130. Habit as the First Species of Quality

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Lecture Notes

Main Topics #

• Habit as Quality: Thomas argues that habit is not merely a generic quality but specifically the first species of quality in Aristotle’s fourfold division.
• Equivocation of ‘To Have’: The word ‘habitus’ derives from ‘habere’ (to have), which is used equivocally across multiple categories, creating the initial objection that habit cannot be uniquely a quality.
• Two Senses of Having: Having can mean either (1) possessing something external to oneself (a category in itself), or (2) a thing having itself in relation to its nature—the latter sense makes habit a quality.
• Nature as the Measure: The fundamental principle distinguishing habit from other species of quality is that nature (the form and essence) serves as the end or measure by which something is disposed well or badly.
• The Four Species of Quality: Aristotle’s division includes (1) habit and disposition, (2) natural ability or inability, (3) sensible qualities (undergoing qualities like heat/cold), and (4) figure and form.
• Habit vs. Disposition: Both belong to the first species but differ: disposition is easily lost and imperfect; habit is difficult to change and perfect.

Key Arguments #

Against Habit Being a Quality (Objections) #

• Augustine’s Argument: The name ‘habit’ comes from ’to have,’ which is common to diverse genera—one has quantity, money, exterior things. Therefore, habit cannot be exclusively a quality.
• The Predicament Objection: Habit is itself one of the ten categories (the category of ἔχειν/to have, Latin habitus). Since predicaments are not contained in one another, habit cannot be a species of quality.
• Disposition and Position: Every habit is a disposition, and disposition pertains to the order of parts in place, which belongs to the category of position (σῖτος/situs), not quality.

Thomas’s Resolution to First Objections #

• The word ’to have’ (habere) is equivocal by reason—it has multiple meanings corresponding to different genera.
• Habit understood as external possession (like clothing) relates to the category of ’to have’ as its own predicament.
• Habit understood as the way something has itself in relation to its nature is properly a quality.
• When a thing has itself well or badly disposed toward its nature, this constitutes a quality determination of the subject according to accidental being.
• Therefore, the first objection proceeds from ’to have’ taken in a common way; the second proceeds from ’to have’ as a middle between haver and thing had (the predicament); neither contradicts that habit is a species of quality in the third sense.

Against Habit Being a Determined Species (Second Article Objections) #

• Universality Objection: Disposition (being well or badly disposed) occurs according to every quality—figure, heat, cold, etc.—so habit cannot be a distinct species.
• Aristotle’s Counter-example: Aristotle himself says heat, cold, health, and sickness are dispositions or habits, yet heat and cold belong to the third species of quality (sensible qualities), creating apparent confusion.
• Difference Problem: The alleged distinguishing feature—‘difficult to move’ (difficile mobilis)—pertains to passion and motion, not to the genus of quality itself. A difference must come from the same genus as the genus being differentiated.

Thomas’s Resolution to Second Article #

• Nature as First: Always what is natural is before what is accidental. Nature is what is first to be considered in a thing, and therefore habit, as the first species relating to nature, should be laid down first.
• Proper Understanding of ‘Well or Badly Disposed’: When we say something is well or badly disposed, we necessarily refer to an end. The natural end of a thing is its nature itself.
• How Other Qualities Relate to the First Species: Figure and sensible qualities (heat/cold) are said to dispose a thing well or badly only insofar as they are suitable or unsuitable to the thing’s nature. When considered this way, they pertain to habit/disposition (first species) rather than to figure or sensible quality as such.
• Beauty and Health as Examples: Beauty is figure considered as suitable to the nature of the body; health is heat/cold considered as suitable to the nature of the body. Both are first-species qualities, not merely figure or sensible qualities.
• Distinction Within First Species: The difference ’easily or difficultly moved’ does not diversify habit from other species of quality in general, but rather distinguishes habit from disposition within the first species itself.
• Mode as Determination According to Measure: Quality implies a certain modus (mode, manner, measure) of substance. Just as quantity is distinguished by measure into discrete and continuous, quality is distinguished by its mode of determination. Habit is distinguished by being determined according to the measure of nature as the end.

Important Definitions #

Habitus (Habit) #

• A quality characterized by being disposed well or badly, difficult to change, and stable in relation to the nature of the subject.
• Properly understood: a determination of the subject according to accidental being, measured and ordered by the nature of the thing.
• Exemplified by sciences and virtues in their perfected state.

Dispositio (Disposition) #

• In the broad sense: the genus of habit, implying order toward something.
• In the narrow sense: a quality easily lost, characterized by imperfect possession and transient causes.
• Distinguished from habit by permanence and difficulty of change.

