fight. Moderate drunkenness expands the heart and causes hope, intensifying anger. Excessive drunkenness impedes reason entirely, preventing anger. This shows that anger requires imperfect reason to operate.

Notable Quotes #

“The irascible power is named from anger, not because every motion of this power is anger, but because to anger are terminated all the motions of this power, and because among other motions of it, it is more manifest.” — Thomas Aquinas

“The man who is angry has the hope of punishing.” — Aristotle, Rhetoric II (cited by Thomas)

“Love is the first root of all the passions.” — Augustine, City of God XIV (cited by Thomas)

Questions Addressed #

Is anger a special passion, or merely a combination of other passions? #

Resolution: Anger IS a special passion. While it is composed of sadness, hope, and desire, it is distinct from each of these. Confusion about whether it is “general” arises from conflating two senses: anger is not general by predication (like a genus), but it is general by causation—caused by the concurrence of multiple passions. Just as the sun is a universal cause of generation without being a genus, anger is a universal result of passion-convergence.

Why does anger uniquely lack a simple contrary? #

Resolution: Anger internally contains contraries (hope of good + sadness of evil), analogous to middle colors (mixtures of simple contraries). Composites containing contraries do not have contraries outside themselves. This distinguishes anger from simpler passions like love (opposed to hate) or hope (opposed to despair).

Is anger in the irascible or concupiscible power? #

Resolution: Anger belongs to the irascible power because it concerns goods and bads with difficulty or elevation, requiring a certain magnitude. The concupiscible concerns goods and bads absolutely. Anger’s very nature—requiring hope of overcoming resistance—places it in the irascible.

Is anger with reason or without it? #

Resolution: Anger is with reason, though imperfectly. Reason operates through manifestation (showing the injury) rather than command. Anger involves a rational comparison or syllogism. Brute animals have anger-like motions through instinct, which is like reason but not deliberative. Drunkenness can intensify anger when reason is impeded but not eliminated.

What is necessary for anger to arise? #

Resolution: Hope is necessary. Without hope of punishing or avenging, sadness and fear remain, but anger does not arise. This shows hope to be a more primary passion than anger; anger is dependent on hope’s presence alongside sadness.

Connections to Broader Themes #

To the Two Distinctions in Logic #

Berquist notes that Thomas’s use of per predicationem vs. per causationem parallels the two fallacies outside speech in logic: the fallacy of accident and the fallacy of simply vs. not simply. These appear repeatedly in philosophy as fundamental types of distinction.

To the Natural Desire to See God #

Berquist illustrates the per se vs. per accidens distinction through the debate about natural desire to see God: one might say (simply) we do not naturally desire to see God (lacking knowledge of what it means), or (not simply) we do naturally desire to know effects and their causes, which would lead to God. The distinction allows apparently contrary texts of Thomas to harmonize.