Modus (Mode) #

• A measure, manner, or determination implying order and fitting.
• Quality implies a modus of substance, a determination according to some measure.
• Related to the notion of fitting or suitability (as clothes must fit the body).

Ἔχειν/Habere (To Have) #

• An equivocal term used in multiple ways: (1) possessing external things, (2) relating to the category ’to have,’ (3) a thing having itself in relation to its nature or another.
• When used in the third sense, it grounds the understanding of habit as a quality.

Four Species of Quality (per Aristotle) #

1. Habit and Disposition (ἕξις/habitus): Qualities in relation to nature; well or badly disposed; easily or difficultly changed.
2. Natural Ability or Inability (δύναμις/potentia): Qualities according to what something is in potency; characterized by ease or difficulty of action.
3. Sensible Qualities (ποιότης/qualitas): Qualities in act in the depths (heat, cold, etc.); characterized by ease or difficulty of change.
4. Figure and Form (σχῆμα/figura): Qualities in act on the surface; without motion and without the notion of good and bad.

Examples & Illustrations #

The Clothing Example #

• When one wears a garment long-term, it becomes fitted to one’s body through mutual action and passion.
• The garment is neither merely in the subject as a quality nor external as a relation, but involves a middle term—the habit of wearing.
• Over time, a suit becomes molded to one’s size; a shoe adjusts to one’s foot.
• Brother Richard’s reluctance to part with his worn jacket illustrates how habits become part of one’s life and identity.

Glasses and Watches #

• Wearing glasses long-term creates an indentation on the nose—the object conforms to the body and the body slightly to the object.
• Wearing a watch all day long makes it seem almost part of one’s body, though it is not.
• These examples show how externals can acquire a quasi-essential relation to the subject through prolonged habituation.

Health and Beauty #

• Health is heat and cold (sensible qualities) ordered toward the well-being of the body according to its nature.
• Beauty is figure and form ordered toward the aesthetic perfection of the body according to its nature.
• When considered as suitable to nature, both pertain to the first species (habit/disposition) rather than to sensible quality or figure alone.

Isabella the Rose #

• Berquist’s reference to his granddaughter Isabella Rose illustrates how a proper name can carry metaphorical weight; Shakespeare’s use of the rose as a metaphor for beauty in his sonnets shows beauty as species to the genus of physical qualities.

Notable Quotes #

“Always what is more natural is before.” — Thomas Aquinas (as cited by Berquist)

• This principle establishes why habit, as relating to nature, is the first species of quality.

“Clothes make the man.” — Common saying

• Used by Berquist to explain how external habit can metaphorically represent essential transformation, applied to understanding the Incarnation.

“From furish creatures we desire in Greece, that thereby beauty’s rose might never die.” — Shakespeare (Sonnets)

• Cited to illustrate beauty as a metaphor for how species relates to genus.

“This above all to thine own self be true.” — Shakespeare, Hamlet (Polonius)

• Interpreted by Berquist as an exhortation to be true to one’s nature.

Questions Addressed #

Is Habit Truly a Quality? #

• Question: If the word ‘habit’ derives from ’to have,’ which applies to multiple genera (quantity, relations, external things), how can habit be uniquely a quality?
• Answer: The term ’to have’ is equivocal by reason. When understood specifically as the way a thing has itself in relation to its nature (not as external possession), habit is properly a quality.

Is Habit a Determined Species of Quality? #

• Question: If being ‘well or badly disposed’ applies to all qualities—figure, heat, cold—what makes habit a distinct species?
• Answer: Habit is distinguished as the first species by its essential relation to nature as the end or measure. Nature is what is first in a thing; therefore, habit, which pertains to how something is disposed toward its nature, is the first species.

How Do Heat and Cold Relate to Habit? #

• Question: Aristotle says heat and cold are ‘dispositions’ or ‘habits,’ yet they belong to the third species of quality. Is this contradictory?
• Answer: Heat and cold themselves belong to the third species. However, when considered as suitable or unsuitable to the nature of the body (as in health or sickness), they are understood through the lens of the first species (habit/disposition).

What is the Difference Between ‘Difficile Mobilis’ and Species-Making Differences? #

• Question: Can ‘difficult to move’ serve as the specific difference of habit within the genus of quality?
• Answer: No, because this feature pertains to passion and motion (another genus), and a difference must derive from the same genus as what is being differentiated. However, ‘difficultly moved’ does distinguish habit from disposition within the first species itself.

Why Four Species of Quality Rather Than Two or Three? #

• Question: The human mind more easily grasps divisions into two or three. Why does Aristotle give four species of quality?
• Answer: The four arise from considering the ways determination by mode/measure occurs: (1) in relation to nature, (2) in relation to action/passion (both of which are natural), and (3) in relation to quantity (figure). Some scholars reduce this to three by subdividing.